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INTRODUCTION

Is death a harm? Is the risk of death a harm? These two
questions are fundamental to risk regulation.1 Whether risky
activities ought to be regulated and, if so, how stringently,
largely depends on whether the activities are harmful—
whether they produce welfare setbacks for humans or other
welfare subjects—either because the activities cause some
humans or other welfare subjects to die, or because they impose
the risk of death on welfare subjects, or both.2 Risk regulation
is expensive, in many different ways. It limits the freedom of
action of regulated parties; it imposes compliance costs on these
parties, costs that are spread to consumers, workers,
shareholders, and others engaged in commercial interactions
with the regulatees; it consumes the money and effort of
administrators, legislators, judges, and citizens.3 Surely the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC), and the host of other federal and state
agencies that engage in risk regulation would not be justified in
doing so absent some substantial nexus between risk, death,
and well-being.4 Yet legal scholars and others who write about
risk regulation have largely ignored these two questions.5

1. Throughout this Article, I use the term “risk” to mean a fatality risk.
2. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 204-16 (1999) (arguing for the central role of
overall well-being in determining normatively appropriate regulatory choice).
3. See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 271-78 (1991)
(providing quantitative estimates for the costs and benefits of social
regulation).
4. For an overview of federal risk regulation, see STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
5. Major scholarly works on risk regulation that are general in scope and
normative in focus include BREYER, supra note 4; CARL F. CRANOR,
REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAW
(1993); RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
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Is death a harm? How could it not be? Uncontroversially,
the death of some person can be a harm (welfare setback) for
her friends, family, and others who survive her. The death may
pain them; they may disprefer it; and the death of a friend, or
family member, is plausibly counted as a welfare loss in a more
objective sense, specifically as the ending of a close relationship.
The standard constituents of well-being—pleasure and pain,
preference, objective goods—are all present here.6 But is death
a harm for the person who dies? That is the question I wish to
focus on here and throughout this Article. Common sense
urges an affirmative answer. If death is not a harm for the
person who dies, why do most of us fear our own deaths quite
intensely and take substantial steps to avoid fatal accidents,
mortal illness, or dangerous substances? Yet common sense
may well mislead here. Death itself (by contrast with the
anticipation of death or the process of dying) is not painful for
the person in that state. More generally, death itself (by
contrast with these other states) is not experienced by the
person in that state.7 Events or states can be harmful without
being painful—if, for example, the events or states are
dispreferred or are objectively bad. But can events or states be
harmful to some person without being experienced by her? It is
a widely shared intuition that posthumous events do not harm
the deceased person: Slandering someone, ruining her business,
and destroying her homestead after her death may wrong her
but, intuitively, these are harmless wrongs.8 If this intuition is
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995)
[hereinafter RISK VERSUS RISK]; K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND
RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991);
W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK (1992); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk:
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 261 (1991); Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and
Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad
Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988);
Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495
(1986). None of these works give sustained attention to the questions “Is
death a harm?” and “Is risk a harm?” Cass Sunstein’s very important recent
book on risk regulation (which was published after this Article was drafted)
addresses numerous important questions, but not these. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 36-60 (delineating elements of
welfare).
7. See infra Part II (articulating and analyzing the arguments for the
claim that death is not harmful).
8. See L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 126-27 (1996)
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accepted, it seemingly follows that death itself is also no harm.
Posthumous events are powerless to affect the well-being of the
deceased because they are experientially remote from her.
They cannot alter what she experiences. Since death, too, is
experientially remote in just this way, death is not a harm—or
so a plausible philosophical argument goes.
This argument was first advanced by the Greek
philosopher Epicurus.
Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and
evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience, . . .
Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that,
when we are, death is not come, and when death is come, we are not.
It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the
living it is not and the dead exist no longer.9

Thomas Nagel, in his 1979 article crisply entitled Death,
criticized Epicurus’s argument but did not decisively refute it.10
Rather, Death triggered renewed philosophical interest in the
Epicurean challenge to the common-sense view, and there is
now a substantial philosophical literature devoted to the
question, “Is death a harm?”11 This literature includes spirited
and sophisticated defenses of Epicurus’s view by a number of
academic philosophers.12 Yet legal scholars, policy analysts,
welfare economists, and others who have written normative
scholarship about risk regulation have unwaveringly assumed
The
that death itself is a serious welfare setback.13
philosophical literature just described has been completely
ignored by these other academic disciplines.
Is the risk of death a harm? Does imposing the risk of
death on some person constitute a welfare setback for her,
separate from whatever setback may inhere in death itself?
This issue has received even less scholarly attention than the
issue of death’s harmfulness. Much philosophical work has
been done explicating the nature of risk and probability.14 It
(discussing welfare impact of posthumous events).
9. Stephen E. Rosenbaum, How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of
Epicurus, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 119, 121 (John Martin Fischer ed.,
1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Epicurus’s “Letter to Menoeceus”).
10. Thomas Nagel, Death, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 1 (1979), reprinted in
THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 61.
11. Many of the important papers are collected in THE METAPHYSICS OF
DEATH, supra note 9.
12. See sources cited infra note 110.
13. See, e.g., supra note 5 (citing major normative works on risk
regulation by legal scholars and others).
14. Good overviews of this philosophical work include L. JONATHAN

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

2003]

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

RISK, DEATH AND HARM

1297

turns out that risk is a many-headed monster. There are at
least four standard accounts of what risk consists in (the
frequentist account, the Bayesian account, the classical
account, and the logical account) and numerous nonstandard
accounts as well. The frequentist sees the risk of some event
(for example, a death) as the frequency with which that type of
event occurs in some large class of events (for example, all
cases in which persons are exposed to a given toxic product).15
The Bayesian sees the risk of some event as someone’s degree
of belief that the event will occur; this account is seemingly
more subjective than the frequentist account, because different
persons can have different degrees of belief for the same event,
while the relative frequency of a fatal event in a given reference
class is a fact determined by the laws of physics, chemistry, and
biology.16 Classicists and logicists, unlike Bayesians and
frequentists, believe that risk is a conceptual rather than
empirical matter. What the risk of death is, in a given case,
depends not upon what people happen to believe (as per the
Bayesian account), or what the empirically contingent relative
frequencies happen to be (as per the frequentist account), but
on the conceptual scheme that we use to understand the world
and its future possibilities. Specifically, the risk of a given
death is the ratio of the number of possible futures in which
that death occurs to the number of all possible futures (this is
the classical view), or some variation on that ratio (this is the
logical view).17
Much philosophical work, too, has been devoted to the
nature of well-being.18 Here, as with the nature of risk, there
COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND
PROBABILITY (1989); DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF
PROBABILITY (2000); HENRY E. KYBURG, JR., PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE
LOGIC (1970); STORRS MCCALL, A MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE: SPACE-TIME,
PROBABILITY, AND DECISION 141-47 (1994); ROY WEATHERFORD,
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY THEORY (1982); and Colin
Howson, Theories of Probability, 46 BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 1 (1995).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82 (discussing the frequentist
account of risk).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing the Bayesian
account of risk).
17. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 43-47, 74-80 (discussing the classical
and the logical accounts of risk); GILLIES, supra note 14, at 14-49 (same);
KYBURG, supra note 14, at 29-39, 54-67 (same); WEATHERFORD, supra note 14,
at 18-143 (same). The statement in the text is rough and, as discussed by the
surveys just cited, better describes one well-known variant of the logical
account (Rudolf Carnap’s) than another (John Maynard Keynes’s).
18. Good overviews include JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 7-72 (1986);
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are multiple standard accounts. I have already alluded to
them: the hedonic account, which sees pleasure and pain as the
source of welfare gains or losses; the preferentialist account,
which looks instead to what people prefer or disprefer; and the
objective-good account, which identifies certain “valuable” or
“desirable” activities, occurrences, or states as welfare sources,
independent of whether the activities, occurrences, or states
are pleasurable or preferred.19 Each of the standard accounts
has flaws, ably presented by the philosophical critics of that
account. But this flurry of argument and counterargument has
not led to some grand, scholarly synthesis.
No single,
consensus view of well-being has yet emerged—just as no
single, consensus view of risk has. Instead, philosophical
hedonists continue to defend hedonism, with sophisticated
modifications designed to reduce the critics’ damage, and the
same is true of preferentialism and objectivism.20 For example,
the sophisticated hedonist construes “pleasure” as a desired or
desirable mental state, rather than (more simplistically) a
positive sensation.21 The sophisticated preferentialist looks to
idealized preferences—to what someone would prefer under full
information, say—in addition to, or in lieu of, actual
preferences.22 And the sophisticated objectivist counts pleasure
and preference satisfaction as objective goods in their own
right—as sources, if not the exclusive sources, of well-being.23
Are you confused? You should be. The question “Is risk a
harm?” is intricate and tricky. Answering that question in a
thoughtful and rigorous way means combining the insights of
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493-502 (1984); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT
WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 108-43 (1998); SUMNER, supra note 8, at 45-137
(1996); and Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECON. & PHIL.
51 (1998).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39, 42-43, 48-56 (describing the
hedonic, preferentialist, and objective-good accounts of well-being).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 37-60 (summarizing the debate
about the standard accounts of well-being).
21. See infra text accompanying note 40.
22. See infra text accompanying note 45.
23. Martha Nussbaum’s list of objective goods includes the use of the
“senses, imagination, and thought,” while James Griffin’s includes enjoyment.
See infra text accompanying notes 50-53. Both make clear that these goods
include pleasure and/or the absence of pain. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-79
(2000) (“Senses, [i]magination, and [t]hought” include “[b]eing able to have
pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain.”); JAMES GRIFFIN,
VALUE JUDGEMENT: IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 30 (1996) (stating,
under the rubric of “[e]njoyment,” that “[w]e value pleasures”).
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the two philosophical literatures just summarized. Even if the
classical and logical accounts of risk are rejected, as I believe
they should be,24 we are still left with the multiple possible
permutations between two quite different accounts of risk—
Bayesian and frequentist—and a number of divergent views of
well-being. Hedonism (as an account of well-being) plus
Bayesianism (as an account of risk) may produce a different
view of risk’s harmfulness than hedonism plus frequentism, or
preferentialism plus Bayesianism, or an objective-good view of
welfare plus a frequentist view of risk. The task seems both
demanding and yet also very inviting. Surely there are
nonobvious and philosophically significant truths that will
emerge by permuting accounts of risk with accounts of wellbeing. Surely, too, the question “Is risk a harm?” has much
importance for risk regulation, as I will elaborate in a moment.
Yet this question is largely overlooked—not only by lawyers,
economists, and policy analysts, but also by philosophers.
Neither the philosophical literatures on well-being or risk nor
the legal, economic, and policy-analytic literatures on risk
regulation have considered the harmfulness of risk in a
sustained way.25
I have already stated, emphatically, that the two questions
mooted here—“Is death a harm?” and “Is the risk of death of
harm?”—have much significance for risk regulation. Let me
elaborate. Much modern legislation is targeted at fatal and
probabilistically fatal activities, products, and substances.26 If
neither risk nor death is a harm, the justifiability of these riskregulation statutes is open to serious question. Presumably
they should just be repealed. Perhaps the supporter of
regulation could respond that some of these statutes aim to
diminish not only death and fatality risks, but also ecological
harm or bodily injury. Ecological harm is indeed a distinct type
of welfare setback27 but one that generally has limited
24. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
25. There are a few substantial articles on this issue. See Stephen R.
Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW 321 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?,
151 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); Stephen Fogdall, Risks as Harms
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 4, at 8 (“[R]egulation designed to screen
out risky substances . . . is embodied in many different regulatory programs—
indeed, in at least twenty-six different statutes administered by at least eight
different agencies.”).
27. See, e.g., A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF
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relevance for risk-regulation statutes administered by
nonenvironmental agencies, such as OSHA, the NHTSA, the
FDA, or the CPSC at the federal level. Further, “[t]he primary
benefit of many important environmental statutes, as
determined by the dollar value assigned by cost-benefit
analysis, is the human lives that are saved.”28 Bodily injury
absent death is clearly welfare reducing,29 but what is far from
clear is whether the large economic costs imposed by our
current regime of workplace safety laws, motor vehicle safety
laws, food and drug laws, consumer product safety laws, and
the like would be warranted by a reduction in injury rates,
taken alone.30 A similar response could be made to the
suggestion that these statutes reduce the third-party costs of
death: the pain and misery death causes for the deceased’s
friends and family. At a minimum it seems quite plausible that
the scope and stringency of the current risk-regulation
regime—now thought to be warranted primarily by the
reduction in first-party costs that result from fatalities and
fatality risks—would change dramatically.31
More generally, both the scope and structure of statutes
regulating fatal and probabilistically fatal activities, and the
proper exercise of administrative discretion pursuant to these
statutes, will depend crucially on which box in the matrix below
turns out to be correct.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS (1993)
(discussing valuation of both ecological harm and death).
28. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943 (1999).
29. Cf. VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994)
(discussing valuation of setbacks to bodily integrity resulting both from
disease and from death).
30. Cf. BREYER, supra note 4, at 11-19 (assuming that death is a harm,
but suggesting that substantial changes in regulatory programs would occur if
we properly valued death).
31. Cf. Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s
Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER
RESULTS FROM REGULATION 208, 219 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) [hereinafter
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED] (reviewing environmental, health, and safety
rules issued by OSHA, the EPA, the CPSC, the NHTSA, and the Mine Safety
and Health Administration, and concluding that “[a]bout 60 percent of the
total benefits results from reductions in the risk of death, disease, and
injury”).
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Is the Risk of Death a Harm?
No

Yes

No

Null View

Risk View (Frequentist
and/or Bayesian)

Yes

Death View

Hybrid View (Frequentist
and/or Bayesian)

Is Death
a Harm?

Consider the justifiability of regulatory statutes, and of the
directives issued by regulatory agencies pursuant to these
statutes, with respect to the moral criterion of overall wellbeing.32 The Null View denies that either death itself, or the
risk of death, is a first-party cost for purposes of determining
overall well-being. Various harms and benefits separate from
fatalities (including ecological harms and bodily injury harms),
plus third-party harms resulting from fatalities, are relevant,
but the first-party effects of death or the risk of death have zero
relevance for the welfare calculus. The Death View changes
this picture by giving weight to the first-party effects of death.
Since the first-party cost of a single death is now appraised by
regulators as somewhere in the vicinity of $6 million,33 the
practical significance of moving from the Null View to the
Death View is huge. The Risk View omits the $6 million per
death first-party cost from the calculus of overall well-being,
but adds in a (presumably much smaller) cost for each person
at risk, in the appropriate sense, of dying. Finally, the Hybrid
View stipulates both that death is a harm and that risk is an
independent harm.
Any regulatory option that involves
fatalities and fatality risks is attributed a $6 million cost for
each fatality, plus a separate cost for each person at risk (in the
appropriate sense) of dying.34

32. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 209-16, 225-38 (defending the
moral relevance of overall well-being, and conceptualizing cost-benefit analysis
as a good if not perfect proxy for overall well-being).
33. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, If It Exists, It’s Getting
Bigger: Revising the Value of a Statistical Life 1-2 (Global Dev. & Env’t Inst.,
Working Paper No. 01-06, Oct. 2001), http://www.ecologicaleconomics.org/
documents/valueoflife.pdf.
34. Strictly, this is not correct, since the “value of statistical life” (VOSL)
method used to calculate the current $6 million valuation of death is
inconsistent with the “Bayesian” type of Hybrid View I argue for in this
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In this Article, I defend a Hybrid View of risk regulation.
More precisely, I defend a Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk
regulation. First, I argue against Epicurus and the modern
philosophical Epicureans and contend that death is indeed a
welfare setback for the person who dies. Second, I consider the
two main viable accounts of risk, frequentist and Bayesian, and
argue that risk in the Bayesian sense is indeed a harm for the
person at risk, but that risk in the frequentist sense is not.
Death and Bayesian risk should be counted as real costs and as
separate costs in the regulatory calculus of overall well-being.
By contrast, a high level of frequentist risk is not a welfare cost
and is irrelevant to policy formulation insofar as policies are
shaped by the aggregate-welfare criterion. More generally,
death and Bayesian risk (but not frequentist risk) should be
counted as separate types of welfare setbacks with respect to
every moral criterion that incorporates welfare considerations.
For example, if regulatory agencies are properly attentive to
the “distributive impacts” of their decisions35—to the effects of
regulation on the distribution of well-being across the
population—both death and the Bayesian risk of death should
figure separately in the distributive analysis. Someone who
dies, and was previously at Bayesian risk of dying, fares worse
(ceteris paribus) than someone who was put at Bayesian risk
but survives, and this survivor in turn fares worse (ceteris
paribus) than someone who neither dies nor was put at
Bayesian risk of dying. However, the fact that some person or
group is exposed to a high relative frequency of premature
death has no bearing on distributive justice.
This Article has five parts. Part I clarifies the concepts of
risk and well-being. Part II considers whether death is a harm.
Parts III and IV consider whether risk is a harm, in first the
frequentist and then the Bayesian sense. The upshot of the
analysis set forth in Parts II, III, and IV is the Hybrid
(Bayesian) View of risk just described: Death is a harm, risk in
the Bayesian sense is a harm, but risk in the frequentist sense
is not. Finally, Part V surveys the large legal implications of
this account. As I demonstrate in Part V, the issues mooted

Article. See infra text accompanying notes 302-05 (criticizing the VOSL
method). Still, the $6 million figure may be approximately correct, see id., and
in any event nothing in my Hybrid (Bayesian) View suggests that the correct
monetary valuation of death is insubstantial.
35. See infra Part V.D. (discussing the role of distributive considerations
within risk regulation).
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here have very substantial implications for a range of
regulatory institutions and practices: cost-benefit analysis, both
monetized and nonmonetized; risk-risk analysis; the proper
interpretation of the safety “thresholds” that statutes
governing risk regulation commonly create; distributive
assessment pursuant to “environmental justice” mandates;
comparative risk assessment; and tort and criminal law.
I. CONCEPTUAL PRELIMINARIES: THE NATURE OF
WELL-BEING AND RISK
A. WELL-BEING
What is well-being or, synonymously, welfare?
Traditionally, philosophers have offered three kinds of answers
to this question: a hedonic answer, a preferentialist answer, and
an objectivist answer.36
The hedonic account of welfare, in the simple version of
this account exemplified by the work of Jeremy Bentham,37
states that welfare consists in pleasure and the avoidance of
pain, with “pleasure” understood as a positive feeling or
sensation experienced by a conscious subject and about whose
existence and sensational qualities the subject is infallible.
“Pain” is understood similarly, except that the feeling or
sensation is negative.38 Simple hedonism is vulnerable to the
following type of counterexample: “At the very end of his life,
Freud, ill and in pain, refused drugs except aspirin. ‘I prefer,’
he said, ‘to think in torment than not to be able to think
Freud seems to have benefited, all things
clearly.’”39
considered, from a mental life that was, all things considered,
more painful in the Benthamite sense—more painful in how it
felt, in the sensations that it contained.
The Freud example suggests a more sophisticated brand of
hedonism: define welfare-enhancing mental states as more
valuable (or as desired) mental states rather than as more
pleasurable mental states. Indeed, John Stuart Mill and
36. For good overviews of the philosophical literature on well-being, see
sources cited supra note 18.
37. See SUMNER, supra note 8, at 87-89 (describing Bentham’s version of
hedonism).
38. See id. at 83-92.
39. GRIFFIN, supra note 18, at 8 (citing ERNEST JONES, THE LIFE AND
WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD, 655-56); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Well-Being
and Value, 4 UTILITAS 1, 6-11 (1992) (further discussing Griffin’s example).
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another famous hedonist, Henry Sidgwick, modified
Benthamite hedonism in just this way.40 But now a different
challenge to hedonism arises: Welfare cannot be reduced to
mental states, however defined.
Hedonists, simple or
sophisticated, are committed to the thesis that welfare
supervenes on mental states: Two outcomes in which a given
person has the same mental states must be the same for his
welfare.
Here is one plausible counterexample to the
supervenience thesis: If Joan prefers that her husband remain
faithful to her, then she is worse off if he betrays her, even if
the treachery never comes to her attention and her beliefs,
feelings, and other mental states are no different from what
they would have been had her husband remained faithful.41
The
preferentialist
account
of
welfare
allows
nonexperiential features of outcomes to come into play.42 In its
simplest version, the preferentialist account says that a person
is benefitted by one outcome, relative to a second, if she prefers
the first to the second.43 Note that a person can prefer one
outcome to another even though her mental states are just the
same in both outcomes. For example, Joan can prefer that her
husband remain faithful and that she (correctly) believe him to
be so, as against her husband betraying her and her
(incorrectly) believing him to be faithful.
Simple
preferentialism, unlike hedonism, cannot be criticized for tying
well-being too tightly to our experiences. But it can be
criticized on other grounds.44 First, a person can prefer an
40. See SUMNER, supra note 8, at 90-91 (describing Mill’s and Sidgwick’s
versions of hedonism).
41. For a famous critique of the supervenience thesis, see ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974).
42. For general discussions of preference-based or, equivalently, desirebased theories of well-being, see, for example, GRIFFIN, supra note 18, at 1039; PARFIT, supra note 18, at 494-99; SCANLON, supra note 18, at 113-23;
SUMNER, supra note 8, at 113-37; and Qizilbash, supra note 18, at 58-63. On
the nature of a “preference,” see, for example, S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL
REASONS 55-83 (1989); Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive
Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158,
161-64 (1990); Arthur Ripstein, Preference, in VALUE, WELFARE, AND
MORALITY 93, 93-111 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1993); and the
papers in PREFERENCES (Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels eds., 1998).
43. See, e.g., Mark C. Murphy, The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory, 33
NOUS 247, 269 (1999) (providing a qualified defense of the “simple desirefulfillment theory” of well-being).
44. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 71-83 (1996); SCANLON, supra note 18, at
113-23; SUMNER, supra note 8, at 113-37; Tyler Cowen, The Scope and Limits
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outcome that is, intuitively, bad—not just morally bad, but bad
for her, or at least no better. Assume that I am a sadist and
prefer to torture Phil. The world in which I am allowed to
satisfy this preference is, of course, worse for Phil, but it also
seems worse or at least no better for me. Second, a person can
prefer an outcome that is, intuitively, unrelated to her own life.
If I have a conversation with a stranger on a train, learn of
various projects in which he is engaged, develop a mild
preference that the projects succeed, and never see the stranger
again, then the projects’ success does not benefit me even
though this is the outcome I prefer.
Third, simple
preferentialism seems to “overcorrect” the error in hedonism.
While hedonism binds welfare too tightly to mental states,
preferentialism arguably makes the link too loose.
Preferentialism, in its simple version, does not limit the
features of outcomes that can ground preferences and thereby
welfare differentials. Thus it allows that an outcome can
benefit some person, relative to some alternative, even though
the only difference between the outcomes is something quite
remote from the person’s experience—at the limit, something
which it would be impossible for that person to experience, as
in the case of dispreferred posthumous events, which according
to simple preferentialism are welfare setbacks for the deceased.
The first of these criticisms might be met by idealizing
preferences, in some way. Indeed, many preferentialists now
stipulate that the preferences which ground welfare must be
“fully informed.”45 Satisfying my desire to torture Phil does not
benefit me because that desire is nonideal. If I were to reflect,
with full information and due deliberation, on what torturing
Phil involved for him and for me, I would not desire it.
However, the move to “fully informed” preferences does nothing
to address the second and third just-listed criticisms,46 and it
arguably fails to answer the first criticism as well. The reason
that torturing Phil is bad or at least no better for me is that
of Preference Sovereignty, 9 ECON. & PHIL. 253 (1993).
45. See Don Loeb, Full-Information Theories of Individual Good, 21 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1995) (surveying full-information accounts of well-being
and presenting criticisms); Connie S. Rosati, Persons, Perspectives, and Full
Information Accounts of the Good, 105 ETHICS 296, 296-99 (1995) (same);
David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104 ETHICS 784, 790-96
(1994) (same).
46. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 18, at 115 (“The objects of a person’s
informed desires are likely to include many things that are not related to the
quality of the desirer’s own life, intuitively understood.”).

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1306

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

this activity lacks value; it is undesirable. We have a sense of
what a good human life consists in, reflected in (or constituted
by) the evaluative concepts with which we perceive and
describe human activity: concepts like “accomplishment,”
“friendship,” “leadership,” “participation,” “intimacy,” “love,”
and so on. With full information, I would disprefer torturing
Phil because I would bring these evaluative concepts into play
and come to recognize that sadistic pleasure makes no positive
contribution to my life. To say that some outcome improves my
welfare if I would prefer it under full information gets things
backwards. Rather, it improves my welfare if it is desirable or
preferable—worthy of desire or preference.47
We have now moved to the third type of welfare account
typically advanced within the philosophical literature: an
objective-good account. Objectivism about welfare goes back to
Aristotle48 and, more recently, has been defended by John
Finnis, Martha Nussbaum, George Sher, and other
Objectivists are typically
distinguished philosophers.49
pluralists; they typically offer a list of “values” or “goods” that
represent different dimensions of human welfare, different
ways in which a human life can go well or badly. For example,
Finnis claims that these goods are life itself, knowledge, play,
aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and
religion.50 Nussbaum’s list includes: life, bodily health, bodily
integrity, the uses of the “senses, imagination and thought,” the
emotions, practical reason, affiliation, interaction with other
species, play, and control over one’s environment.51 Derek
Parfit, describing (without endorsing) objectivism, writes that
“[t]he good things might include moral goodness, rational
47. See, e.g., id. at 119. Scanlon states,
It may be true that something contributes to one’s well-being only if
one has reason to desire it. But even when this is so, what makes this
thing good will not be the fact that it would satisfy that hypothetical
desire but rather those considerations, whatever they may be, that
provide reasons for desiring it.
Id.
48. See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 8, at 69-72 (summarizing Aristotle’s
view of well-being).
49. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59-99 (1980);
THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 9-143 (1993); NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at
34-110; GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS
199-244 (1997). James Griffin’s most recent work on well-being has a
decidedly objectivist flavor. See GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 19-36.
50. See FINNIS, supra note 49, at 85-90.
51. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 78-80.
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activity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and
being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true
beauty.”52 James Griffin lists accomplishment, autonomy,
understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relations.53 In
short, there is substantial disagreement within the objectivist
camp as to the content of the canonical list of goods or values,
and there is also substantial disagreement as to the basis for
that list. Some objectivists argue that human values or goods
are grounded in the human essence—in the properties, such as
a capacity for rational belief and action, that a being
necessarily possesses if she is human.54 A different proposal is
that “what unifies the diverse elements of a good life is their
connection(s) to near-universal, near-unavoidable goals.”55
This, in turn, differs from an objectivist view that places more
emphasis on culture and language: humans, living together,
develop shared understandings of what valuable and worthless
lives consist in.56 Despite these differences, objectivists all
concur in the claim that welfare depends upon some set of
objective goods or values: objective in that what is truly good or
valuable for a given person can differ from what she believes to
be good or valuable, or what she prefers.
Objectivism, in theory, can remedy the various deficits in
preferentialism mentioned above. It will circumscribe the
features of outcomes that count as good or bad, welfareenhancing or -reducing, for a given person. Features that are
undesirable in any life (sadistic pleasures), or unconnected to a
given person’s life (the stranger on the train), or too
experientially remote (posthumous events), will be ruled out.
And objectivism, unlike hedonism, is not committed to the view
that experience is all that matters for our welfare.
Notwithstanding these attractions, objectivism has hardly
defeated preferentialism or hedonism within the philosophical
literature on well-being. Why not? To begin, it seems
implausible that a person can be benefited by some outcome
which she never prefers or comes to prefer.57 Opera might be
better than sitcoms, but if I like and continue to like sitcoms,
my watching opera instead of sitcoms does not benefit me. A
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499.
GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 29-30.
See HURKA, supra note 49, at 9-51.
SHER, supra note 49, at 229.
See Qizilbash, supra note 18, at 63 (discussing Griffin’s objectivism).
See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 200-02.
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possible response is to develop a mixed theory of well-being
which states: an outcome benefits some person if and only if it
is both (1) good for him and (2) preferred by him.58 But this
mixed theory will be unpersuasive to some preferentialists, who
will insist that “goodness” or “value” is irrelevant to welfare
and should be abandoned in favor of the concept of “fully
informed” (or otherwise idealized) preferences.
As for the continued appeal of hedonism, some
philosophers continue to find compelling the thought that
welfare does supervene on our experience.59 Consider the
concepts of happiness, welfare, and value. Happiness, most
would agree, supervenes on experience; value, most would
agree, does not.60 Is welfare nearly the same as happiness, or
is it nearly the same as value? Because answers to this
question differ, it is not surprising that reactions to the
supervenience thesis also do.
In short, the philosophical literature has failed to coalesce
around a particular account of well-being, and indeed there is
persisting and deep-rooted scholarly disagreement about which
general type of account (hedonic, preferentialist, or objectivist)
is correct. Given this disagreement, how should we analyze the
two issues at the heart of risk regulation, namely, “Is death a
harm?” and “Is risk a harm?” Rather than grounding the
analysis on a particular welfare view, which would render the
analysis unpersuasive to those who reject the view, or
considering the two issues in light of all possible welfare
views—an impossibly large task—my approach will be as
follows. I will consider how the main plausible elements of a
welfare account, those that have received substantial and
continuing support within the philosophical literature, bear
upon the harmfulness of risk and death. I take the “main
plausible elements of a welfare account” to be the following:

58. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist
Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 265 (2000).
59. For a recent defense of experientialism about welfare, see Mark
Bernstein, Well-Being, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 39 (1998). See also Goldsworthy, supra
note 39, at 3, 6-20 (presenting a qualified defense, which does not choose
conclusively between hedonism and the “non-cognitivist” position that wellbeing is not a factual matter); Matthew Silverstein, In Defense of Happiness: A
Response to the Experience Machine, 26 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 279 (2000)
(contending that Nozick’s experience-machine example fails to refute
hedonism about well-being); id. at 281 n.7 (citing scholarly defenses of
hedonism).
60. On the concept of happiness, see SUMNER, supra note 8, at 140-47.
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Experience, Preference, Value, and Integration.
Experience: As we have seen, hedonists insist that welfare
supervenes on experience: A given person cannot fare better in
one outcome than another unless his experience or mental
states are different in the two outcomes. Experience might be
incorporated into welfare accounts in weaker or, for that
matter, more robust ways than through a supervenience
requirement.
The basic thought behind any experience
requirement is that welfare concerns how well a person’s life
goes, and the “boundary” of her life—the distinction between
those states, events, etc., sufficiently linked to her to affect her
welfare, and those that are too remote—is best delineated in
terms of her experience.
Preference: Here, as with experience, there are many
ways to incorporate the general concept of “preference” into a
welfare account. The preferences highlighted by a given
welfare account might be prospective or retrospective, more or
less tightly connected to cognitions, more or less tightly
connected to choice, and so forth. The basic function of
preferences, within a welfare account, is to provide a ranking of
outcomes from the subject’s point of view. The thought here is
that welfare concerns how well a person’s life goes for her—and
thus that an outcome cannot benefit a person unless she herself
favors that outcome (at some level).
Value: What is valuable, i.e., what goes on the list of
objective goods or values? What makes something valuable: its
connection to human perfection, to unavoidable human goals,
to our shared sense of a valuable life, or something else? As
already noted, these questions remain the subject of ongoing
debate among objectivists. Still, there is a common idea that
motivates the inclusion of objective goods or values within a
welfare account: Since welfare concerns how well a person’s life
goes (or goes for her), an outcome that is less valuable for some
person cannot be better for that person’s welfare.
Integration: Welfare changes are, intuitively, changes in
the subject’s life. They are not remote changes in the world
that she (or someone else) prefers or that are good in a general
sense. Call this “integration”: a welfare account will typically
try to delineate the boundary between the subject’s life and the
outside, and to ensure that welfare changes occur within the
boundary. This boundary might be delineated with the help of
an experience requirement, or a list of objective goods (chosen
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to be sufficiently “personal” to the subject), but it need not be.61
The Integration component of welfare does not necessarily
reduce to Experience or Value.
Experience, Preference, Value, and Integration, or some
subset of these, will be the central constituents of any colorable
welfare view. They will therefore be central to my analysis of
the harmfulness of risk and death.
B. RISK
At the threshold, let me distinguish between probabilistic
Probabilistic
and nonprobabilistic conceptions of risk.62
conceptions are dominant within economics,63 philosophy,64 and
within the more technical literature on risk assessment,65 and
if not dominant are certainly very important within scholarship
on risk regulation.66 On the probabilistic view, the magnitude
of the risk of some given adverse outcome equals the
probability of the outcome. Probabilists will say that Jim is
subject to a higher risk of death in one scenario, as opposed to a
61. Many within the preferentialist tradition have suggested that the
category of welfare-relevant preferences needs to be “restricted” in some way—
so that, for example, the satisfaction of someone’s moral preferences doesn’t
count as enhancing her welfare. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 199-200
& n.93 (citing sources). Mark Carl Overvold has done the most sustained
philosophical work in developing a theory that is preferentialist, not hedonic
or objectivist, but distinguishes between welfare-relevant and welfareirrelevant preferences. See Mark Carl Overvold, Morality, Self-Interest, and
Reasons for Being Moral, 44 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 493, 499-501
(1984); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and Getting What You Want, in THE
LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 186 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams eds.,
1982); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-Sacrifice, 10
CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 114-17 (1980) [hereinafter Overvold, Self-Interest]; see also
David Sobel, Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration, 14 ECON. &
PHIL. 249, 266-69 (1998) (criticizing Overvold’s account).
62. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1071-85 (1990) (distinguishing between “expert” and
“lay,” i.e., probabilistic and nonprobabilistic, conceptions of risk); Ortwin
Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 53, 5872 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (surveying the
conceptions of risk adopted by scientists, economists, psychologists, and
sociologists); Paul B. Thompson & Wesley Dean, Competing Conceptions of
Risk, 7 RISK 361, 367-71 (1996) (distinguishing between “probabilist” and
“contextualist” conceptions of risk).
63. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 19-20 (1992).
64. See, e.g., David McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107
ETHICS 205, 210-11 (1997); Perry, supra note 25, at 322.
65. See Renn, supra note 62, at 58-61.
66. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 4, at 3-6.
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second scenario, just in case his probability of death in the first
scenario is greater. A nonprobabilistic conception of risk makes
the risk level depend, in part, on factors other than the
probability of the adverse outcome at issue—such as whether
the relevant persons have voluntarily chosen to take a chance
of incurring that outcome; whether the outcome is particularly
“dreaded” or feared by them; and whether the outcome, and the
causal mechanisms leading to it, are well or poorly understood
by these persons.67 Nonprobabilists need not say that Jim’s
risk of death is higher in the scenario where his probability of
death is higher. For example, the risk of Jim’s death created by
his 1 in 10,000 probability of dying from radiation leakage from
the nearby nuclear plant might be higher than the risk of his
death created by a 1 in 5,000 probability of dying in a car
accident that results from his own negligence. Nonprobabilistic
conceptions of risk have been influential within the
experimental psychology68 and sociological literatures on risk
and risk perception,69 and have also played some role in
scholarship about risk regulation.70
This Article focuses on the probabilistic conception of the
“risk” of death. Although the analysis presented will have
important implications for nonprobabilistic accounts of risk, it
is beyond the scope of the Article to delineate those
implications in detail.
The probabilist equates “risk of death” with “probability of
death.” This equation immediately leads us to ask: What is
probability? There are four standard theories of probability.
This Article focuses on two (the Bayesian and frequentist

67. See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, at xxi-xxxvii (2000)
(surveying Slovic’s scholarship, which advances a nonprobabilistic conception
of risk).
68. See id.; SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 138-40 (1993).
69. See Roger E. Kasperson, The Social Amplification of Risk: Progress in
Developing an Integrative Framework, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK, supra
note 62, at 153-78 (reviewing part of the sociological literature on risk); Ingar
Palmlund, Social Drama and Risk Evaluation, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK,
supra note 62, at 197-212 (same); Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk
Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK, supra note 62, at 83-115 (same);
Ortwin Renn, The Social Arena Concept of Risk Debates, in SOCIAL THEORIES
OF RISK, supra note 62, at 179-96 (same).
70. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
101, 122-29 (suggesting that some but not all of the factors that underlie
nonprobabilistic, lay judgments of risk should be given weight in risk
regulation independent of the criterion of “decently-livable life-years”).
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theories) and ignores the other two (the classical and logical
theories).71 All four theories agree on the following points.
Probabilities are numbers that can be attached to propositions,
or to certain types of propositions. Probabilities are real
numbers between zero and one. Probabilities obey a set of
mathematical rules known as the “probability calculus.”72 Take
p(S) to be the probability of proposition S. Then, for example,
the probability calculus states that
— p(S) = 1 - p(not S)
— p(S or T) = p(S) + p(T) - p(S and T)
— p(S/R), the so-called “conditional probability” of S given
R, equals p(S and R)/p(R)
— If p(S/R) = p(S), i.e., if S and R are “independent,”
p(S and R) = p(S)*p(R)
The Bayesian theory sees the probability of a proposition
as someone’s “degree of belief” in that proposition. The
probability that “The President of the United States had an
intimate relationship with Monica Lewinsky,” for Fran, is
Fran’s degree of belief that the President had such a
relationship. If Fran’s degree of belief in that proposition is 1/3,
then according to the Bayesian theory her degree of belief in its
negation is 2/3, and her degree of belief in the proposition “the
President of the United States either had or did not have an
intimate relationship with Monica Lewinsky” is 1. In effect,
probabilities for the Bayesian are a numerical measure of a
given person’s certainty or confidence in various propositions.73
How, precisely, are degrees of belief assigned to
propositions?
Different Bayesian theories give different
answers to this question. A person might have primitive
judgments of the likelihood of various propositions, which

71. For good overviews of the scholarship on the nature of probability, see
sources cited supra note 14.
72. For introductions to the probability calculus, see IAN HACKING, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 23-78 (2001); MICHAEL
D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 45-80 (1987);
BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE AND CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC
130-59 (2d ed. 1975).
73. For overviews of Bayesian theories of probability, see COHEN, supra
note 14, at 58-70; GILLIES, supra note 14, at 50-87; COLIN HOWSON & PETER
URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING: THE BAYESIAN APPROACH 75-97 (2d ed.
1993); KYBURG, supra note 14, at 68-76; WEATHERFORD, supra note 14, at 21942; and Howson, supra note 14, at 2-13. An important, recent collection of
essays exploring the Bayesian view is SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY (George
Wright & Peter Ayton eds., 1994).
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under certain conditions can be represented numerically.74
Alternatively, her degree of belief in a proposition might track
the odds at which she is willing to make a small monetary bet
for or against that proposition;75 or, it might be a number which
we can derive once we know the “utility” she attaches to
different outcomes and choices, since the utility for Fran of a
choice depends on the utility of the various outcomes that
might result from the choice, plus her beliefs about the relative
likelihood of these various outcomes.76
The frequentist account of probability looks not to the
beliefs of actual or hypothetical persons, but rather to the
frequency with which objects possess a certain property. The
basic idea behind the frequentist account is as follows: Start
with a collection or “reference class” of objects. This might be a
class of persons (“All men over the age of thirty”), or it might be
a class of events, which are a kind of object (“All firings of a
revolver,” “All releases of radiation from a water-cooled nuclear
plant”), or it might be a class containing some other kind of
object. Then we can define the probability that an object in the
reference class has the property as the proportion of objects in
the reference class with that property. For example, the
probability that a man over the age of thirty is bald equals the
proportion of men over the age of thirty (the reference class of
persons) with the property of baldness. The probability that a
release of radiation from a water-cooled nuclear plant exceeds
100 curies is the proportion of radiation releases from watercooled nuclear plants (the reference class of events) with the
property of exceeding 100 curies.
The frequentist account of probability was first rigorously
developed some seventy years ago by the statistician Richard
von Mises.77 Von Mises’s version of frequentism focuses
74. See, e.g., SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY:
THE MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALITY 222-32 (1988).

AN INTRODUCTION TO

75. The pioneer of this approach is de Finetti. See Bruno de Finetti,
Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources, in STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE
PROBABILITY 53, 93 (Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. & Howard E. Smokler eds., 1964).
76. The classic Bayesian works that develop probability and utility
measures in tandem are RICHARD C. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION 59-163
(2d ed. 1983); LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 6-104
(Dover 1972) (1954); and Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Truth and Probability, in
STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY, supra note 75, at 63. An excellent,
philosophically sophisticated survey of these works and expected utility theory
more generally is ELLERY EELLS, RATIONAL DECISION AND CAUSALITY 65-86
(1982).
77. See RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 1-65
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specifically on events, rather than other kinds of objects, and
requires that the reference class of these events be infinite and
have certain other characteristics—it must be sequentially
ordered and it must be “random.” Von Mises then, famously,
defines probability as the limit of the relative frequency of an
attribute with respect to a random, sequentially ordered,
infinite reference class of events.78 But no reference class of
actual events—events that have actually occurred in this
world—is infinite. Von Mises’s infinite reference class is, thus,
best understood as an abstract, mathematical entity that (in
some sense) constitutes a good theoretical representation of a
class of actual events. Other frequentists have dispensed with
the requirement of an infinite reference class, and instead
define probability as the relative frequency of an attribute in a
sufficiently large and temporally sequenced class of actual
events.79 Still others look to large or infinite classes of
hypothetical events: events that would occur were a certain
kind of experiment to be repeated over and over again.80 In
short, there are important differences of detail between
frequentist views of probability. All such views, however, share
the following characteristics. Probability is defined relative to a
reference class of (actual, hypothetical, or mathematical)
objects, such as events. This reference class must be general; it
must be infinite or at least very large. The attribute in
question must also be general; it must be the kind of attribute
that many things, or at least more than one thing, could
possess.
Because it is structured around general reference classes,
general attributes, and relative frequencies, the frequentist
account is unable to attach a probability number to so-called
“singular” propositions absent some restructuring of such
propositions in general terms.81 A singular proposition is one
that predicates some attribute of a particular person, event or
other object: for example, “The card face down is a spade” or
(2d rev. ed. 1957).
78. See id. at 28-29.
79. For good discussions of von Mises’s view and the variations advanced
by other frequentists, in particular Hans Reichenbach, see GILLIES, supra note
14, at 88-112; KYBURG, supra note 14, at 40-53; and WEATHERFORD, supra
note 14, at 144-218. Reichenbach’s account is presented in THE THEORY OF
PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1949), particularly at 337-83.
80. See Karl R. Popper, The Propensity Interpretation of Probability, 10
BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 25, 37-38 (1960).
81. See, e.g., GILLIES, supra note 14, at 119-25.
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“John will die of cancer” or “Bush will win the next Presidential
election.”
The frequentist account directly attaches a
probability number only to a proposition that (1) describes a
suitably general reference class of objects (i.e., an infinite or
very large class, depending on the theory), and (2) predicates a
suitably general attribute of objects within the class—for
example, “a man over the age of seventy is infertile.” The
frequentist probability of that proposition is q, where q is the
proportion of infertile men within the large or infinite class of
men over seventy. But a singular proposition cannot (without
reinterpretation) be assigned a relative frequency, since the
reference class here has only one member, the particular object,
which either has the attribute in question or lacks it. This
feature of the frequentist account will be very important when
we consider whether risk (in the frequentist sense) is indeed
harmful.82
Neither the frequentist account nor the Bayesian account
is a perfectly satisfying account of probability. Intuitively,
probability is both physical (not mind dependent) and
predicable of individuals (not merely of classes).
The
probability of “this rat dying from a 10-centigray dose of
radiation” seems to be a hard, physical number, like the pH of
the rat’s blood, the weight of its body, or the amount of
radiation released. It also seems to be a number which
attaches to this particular exposure and this particular rat, like
the pH, weight, and amount of radiation. However, no rigorous
account of probability that satisfies both these intuitive
desiderata has yet been developed. The frequentist theory is
mind independent—the frequency with which some attribute
occurs in a reference class is a purely physical fact—but
essentially links probability to classes, not individuals. The
Bayesian theory has no trouble with individualized probability
ascriptions—it is perfectly intelligible to speak of some person’s
degree of belief that this particular rat has a given attribute—
but reduces all probabilities to what actual or hypothetical
persons would believe. In short, neither theory dominates the
other, and I will therefore consider both the Bayesian and the
frequentist theories of probability in analyzing whether risk is
harmful.
The classical and logical accounts of probability are not

82. See infra text accompanying notes 151-59.
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considered here.83 Both accounts insist that the probability of a
proposition is established a priori—that a given proposition has
one and the same probability in all possible worlds. But this
seems wildly implausible, at least for the conception of
probability relevant to risk regulation. Surely the probability
that Jim’s exposure to a particular dose of radiation will cause
his premature death depends at least in part upon the
empirical correlation between such exposures and death (on the
frequentist view), or on someone’s beliefs about that correlation
(on the Bayesian view), or on some other, empirically
contingent features of the world in which the exposure occurs.
For this reason, and for others explained in the margin,84 we
can safely ignore the classical and logical construals of the
probability of death and focus our attention on the Bayesian
and frequentist construals.
C. CONSEQUENTIALISM, RISK, AND THE EX ANTE/EX POST
DISTINCTION
As will become clear, the analysis of the questions “Is
death a harm?” and “Is risk a harm?” offered in this Article is
consequentialist in its presuppositions. In Part II, I ask
whether two outcomes or “possible worlds” differentiated by the
fact that some person (P) dies earlier in one outcome than the
other are different for P’s well-being.85 In Parts III and IV, I
ask a similar question for pairs of outcomes differentiated by
the existence of a risk of death for P, in either the frequentist or
the Bayesian sense of risk.86
What justifies this consequentialist approach? I believe,
and have argued elsewhere, that the moral criteria bearing on
regulatory choices include at least some consequentialist
criteria.87 A criterion (C) is consequentialist if the right thing
for the agent to do, in a choice situation, in light of C is to
promote the occurrence of good outcomes—where the goodness
83. See sources cited supra note 14 (discussing classical and logical
accounts).
84. The so-called Principle of Indifference, which assigns equal
probabilities to equally possible cases, and which is central to the classical
account, generates paradoxes that afflict that account and perhaps the logical
account as well. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 43 (presenting the principle of
indifference); GILLIES, supra note 14, at 37-49 (discussing the paradoxes).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 101-09.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
87. See Adler, supra note 58, at 302-13 (arguing for moral relevance of
overall well-being); Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 209-16 (same).
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of outcomes is specified in a suitably impartial (technically,
“agent neutral”) way.88 Consequentialist criteria are not
necessarily welfarist in focus. For example, a criterion that
ranks outcomes in light of the ecological complexity of the
outcomes, or their aesthetic value, may give a higher ranking to
outcomes that are worse with respect to overall well-being, the
equal distribution of well-being, or some other welfare-focused
measure.89 Still, there is at least one, morally weighty
consequentialist criterion that (1) does in fact bear upon
regulatory choice, or so I have argued; and (2) is welfarist in
structure, indeed welfarist in the strong sense that outcomes
differing in light of the criterion must differ for someone’s
welfare. This is the criterion of overall welfare.90 The
consequentialist criterion of equal welfare has also seemed
plausible to many philosophers and political theorists, as have
the related criteria of equal responsibility-adjusted welfare;
equal resources for welfare; and a criterion that looks to overall
weighted welfare, with the welfare of poorer persons given
greater weight.91
Might the moral relevance of welfare and welfare changes,
for regulators, transcend the consequentialist criteria bearing
on their choices? Perhaps. Imagine that the set of criteria
binding them includes at least one criterion that is both

88. For an accessible discussion of the concept of consequentialism and an
overview of the debate between consequentialists and nonconsequentialists
(“deontologists”), see SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 59-77 (1998). For
sources containing more technical discussions, see Adler, supra note 58, at 314
nn.188-89.
89. See KAGAN, supra note 88, at 59; Adler, supra note 58, at 315-17.
90. See Adler, supra note 58; Adler & Posner, supra note 2.
91. See Adler, supra note 58, at 302-13, 315-19 (discussing distributive
views). Distributive views are usually consequentialist in their structure—the
criteria of appropriate distribution articulated by these views typically provide
an agent-neutral ranking of outcomes—although the foundations of such views
are often contractarian, and for that reason they are sometimes characterized
as “nonconsequentialist.” See KAGAN, supra note 88, at 17-22, 189-303
(distinguishing between the “factors” set forth by a moral theory and its
foundations, and discussing both “teleological” and “deontological” types of
foundations).
Distributive views that look to the distribution of welfare resources, or to
the distribution of welfare adjusted for responsibility, are welfarist not in the
strong sense that the goodness of outcomes supervenes on welfare, but in the
weaker sense that welfare considerations are central to these views. See
Matthew D. Adler, Legal Transitions: Some Welfarist Remarks, J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 4-8, on file with author)
(discussing variants of welfarism).
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deontological and welfarist: deontological because it does not
enjoin the agent to promote good outcomes characterized in an
agent-neutral way, welfarist because it defines morally
required or permitted actions partly in terms of their welfare
impact.92 This is a conceptual possibility. (Here is a silly
example: a deontological criterion that prohibits the agent from
acting in a way that reduces the welfare of anyone situated
exactly ten miles from the agent at the time of choice.) Nor
would I want to argue, here, that deontological criteria do not
exist. But I tend to doubt that such deontological criteria as do
exist make reference to welfare. Consider the classic example
of a deontological constraint: the putative constraint on the
actor intentionally harming another person (as opposed to
merely acting in a way that foreseeably harms her).93 I
seriously doubt that “harming” for purposes of this constraint,
assuming it exists, means “reducing welfare.” Imagine that I
intentionally pick a flower from the common garden, just to
spite you. Have I committed a deontological wrong? Intuitively
not. Plausibly, “harming” here means producing some kind of
physical impact on the victim which is neither necessary nor
even sufficient for a welfare reduction. Or consider the
plausible, deontological constraints on lying and promise
breaching:94 welfare-irrelevant lies and breaches would
arguably violate these constraints, and (obviously) many
welfare-reducing actions would satisfy them.
Perhaps I am wrong about the deontological irrelevance of
welfare. Assume that a deontological constraint prohibits
“intentional harming,” where harmings are (1) physical impacts
of a certain sort that (2) reduce welfare. If so, we would need to
understand whether deaths or death risks are welfare
reductions for purposes of this constraint—whether they are
welfare reducing in a deontological, not a consequentialist,
sense. The consequentialist analysis presented in this Article
does not address that question. Still, as I have explained, it is
far from clear whether the question needs to be addressed.
Return, then, to consequentialism. Any consequentialist
criterion C provides a ranking of outcomes—more precisely, a
ranking of possible worlds, that is, of maximally specified

92. See KAGAN, supra
deontological constraints).
93. See id. at 100-05.
94. See id. at 106-25.

note

88,

at

70-137

(describing

plausible
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outcomes.95 These outcomes or worlds are ranked as better,
worse, equally good, or perhaps incommensurably good.96 This
C-ranking of outcomes, in turn, helps determine the C-ranking
of actions for a given agent, in a given choice situation. One
moves from a view about the goodness of outcomes to a view
about the rightness of the alternative actions that the agent
might perform.97 The agent ought to choose the action that
best “promotes” good outcomes. But what does that mean?
Different variants of consequentialism offer different answers
to this question. Here are six different possibilities: in a given
choice situation (1) the agent should choose the action the
actual outcome of which is better or at least not worse than the
actual outcomes of the other actions available for choice; (2) the
agent should choose the action with the highest Bayesian
probability of having the best actual outcome; (3) the agent
should choose the action with the highest frequentist
probability of having the best actual outcome; (4) the agent
should choose the action with the largest Bayesian expected
goodness, where the Bayesian expected goodness of an action
equals p1*g(O1) + p2*g(O2) + . . . pn*g(On), such that g(Oi) is a
numerical measure of the goodness of outcome Oi and pi is a
Bayesian probability that the action results in Oi; (5) the agent
should choose the action with the largest frequentist expected
goodness, where the frequentist expected goodness of an action
equals p1*g(O1) + p2*g(O2) + . . . pn*g(On), such that g(Oi) is a
numerical measure of the goodness of Oi and pi is a frequentist
probability that the action results in Oi; and (6) the agent
should follow a “maximin” approach, i.e., choose the action
whose worst possible outcome is best.98

95. See MICHAEL J. LOUX, METAPHYSICS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION 176-214 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing possible worlds).
96. On incommensurability, see Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1383-89 (1998) [hereinafter
Adler, Incommensurability]; Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability:
Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Law].
97. On this issue see RICHARD A. FUMERTON, REASON AND MORALITY: A
DEFENSE OF THE EGOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 92-113 (1990); KAGAN, supra note
88, at 64-69. For a general discussion of moral decision making under
uncertainty, see TED LOCKHART, MORAL UNCERTAINTY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (2000).
98. See FUMERTON, supra note 97, at 92-113 (distinguishing between
“actual consequence,” “probable consequence,” and “value adjusted possible
consequence” conceptions of consequentialist choice). Since the probabilities
employed in the latter two conceptions might be either Bayesian or
frequentist, Fumerton’s tripartite distinction generates the first five of the six
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As this summary suggests, risk or probability might be
morally relevant, in two quite different ways, for any
consequentialist criterion C. First, the fact that someone is at
risk of some adverse (or for that matter favorable) occurrence
might bear upon the goodness of outcomes. Imagine two
possible worlds, O1 and O2, identical except that in O1 some
event occurs and imposes a high risk of death (in either the
Bayesian or frequentist sense) on P, while in O2 the event does
not occur. Then it might well be the case that O1 is a worse
outcome, in light of C, than O2. Second, risk or probability
might be relevant in moving from the C-ranking of outcomes to
the C-ranking of actions or choices available to a given agent in
a given choice situation. Consider, for example, the Bayesian
expected goodness account of consequentialist rightness. On
this account, what the agent ought to do in a given choice
situation, faced with possible actions {A1 . . . Am}, is the following: (1) for each action Aj and each outcome Oi from all possible
worlds {O1 . . . On}, there is a Bayesian probability, in some
sense, that Aj will result in Oi; (2) using these probabilities plus
the “goodness” numbers measuring the goodness of each
possible world, the agent determines the Bayesian expected
goodness of each possible action; (3) the agent chooses the
action with the highest Bayesian expected goodness. Within
the Bayesian expected goodness account of consequentialist
choice, probability numbers linking actions and worlds play an
important role in determining what choices actors ought to
perform, quite independent of any role that probability might
have in shaping the goodness of worlds. The same is true of a
frequentist expected goodness account and of the accounts that
specify the consequentially right action as the action with the
highest probability (frequentist or Bayesian) of having the best
outcome.
Economists frequently distinguish between welfare
maximization “ex post” and “ex ante.”99 The “ex post”/“ex ante”
distinction, I suggest, is plausibly mapped onto the distinction
between the goodness of outcomes and the goodness of actions
that I have just described. To talk about “ex post” welfare

variants of consequentialism listed here. The last variant, maximin, derives
from the literature on rational choice. See FRENCH, supra note 74, at 36.
99. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE 437-44 (2002); Philippe Mongin & Claude d’Aspremont, Utility
Theory and Ethics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF UTILITY THEORY 371, 437-44 (Salvador
Barberà et al. eds., 1998).
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maximization is really just to specify how all the different
possible outcomes of one or another choice are ranked in light
of the overall welfare criterion. That criterion provides a
ranking or, technically, an “ordering” (partial if not complete)100
of the set of possible worlds {O1 . . . On}. To talk about “ex ante”
welfare maximization is to specify how one moves from the
overall-welfare ordering of outcomes to the overall-welfare
ranking of actions {A1 . . . Am} available to a given agent at a
given time.
The focus of this Article is on the “ex post” inquiry. I ask
whether death or risk is a feature of an outcome that
diminishes the welfare of the dying or at-risk person, in that
outcome, and thereby affects the goodness of that outcome in
light of one or another consequentialist criterion that
incorporates welfare considerations. I largely ignore the “ex
ante” inquiry—for there is, after all, only so much one can do in
a single article. So the picture of the normative foundations of
risk regulation painted here is, in an important respect,
incomplete. A complete picture would specify how one moves
from the outcome ranking to the action ranking, and what role
risk (in a Bayesian or frequentist sense) plays in that move
separate from any role it plays in shaping the goodness of
outcomes. Still, the conclusions I reach in this Article have
much importance for risk regulation, as elaborated in Part V.
Whatever one’s view about the move from outcomes to actions—
about the “ex ante” perspective, as it were—my claim that
death and Bayesian risk but not frequentist risk affect the
welfare goodness of outcomes will be highly relevant in
determining what regulators ought to do.
II. IS DEATH A HARM?
Is death a harm? It is, I will claim; and this claim will
prove to have much importance for risk regulation. At the
outset, however, let me explain as clearly as I can what it is I
will be claiming.
First, “harm” is an ambiguous term which is sometimes
used to mean a welfare setback, sometimes not. For purposes
100. See Adler, Incommensurability, supra note 96, at 1401-05 (suggesting
that outcomes might be incomparable with respect to overall well-being rather
than better, worse, or precisely equal); Adler, supra note 58, at 328-30 (same);
Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS 1073, 1127-28 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds.,
1986) (summary of technical, social-choice literature on partial orderings).
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of this Article, “harm” is an exact synonym for “welfare
setback.”
Second, as already explained, the spirit of my analysis is
consequentialist. I analyze the impact of P’s premature death
on his welfare by asking whether two outcomes or “possible
worlds” differentiated by the time of his death are different for
P’s welfare.
Third, and relatedly, my claim about the
harmfulness of death concerns comparative well-being. I will
argue that an outcome in which a given person, P, dies at a
particular point in time can be worse for P than an outcome in
which he does not die at the time, but lives longer.101
Fourth, my claim about the harmfulness of death concerns
harm to P, not harm to third parties. No one disputes that P’s
premature death can adversely affect the welfare of his friends,
family, and other survivors. What is controversial is whether
premature death can affect P’s own welfare.102 Fifth, the claim
concerns death itself, not the process of dying.103 No one
disputes that an outcome in which P dies painlessly or
instantly, as opposed to one in which he dies a slow, painful
death, can be better for P. The harder question is whether two
outcomes differentiated by the fact that P continues to live in
one outcome, and not in the other, can differ for P’s welfare
even if the process by which P dies in the latter outcome is not
painful, anxiety provoking, or otherwise experientially bad.
Sixth, my claim is that death can be a harm, not that it
need be. If death is necessarily harmful, then (for example) an
outcome in which P dies at a certain point will be worse for him
than an outcome in which he survives, but in a permanent

101. See, e.g., Fred Feldman, Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death, in THE
METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 308 (arguing that the harmfulness
of death consists in a comparison between the individual’s actual life history
and the alternative history that would have occurred had the individual not
died); Nagel, supra note 10, at 67 (same). I am not sure what it would mean
(at least within a consequentialist framework) to describe death as
noncomparatively bad for a person, or to describe life as noncomparatively
good. Such statements, I suggest, are not to be taken literally but actually
involve covert comparisons of the premature-death outcome or continued-life
outcome to some baseline outcome. See JOHN BROOME, ETHICS OUT OF
ECONOMICS 162-73 (1999) (arguing that goodness is reducible to betterness
and that Epicurus’s experientialist argument against the harmfulness of
death is therefore “trivially mistaken”); see also Ruth Chang, Comparison and
the Justification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1569-72 (1998)
(presenting a comparativist account of justified choice).
102. See Nagel, supra note 10, at 62.
103. See FRED FELDMAN, CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE REAPER 130 (1992).
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vegetative state. That strikes me as untrue. Bare life—life
without experiences, activities, and the other features that
subserve human welfare—certainly need not be better than
death.104 Indeed, a welfare theorist who places emphasis on
Experience will say that continuing P’s life in a vegetative state
is never better for him than early death; while a theorist who
places emphasis on Preference would at most say that
continuing P’s life in a vegetative state is better if P (prior to
the loss of consciousness) preferred that.105
Seventh, my claim is that death can be a harm to P in light
of events that would have occurred had P continued to live. Let
us call the outcome in which P dies earlier OE, and the outcome
in which he dies later OL. P dies at time T in OE; he does not
die at that time in OL, but continues to live until some later
time. Obviously, if OE and OL differ in events that occur before
T, then OE can be worse for P than OL. Assume that, in OE, P
lives in poverty and ignorance, has no friends or meaningful
work, and dies at the age of forty, while in OL P has sufficient
resources, is well educated, has lots of friends and an engaging
career, and dies at the age of seventy-five. It would be absurd
to suggest that P here is no worse off in OE than in OL. The
proponents of the view that “death is no harm” do not mean to
assert that. The much more plausible and interesting assertion
is this: if OE and OL differ only in events that occur after T, the
time of P’s early death in OE, then OE is not worse for P than OL.
And this is the assertion that I mean to dispute. Assume that
104. As Nagel puts it, “[A]lmost everyone would be indifferent . . . between
immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later
without reawakening.” Nagel, supra note 10, at 62.
105. The kind of harm involved in death is therefore subtly different from
the harm at issue in my discussion, below, of frequentist and Bayesian risks.
In that discussion, I focus on whether frequentist and Bayesian risks are
intrinsic harms—features of outcomes that, ceteris paribus, make the
outcomes worse with respect to someone’s welfare. But in claiming that
“death is a harm,” I am not claiming that death is an intrinsic harm. If O and
O* differ merely in P’s being alive (as would be the case where P dies at T in
O, and lives longer in a vegetative state in O*), then the two outcomes may
well be identical for P’s welfare. Rather, my claim is that death can reduce the
deceased’s well-being by depriving him of intrinsic benefits he would realize if
he lived longer.
Note however that many and perhaps all such benefits necessitate being
alive—for example, the benefits of having certain experiences or engaging in
various activities. Insofar as some welfare benefit does necessitate being
alive, life is an intrinsic benefit as a component of a hybrid, and death
necessarily deprives the person of that benefit. So, in this sense, the
harmfulness of death is not very different from intrinsic harmfulness.
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P has a sociable and professionally engaging life in OE and dies
a sudden death at the age of forty, in 1980; in OL, he lives
exactly the same life up until 1980, but does not die and
continues to prosper until the age of seventy-five. Is OE here
worse for P than OL? I believe it is, while modern philosophical
Epicureans deny that it is. That is the crux of the dispute.
More generally, where the earlier-death world OE and the
later-death world OL differ in events that occur both before and
after T, the time of P’s death in OE, then the later-occurring
events, like the earlier occurring events, can make a difference
to P’s welfare. Assume P leads a life of poverty in OE, and dies
at the age of forty, while in OL he leads a sociable and
professionally engaged life until the age of seventy-five. Then
OL is better for P than OE, both because of the better life P leads
in OL up to the age of forty, and because of the additional,
fruitful years of life he enjoys in OL after the age of forty.
Longer life can be one feature of an outcome (among others)
that makes that a better outcome for some person. This is the
form of my “death is harmful” claim that will have the most
practical relevance for regulators. Regulatory choices typically
produce or prevent deaths that occur or would occur at some
point in time subsequent to the choices; thus, regulators are
typically comparing outcomes in which some persons live
longer, as against outcomes in which those persons’ lives are
both shorter and otherwise different. The pure case in which
P’s life in the earlier-death world OE and the later-death world
OL is just the same, up until the time T that P dies in OE, is an
analytic device designed to sharpen understanding of death’s
harmfulness, not a realistic scenario. However, because this
pure case is particularly clear and simple, that case will be the
focus of my discussion in this Part.
Finally, my claim concerns lifetime well-being, not
momentary well-being. Lifetime well-being is, I believe, a
meaningful construct.106 A person’s (actual or possible) life
history can be compared with another (possible) life history,
and one can often if not always determine that the first life
history is better or worse, with respect to the welfare of that
person, than the second. Momentary well-being may also be a
meaningful construct. Intuitively, one can ask and often
determine how well a person is doing at one moment, as
106. See John Bigelow et al., Death and Well-Being, 71 PAC. PHIL. Q. 119,
120-23 (1990); J. David Velleman, Well-Being and Time, in THE METAPHYSICS
OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 329.
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compared to another moment later or earlier in her life, or in a
different possible life. However, momentary well-being is not
my concern here. It is a serious mistake to think of the
harmfulness of death in terms of momentary well-being.
Imagine OE and OL that are identical up until T, the time of P’s
death in OE. At times prior to T, P’s momentary well-being is
the same in both worlds. At T and at later times, P does not
exist in OE, and so lacks a momentary well-being in that world.
Therefore P’s momentary well-being at or after T in OL is not
greater than her momentary well-being at or after T in OE. The
comparison is meaningless. Think of the parallel case of
happiness: Since the dead cannot be happy or sad during postmortem moments, it is meaningless to ask whether the dead
are less happy at those moments, than they would be had they
continued to live.107
The upshot is that P’s momentary well-being in OL is never
greater than her momentary well-being in OE; neither during
the moments before T (in the pure case we are considering), nor
at or after T. Thus my claim that OL can be better for P than
OE is, and must be, a claim about lifetime well-being. But does
not lifetime well-being reduce to momentary well-being? The
answer is no. As David Velleman explains,
[T]he welfare value of a life is not in general determined by, and
cannot be inferred from, the amount of momentary well-being that
the life contains.
....
Consider two different lives that you might live. One life begins in
the depths but takes an upward trend . . . . Another life begins at the
heights but slides downhill . . . . Surely, we can imagine two such
lives as containing equal sums of momentary well-being. Your
retirement is as blessed in one life as your childhood is in the other;
your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage in the other.
Yet even if we were to map each moment in one life onto a
moment of equal well-being in the other, we would not have shown
these lives to be equally good. For after the tally of good times and
bad times have been rung up, the fact would remain that one life gets
progressively better while the other gets progressively worse . . . . To
most people, I think, the former story would seem like a better lifestory . . . in the sense that it is the story of a better life.108

P’s life in OL, her overall package of experiences, activities,
accomplishments, relationships and so on, can be better than

107. But see Bigelow et al., supra note 106, at 134-39 (arguing that death
typically lowers “temporal well-being” as well as “global well-being”).
108. Velleman, supra note 106, at 330-31.
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her life in OE, even though there is no moment at which P’s
happiness or momentary well-being is greater.109
To sum up, the claim I will defend in this Part (for short,
“death can be harmful”) is as follows: It is possible that the
lifetime well-being of a person who dies prematurely is lower
than it would have been, had she continued to live, in virtue of
events that would have occurred during that additional period
of life. The loss of life years can diminish a person’s lifetime or
overall well-being.
Isn’t this obvious? In a word, no—not if one is sensitive to
the thorny conceptual and normative issues that are posed by
death, welfare, and their intersection. In the remainder of this
Part, I will seek to accomplish two goals in tandem: first, to
clarify why my claim is philosophically controversial; and,
second, to defend it. Epicurus and the modern philosophical
Epicureans110 raise serious challenges to the common-sense
view that death can be harmful, but these challenges are
ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the claim that death can be
harmful is true across reasonable theories of well-being. This
claim does not presuppose a commitment to a hedonic theory
that gives great weight to Experience; a preferentialist theory
that gives great weight to Preference; or an objectivist theory
that gives great weight to Value.111 On this score, the
philosophical literature is quite misleading. Philosophical
109. I should note that the view about lifetime well-being presupposed by
this Article is not identical to Velleman’s view. This Article presupposes, and
Velleman would agree, that lifetime well-being is a coherent and morally
important concept distinct from momentary well-being.
Further, my
discussion of legal implications in Part V assumes that it is lifetime wellbeing, not momentary well-being, that is relevant to legal standards (such as
cost-benefit analysis) that incorporate welfare considerations and do so in a
consequentialist way.
This is surely a contestable assumption, but
unfortunately not one that I have space to defend within the confines of this
Article. Velleman, by contrast, does not argue that momentary well-being has
less moral and legal importance than lifetime well-being. See Velleman, supra
note 106, at 347-54 (arguing for the “independent validity of momentary
perspectives”). Finally, Velleman contends that two lives “containing equal
sums of momentary well-being” may differ for lifetime well-being—that
lifetime well-being also depends upon, as it were, the narrative structure of a
life. Id. at 331. This last contention may well be true, but is not important for
my purposes, since in standard cases of premature death the two outcomes
will not contain the same aggregate momentary well-being.
110. See, e.g., Walter Glannon, Epicureanism and Death, 76 MONIST 222
(1993); O.H. Green, Fear of Death, 43 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 99 (1982);
Stephen Hetherington, Deathly Harm, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 349 (2001);
Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 117.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 115-35.
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critics of the Epicureans have typically argued for the
harmfulness of death by advancing a specific welfare theory:
hedonism, preferentialism, objectivism, or some hybrid. As we
shall see, the claim that death can be harmful is much more
robust than these critics have suggested.
*****
Why do Epicureans deny that death can be harmful? Let
us start with Epicurus’s own words on the subject and those of
an early disciple, Lucretius. Epicurus argues,
Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and
evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all
sentience, . . . Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to
us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and when death is
come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the
dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.112

Lucretius explains,
Death therefore to us is nothing, concerns us not a jot, . . . For he
whom evil is to befall, must in his own person exist at the very time it
comes, if the misery and suffering are haply to have any place at all;
but since death precludes this, and forbids him to be, upon whom the
ills can be brought, you may be sure that we have nothing to fear
after death, and that he who exists not, cannot become
miserable . . . .113

One clear theme in these passages concerns the
experiential element of well-being. Epicurus contends that
“good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all
sentience”; Lucretius reasons that death precludes harm
(“evil”) because it precludes “misery and suffering,” that is,
unpleasant, dispreferred, or undesirable mental states.
Modern philosophical Epicureans, too, suggest that death
cannot be harmful for the person who dies because, at death,
that person loses the capacity to have experiences—the
capacity to feel pains or pleasures, to have beliefs, or to possess
other types of mental states. Steven Rosenbaum, a prominent
contemporary defender of the Epicurean view, writes,
I offer [and defend as cogent] the following reconstruction of
Epicurus’s argument. In formulating the arguments as I do, I
attempt to do justice to Epicurus’s philosophical insight, caring less
for historical accuracy than for versimilitude. The reconstruction
112. See Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121 (alteration in original) (quoting
Epicurus’s “Letter to Menoeceus”).
113. See FELDMAN, supra note 103, at 129 (first alteration in original)
(quoting Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura).
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runs as follows:
A state of affairs is bad for person P only if P can experience it at
some time. . . .
. . . P’s being dead is not a state of affairs that P can experience at
some time.
....
THEREFORE, P’s being dead is not bad for P.114

Like Epicurus and Lucretius before him, Rosenbaum is in effect
voicing some version of the following general argument:
Because the right theory of well-being includes an Experience
element, death cannot be harmful for the person who dies.
Is the argument cogent? As I have already noted, the
Experience element of welfare might be specified in different
Standardly, that element is specified as a
ways.115
supervenience requirement, which states that two outcomes
cannot differ, with respect to the welfare of some person P, if P
has the same mental states in both outcomes.116 Note,
however, that my “death can be harmful” claim is consistent
with a supervenience requirement. To say that “death can be
harmful” is to say that OE (the earlier-death outcome) can be
worse for P than OL (the later-death outcome) even if OE and OL
are identical in features that occur before T, the time of P’s
early death in OE. Imagine, therefore, that OE and OL are
identical in their pre-T features but differ in their post-T
features as follows: In OE, P is dead and experiences nothing,
while in OL, P continues to live and experiences various pains,
pleasures, and other mental states. In more colloquial terms,
imagine a case in which P would continue to possess a mental
life (in OL), were he not to die (in OE). This is hardly an esoteric
case. Although premature death does not necessarily cut short
a mental life that would otherwise continue—the premature
death of a comatose person, who would die later without
regaining consciousness were the premature death not to occur,
shortens life but not mental life—it is certainly normal,
unsurprising, and in any event quite possible for premature
death to deprive a person of experiences she would otherwise
have. So it is normal, unsurprising, and in any event quite
possible for P not to have the same mental states in OE and OL.
But if P does not have the same mental states in OE and OL, the
114. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121-22.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
116. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 88, at 180-81; Bernstein, supra note 59,
at 42-47.
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supervenience requirement is satisfied. As Jeff McMahan puts
it: “[A]lthough one does not experience death, it does affect
one’s experience—by limiting or ending it.”117
McMahan’s comment here about “experienc[ing] death”
suggests a different specification of the Experience element—
one that makes a particular type of mental state, namely
awareness or cognizance, a precondition for welfare changes.118
Similarly, when Rosenbaum writes that “a state of affairs is
bad for person P only if P can experience it at some time” and
“P’s being dead is not a state of affairs that P can experience at
some time,”119 he is seemingly using the term “experience” as
synonymous with awareness or cognizance. Imagine, then,
that our welfare theory includes an “awareness requirement”
which stipulates that some feature (F) of an outcome can make
a difference to P’s well-being only if P is aware of F when or
after it occurs. If this latter requirement obtains, then death
cannot be harmful. Why? Consider our test case for the
harmfulness of death: two outcomes OE and OL, where P dies at
T in OE and the outcomes are identical in their pre-T features.
The crucial point to see is that P in OE cannot be cognizant of
its post-T features (specifically, the fact that she is not alive
and does not engage in the various activities, relationships, etc.
that she would have pursued had she not died). But the post-T
features of OE are the only features that differentiate it from
OL. Therefore, given the awareness requirement, OE cannot be
worse for P than OL.120
117. Jeff McMahan, Death and the Value of Life, in THE METAPHYSICS OF
DEATH, supra note 9, at 234; see also BROOME, supra note 101, at 170-73
(arguing that experientialism about welfare permits death to be harmful, since
death can deprive a person of experiences he would have if alive).
118. See McMahan, supra note 117, at 234-45 (distinguishing between
“Narrow Experience Requirement” and “Wide Experience Requirement”).
119. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121-22. Rosenbaum goes on to state that
experience has a causal aspect, and that the concept in one sense entails the
subject’s awareness but in another sense simply entails a causal connection
between the “experienced” event or state and the subject. Id. at 124. I do not
believe that redefining Experience to include a causal element undermines the
argument presented in this section for the harmfulness of death, since what is
at issue is comparative lifetime well-being across different possible worlds, not
some putative effect that death causes and the dead person “experiences” (in
the causal sense) after her death.
120. The proposition that OL is better for P than OE is, at first blush,
consistent with the awareness requirement, since P in OL is alive after T and
can be cognizant of the features that differentiate that outcome from OE. One
might then (1) permit the asymmetry of “better” and “worse” and conclude
that OL really is better for P even though OE is not worse; or (2) demand
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How should the defender of the claim that death can be
harmful respond to this powerful, Epicurean line of argument?
Unless cognizance and awareness somehow continue after
death—and my assumption here is that they do not, that death
necessarily means the end of the person’s existence and
therewith his awareness and his mental states more
generally—the argument from an awareness requirement to an
Epicurean conclusion seems ironclad.121 I will therefore need to
show that the awareness requirement itself is mistaken. Let
me postpone the issue, for the moment,122 and examine whether
the Preference component of welfare also argues for
Epicureanism.
As we shall see, Preference might be
understood to generate an “endorsement requirement” that is
closely related to the awareness requirement. I will delineate
this new requirement, and then try to demonstrate why the
twin requirements, endorsement and awareness, are too robust
to be incorporated in the correct theory of welfare.
The Preference component of welfare stipulates that the
welfare ranking of outcomes, for a given person, depends at
least in part on the person’s own ranking of the outcomes—on
his preferences as between the outcomes. The stipulation,
thus stated, is quite general. Are the preferences actual or
hypothetical? Are they retrospective or prospective? Are they
closely or only tenuously linked to choice? Need they have a
certain kind of cognitive or affective component? Welfare
theorists who share a basic commitment to Preference can
disagree about the answers to these more specific questions.123
The crucial question, for our purposes here, concerns the timing
of the preferences that are incorporated in the welfare theory.
Let us first consider the case of a welfare theory that
incorporates a Preference component, and specifies in some
way which preferences are determinative of welfare—for
example, by stipulating that such preferences are actual
preferences which are sufficiently informed and sufficiently
grounded in deliberation—but does not define the category of
symmetry and conclude that OL is not really better for P than OE since (given
the arguments stated in the text) OE is not worse; or (3) demand symmetry
and conclude that OE is really worse for P since OL is better. On these issues,
see McMahan, supra note 117, at 235-40.
121. But see supra note 120 (describing a line of argument that, together
with the putative symmetry of “better” and “worse,” seeks to square the
awareness requirement with the harmfulness of death).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 127-33.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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welfare-determinative preferences in a way that excludes
prospective preferences. Clearly, this type of preferentialist
welfare theory permits death to be harmful. Assume that P
prospectively prefers continued life, to premature death, except
under unusual circumstances where continued life would be
miserable or painful. P carefully and with good information
considers how he would rank a world like OE, as compared to a
world like OL, and determines that he would give a lower
ranking to OE. Further, assume that this preference or ranking
of P’s is his ranking at all times, both in OE and in OL. Finally,
assume that the actual world is OE. P ends up dying
prematurely at time T, as opposed to enjoying continued life.
Under these circumstances, premature death can be worse for
P than continued life even though the premature-death world
(OE) and the continued-life world (OL) are identical in their preT features. P had a preference, prior to his premature death,
not to die prematurely and forego the experiences and activities
he would otherwise enjoy. Although this preference was
prospective, it was actual, informed, and deliberative, and thus
counts as a welfare-determinative preference within the theory
just described.124
By contrast, if the Preference element of welfare is
specified so that the only welfare-determinative preferences are
retrospective, not prospective, death cannot be harmful.
Specifically, imagine that our welfare theory includes an
“endorsement requirement,” which states that a feature F can
make an outcome better (or worse) for some person P only if P

124. See generally Bernard Williams, The Makropulos Case: Reflections on
the Tedium of Immortality, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at
73 (presenting a preferentialist account of death’s harmfulness). As Williams
notes, “[A] man could . . . have a reason from his own point of view to prefer a
possible world in which he went on longer to one in which he went on for less
long . . . .” Id. at 78.
Isn’t it incoherent to imagine a human person, with the epistemic and
conceptual limitations characteristic of humans, actually having preferences
with respect to entire possible worlds? This question raises deep issues for the
actual Preferentialist that I cannot, and need not, consider here. Whatever
the answer, my claim that a Preference requirement permits death to be
harmful, if the relevant preferences can be prospective, holds true. If the
answer to the question is “yes,” then the Preferentialist will either shift
entirely to idealized rather than actual preferences, or instead will weaken her
demand with respect to actual preferences (for example, by requiring that the
person actually prefer some of the features differentiating the two worlds in
question). In either case, OE can be worse than OL, assuming prospective
preferences.
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(dis)endorses F during or after the time F occurs.125 Consider
now our two outcomes OE and OL. The feature of OE that
putatively makes it worse for P is the fact that P does not enjoy
various welfare goods, which he would have enjoyed (in OL) had
he not died prematurely. But this feature of OE does not occur
until P dies.
Therefore, P cannot have a retrospective
preference with respect to this feature. Since he is dead after
T, he cannot have any preferences, actual or hypothetical. P
might prefer, before his premature death, not to die
prematurely; but he cannot prefer, after his premature death,
not to have died prematurely.126
The endorsement requirement is one possible specification
of the Preference element of welfare.
The awareness
requirement, discussed earlier, is one possible specification of
But these two
the Experience element of welfare.127
requirements are closely linked. Both are based on the
intuitive idea that P’s own perspective is crucial to his
welfare.128 Both requirements are also grounded in the thought
that the authoritative perspective is backward looking, not
forward looking. It is only after experiences, activities, and
other putative constituents of welfare have occurred (or failed
to occur) that we can really assess their welfare impact—or so
the argument goes. P might prospectively prefer or disprefer
some feature F of an outcome, but this preference (since
prospective) merely concerns a possible occurrence. Possible
features, when actualized, can surprise even the best informed.
It is a truism that people often end up disliking what they
imagined they would like, or endorsing what they imagined
they would disprefer.129 Thus our prospective likes and dislikes
with respect to possible occurrences should be given much less
weight, in a welfare theory, than our retrospective likes and

125. Cf. SUMNER, supra note 8, at 122-83 (emphasizing the importance of
retrospective evaluations rather than prospective desires to well-being).
126. The symmetry of benefit and harm might be adduced to show that
death can be harmful, consistent with an endorsement requirement, since life
can be beneficial. See supra note 120 (noting a parallel argument in the
context of the awareness requirement). Because, I believe, the endorsement
requirement, like the awareness requirement, can successfully be attacked
head-on, see infra text accompanying notes 127-33, I do not pursue the
symmetry issue here.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
128. SUMNER, supra note 8, at 26-80.
129. See id. at 129-33 (arguing against the equation of welfare with the
satisfaction of antecedent desires).
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dislikes with respect to what actually happens. Until P has
both become aware of F and developed a retrospective
preference for or against F, F cannot make an outcome better
or worse for P.
The line of reasoning just articulated has real force, but
ultimately fails to persuade. Retrospective awareness and
preference are not preconditions for welfare. Consider the
plausible “idealizing” conditions, other than temporal position,
that make a perspective or point of view relevant for welfare
assessment. Plausibly, the point of view must be one where the
person, P, is sufficiently informed130 about the features being
assessed; those features must be sufficiently vivid to her;131 she
must be sufficiently thoughtful about the features; she must be
sufficiently engaged by the ranking exercise;132 and so on.
Virtually all the plausible “idealizing” conditions I can think
of—even conditions like vividness and engagement—can be
true of prospective as well as retrospective points of view. One
exception is an actuality condition: a requirement that the
features under assessment be actual, not merely possible,
features. A moment’s thought, however, will show that the
actuality condition is too demanding. When P prospectively
evaluates a possible life history O, as against another possible
life history O*, he is comparing one group of possible features
to another. When P retrospectively evaluates his actual life
history O, as against a possible life history O* that did not
occur, he is comparing one group of actual features to a group
of possible features. If features must be actual to be properly
evaluated, then retrospective evaluation, like prospective
evaluation, falls short.
Intrapersonal judgments of
comparative well-being always involve comparisons of multiple
outcomes, at least some of which must be merely possible, not
actual.
Note further that the awareness requirement and
endorsement requirement make prospective points of view
flatly irrelevant to welfare evaluation, rather than merely—and
more plausibly—discounting their relevance vis-à-vis
retrospective points of view. Imagine that P prospectively
prefers one outcome to another, and then later, retrospectively,
130. Cf. sources cited supra note 45 (surveying, but criticizing, fullinformation preferentialist accounts of welfare).
131. RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 111-12
(1979).
132. On these last two elements, see GRIFFIN, supra note 18, at 26-31.

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1334

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

switches his ranking. Perhaps we might give priority to the
retrospective ranking, in determining which outcome is really
better for P. But the premature-death case is different. Here,
we have (or may have) a prospective ranking by P of continued
life over premature death, and no retrospective ranking
whatsoever by P if he does die prematurely. Surely this
prospective ranking could be good enough—sufficiently
informed, engaged, vivid, etc.—to be authoritative for P, in the
absence of a conflicting retrospective ranking.
Finally, note that the awareness requirement and
endorsement requirement would apply to all changes in a
person’s circumstances that preclude awareness and
endorsement—not just death. The awareness and endorsement
requirements, taken separately or together, imply that no such
changes can be harmful. Consider the family of experiential
changes that preclude awareness and endorsement. In O, P
lives a normal life. In O*, P continues to live, but suffers
catastrophic brain damage which lowers his IQ to fifty and
prevents him being aware of this damage and from having all
but the most infantile preferences.133 Or, O* is an outcome in
which P continuously experiences terrible pain—pain so
intense that more advanced cognitive states like belief
(awareness) and preference are simply crowded out. Or, O* is
an outcome in which P lives but is unconscious. Or, in O* P
develops a severe and rapidly progressing case of Alzheimer’s
disease. Intuitively, these kinds of radical, negative changes in
the quality of someone’s experiential life are very bad, indeed,
for her welfare. And I see no real reason why a welfare theory
should insist otherwise. What changes is experience (so the
Experience requirement is satisfied); the persons involved
might strongly and with good reason prefer, beforehand, that
the changes not occur (so Preference is satisfied); and the
changes either introduce bad things into the person’s life, or
deprive her of good things (so Value is satisfied, as is
Integration).
Yet an awareness requirement and/or an
endorsement requirement would inter alia lead to the
conclusion that catastrophic brain damage, radical and
permanent
pain,
continuing
unconsciousness,
severe
Alzheimer’s, and the like are not welfare setbacks.
Let me summarize the analysis to this point. We are

133. See Nagel, supra note 10, at 65-66 (inferring death’s harmfulness from
the harmfulness of severe brain damage).
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considering whether death can be a harm: whether a life
history OE ending in premature death for P at T can be worse
for P than an alternative life history OL differing only in events
that occur after T. I suggested that the Experience component
of welfare, if specified in certain ways, is consistent with the
claim that “death can be harmful” and the same holds true for
Preference. Experience and Preference can be specified in ways
that contradict the “death can be harmful” claim, but these
specifications—the awareness and endorsement requirements,
respectively—were shown to be mistaken. I see no other
plausible specifications of Experience and Preference that
contradict the claim, and so will now consider whether Value or
Integration do so.
The Value element of welfare poses no difficulty for the
“death can be harmful” claim. Different theorists generate
different lists of objective “goods” and “bads” and adduce
different rationales for these lists.134 Still, any viable list and
rationale will count certain activities and experiences as
valuable; and death, then, can be harmful within the
framework of this list and rationale, because death precludes
activity or experience. For example, Parfit offers “moral
goodness, rational activity, the development of one’s abilities,
having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the
awareness of true beauty”135 as a paradigmatic list of goods
that an objectivist might adduce. Premature death prevents
the dying person from performing any additional morally good
acts, from continuing to engage in rational activity, from
developing his abilities any further, from having more children
or engaging in good parenting, from acquiring more knowledge,
or from being aware of true beauty.
While the Value element of welfare doesn’t provide
Epicureans with ammunition for their view that death is
harmless, the Integration element clearly does. There are a
cluster of difficult metaphysical problems raised by the “death
can be harmful” thesis—problems concerning the subject of the
putative harm and the time of the putative harm. Epicurus
alludes to these problems when he writes: “Death, therefore,
the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we
are, death is not come, and when death is come, we are not.”136

134. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
135. PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499.
136. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 121.
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As Thomas Nagel explains,
[T]here are special difficulties, in the case of death, about how the
supposed misfortune is to be assigned to a subject at all. There is
doubt both as to who its subject is and as to when he undergoes it. So
long as a person exists, he has not yet died, and once he has died, he
no longer exists; so there seems to be no time when death, if it is a
misfortune, can be ascribed to its unfortunate subject.137

Consider, once more, my claim that an earlier-death outcome
OE can be worse for a person P than a later-death outcome OL,
even if the two outcomes are identical in events that occur
before the time T of P’s death in OE. Isn’t this claim
metaphysically incoherent? If P dies prematurely, at what
time is she worse off than if she had continued to live? In
short, at what time does premature death harm P?
Presumably not before time T, because P has not died yet. Yet
it also appears that premature death does not harm P at any
time after T, because at those later times P does not exist and
cannot be harmed. Finally, it seems odd to think that the harm
of premature death is an instantaneous harm, which occurs
neither before T, nor after T, but precisely at the instant of P’s
death.
The problems I have just sketched are, in effect, problems
of Integration. My claim is that P’s well-being is lower in one
outcome (OE), as compared to another outcome (OL).
Integration demands that the difference between OE and OL be
a difference that “concerns” P. This difference must not be
merely a difference in the general or impersonal goodness,
beauty, or value of the outcomes. It is not enough to show that
OE is worse than OL from some detached viewpoint. OE must be
worse than OL for P.138 More precisely, the Integration element
of welfare plausibly includes the following requirement: A
person’s lifetime well-being is lower or higher in the actual
world O, as compared to a counterfactual alternative O*, only if
P in O (at some time) has the property of being worse or better
off than her counterfactual self in O*. Yet there is, apparently,
no time in the premature-death world OE where P would have
the property of being worse off than her counterfactual longerlived self in OL.
Much philosophical ink has been spilled proposing, and
criticizing, various solutions to the related problems of
identifying (1) the time at which premature death is harmful
137. Nagel, supra note 10, at 64.
138. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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and (2) the subject of that harm. Indeed, more attention has
been given to these problems than to any other issue discussed
in the “Is death harmful?” literature. One general approach to
solving the timing and subject problems is to argue that dead
people do, in some sense, exist. Harry Silverstein and Palle
Yourgrau have taken this approach.139 The other general
approach is to concede that dead people do not exist, but then
either (I) identify a discrete moment or stretch of time at which
premature death is harmful, or (II) argue that there is no
discrete moment or stretch of time at which death is harmful.
Joel Feinberg, George Pitcher, and Julian Lamont fall in
category I. Feinberg and Pitcher argue that premature death is
harmful for the dying person before the premature death
occurs.140 Lamont argues that premature death is harmful for
the dying person at the point of death and thereafter.141 Fred
Feldman, Thomas Nagel, and William Grey fall in category II.
Feldman argues that premature death is harmful “eternally,”
i.e., at all times:
[W]hen we say that [the dying person’s] death is bad for her, we are
really expressing a complex fact about the relative values of two
possible worlds. If these worlds stand in a certain value relation,
then (given that they stand in this relation at any time) they stand in
that relation not only when [the person] exists, but at times when she
does not.142

Nagel argues that premature death is harmful at no time,
while Grey argues that the harm in premature death does have
a temporal location, but this location is vague—it cannot be
precisely defined.143
One important point has been missed, or at least underemphasized, in this philosophical back and forth. The specific
problem of explaining how premature death can be harmful for
the dying person is simply one instance of a more general
problem, namely explaining how a person’s lifetime well-being
can ever be higher or lower than a counterfactual alternative.
139. See Harry S. Silverstein, The Evil of Death, in THE METAPHYSICS OF
DEATH, supra note 9, at 95, 110-15; Palle Yourgrau, The Dead, in THE
METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 137, 142-45.
140. See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH,
supra note 9, at 171, 186-88; George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, in
THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH, supra note 9, at 159, 168.
141. Julian Lamont, A Solution to the Puzzle of When Death Harms Its
Victims, 76 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 198, 209-12 (1998).
142. Feldman, supra note 101, at 321.
143. See William Grey, Epicurus and the Harm of Death, 77 AUSTRALASIAN
J. PHIL. 358, 363-64 (1999); Nagel, supra note 10, at 67.
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To see this, imagine that we are comparing the actual world O,
to a counterfactual alternative O* in which P dies at exactly the
same time as in O. The issue of premature death is thus
eliminated.
But here, too, the Integration requirement
seemingly cannot be satisfied. The Integration requirement
stipulates that P’s lifetime well-being is higher or lower in O, as
compared to O*, only if O is better or worse for P than O*—only
if the difference between the outcomes is expressible as a
relational property of P, such that P in O has the property of
being better or worse off than his counterfactual counterpart in
O*. Yet at what time is O better or worse for P than O*?
Seemingly not before P’s death. At that point, P’s life is not
over, and his actual lifetime well-being has not yet been
determined. How can we say that P’s life has in fact been
better or worse for him, as compared to a counterfactual
alternative, until P has died—until we know what path his life
history has in fact taken? On the other hand, the time at which
O is better or worse for P than O* cannot, seemingly, be the
time P dies or thereafter, because P does not exist at or after
that time.
In short, if it is metaphysically incoherent to say that
premature death is harmful for the dying person, then more
generally it is metaphysically incoherent to make statements to
the effect that one life history is better or worse for a person
than another life history. This leaves three options. The first
is to give up the concept of lifetime well-being. But lifetime
well-being is a coherent concept, and indeed is crucial to moral
assessment. As David Velleman and others have persuasively
argued, judgments of well-being cannot be reduced to
judgments of momentary well-being.144 The first option should
be rejected.
The second option is to give up the Integration
requirement. If the Integration requirement is abandoned,
then to say that P’s lifetime well-being in O is higher or lower
than her lifetime well-being in O* does not imply that O is
better or worse for P than O*. The third option is to preserve
the Integration requirement, and show how it is possible for P
in one world to be better or worse off—with respect to lifetime
well-being—than her counterfactual counterpart in another
outcome. This is where the various proposed solutions to the
“timing” and “subject” puzzles advanced by Silverstein,

144. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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Yourgrau, Feinberg, Pitcher, Lamont, Feldman, Nagel and
Grey come into play.145 These “solutions” are different ways to
pursue the third option—different ways to show that one life
history can be worse for the subject than the alternative. Note
that this third option must be correct if the first two are
properly rejected. If lifetime well-being is a coherent concept,
and the Integration requirement obtains, then one of the
proposed solutions to the timing and subject puzzles must be
cogent.
Which one? I cannot hope to address that extremely
difficult metaphysical question here. My contribution, if any, is
to have shown that the timing and subject puzzles are
generally implicated in comparisons of lifetime well-being, and
reciprocally to have argued that the coherence of such
comparisons plus an Integration requirement implies the
solubility of these puzzles. I do not know when, if ever, it
becomes true that P in OE, the premature-death world, is worse
off than P in OL, the continued-life world.146 What I have
argued is this: If P in OE is never worse off than P in OL, and if
this implies that premature death is not a harm for the dying
person, then it follows that nothing which alters someone’s lifeplan can be harmful or beneficial for him. Because this is an
absurd conclusion, we should infer that an Integration
requirement poses no obstacle to the claim that death can be
harmful. Although the metaphysicians continue to debate how
to reconcile the harmfulness of death with the Integration
requirement, what is clear is that some such reconciliation
145. Since Nagel and Feldman do claim that death can be harmful for the
dead person, I am inclined to interpret them as pursuing the third option
(preserving Integration) rather than the second (abandoning it) even though
they do not identify a discrete stretch of time during which the harm occurs.
146. I am inclined to think that those who die prematurely are worse off, as
compared to hypothetical alternative life histories, at the point of death and
thereafter (and not before). This is Lamont’s view, and it rests upon the quite
plausible premise that nonexistent things can have relational properties. See
David Hillel Ruben, A Puzzle About Posthumous Predication, 97 PHIL. REV.
211, 222-36 (1988). But see Jack Li, Commentary on Lamont’s When Death
Harms Its Victims, 77 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 349, 352-53 (1999) (criticizing
Lamont). If indeterminism is true and our futures are indeed open, it would
not be true that the person who ends up dying prematurely was actually worse
off, earlier on, than in the counterfactual outcome where he continues to live.
The “no time” solutions are, I think, inconsistent with Integration: If P has the
relational property of being worse off than some counterfactual counterpart,
then she possesses this property at some time. I cannot, however, defend
Lamont’s position here, and—as explained in the text—do not need to do so in
order to argue that death is harmful.
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must be possible if any judgments of comparative lifetime wellbeing are.
III. IS THE RISK OF DEATH A HARM? RISKS AS
RELATIVE FREQUENCIES
Is the risk of death a harm? Here, as with the question “Is
death a harm?”, I use the term “harm” to mean a setback to
well-being. Here, as there, I adopt a consequentialist approach
and focus on what economists would call “ex post” welfare
impacts—namely, whether the risk of death is a feature of an
outcome or possible world that changes a person’s welfare in
that world.147 Finally, my focus remains comparative rather
than noncomparative well-being, lifetime rather than
momentary well-being, and harm to the person herself (here,
the person at risk) rather than harm to third parties.148
In short, the question I intend to ask is this: Does (or can) a
risk of death lower the lifetime well-being of a person who is
subject to that risk, as compared to an outcome in which she is
not at risk? In answering this question, I will focus on
probabilistic conceptions of risk and, within that category, on
the two most attractive accounts of probability: the relativefrequency account and the Bayesian account. Frequentist
accounts of risk are discussed in this Part and Bayesian
accounts in Part IV.
Throughout this Part and the next, I will assume that risks
of death occur as a result of events.149 A risky event might be
simple in structure (a nuclear reactor near to P’s home releases
some radiation at a particular place and at a particular time),
or it might be more complex (P’s supervisor misinforms him

147. See supra Part I.C. (explaining the consequentialist and “ex post”
approach of this Article).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 101-09 (explaining that the
analysis of death’s harmfulness focuses on comparative well-being, lifetime
welfare setbacks, and harm to the person who dies).
149. Probabilities, as I have explained, are numbers attached to
propositions.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
But those
propositions—at least on a frequentist account—are, paradigmatically,
propositions that predicate some property of some event. See, e.g., COHEN,
supra note 14, at 40-51 (summarizing the frequentist view).
And
presentations of the probability calculus that are agnostic as between
frequentist, Bayesian, classical, and logical accounts of probability are often
formulated in terms of events. See HACKING, supra note 72, at 38 (“Most
statisticians and most textbooks of probability talk about the probability of
events.”).
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about workplace safety procedures regarding certain chemicals;
P, over the course of his adult life, consumes a diet that makes
him particularly susceptible to those chemicals; and P’s
coworkers, at different points, engage in negligent behavior in
an area of the factory close to the chemicals). Risky events
include natural events as well as human actions and—within
the latter category—P’s own actions as well as the actions of
others.
Events that produce premature death risks also frequently
lead to other kinds of welfare setbacks. Imagine that a toxic
waste spill not only produces a death risk for P, but damages
his property and injures his pets. Or, imagine that the
consumption of a dangerous food additive increases P’s risk of
death, and also causes P physical discomfort or injury of some
kind. For that matter, imagine that the risk of premature
death imposed on P by some event is realized, so that P suffers
not only the harm of risk (such as it may be) but the additional
and separate harm of death itself.
The general issue under consideration here is whether the
imposition of a risk of death on P by an event E is a feature of
an outcome that can make the outcome worse for P’s lifetime
well-being, as compared to an outcome in which P suffers no
such risk. I will sharpen and simplify analysis of this issue by
focusing on the simple case where the outcomes under
comparison are identical except for the risk of death.150 In this
simple case, OR, the riskier world, contains some event (E) that
imposes a substantial risk of premature death on P; OS, the
safer world, does not contain that event; and OS and OR are
otherwise identical with respect to P’s well-being. The question
I will address, in detail, is whether—given the multiple
considerations plausibly relevant to well-being, specifically
Preference, Experience, Value and Integration—P’s lifetime
well-being in OR is lower than his lifetime well-being in OS. In
short, is the risk of death itself a harm? As we shall see, the
answer is “no” on a frequentist account of risk, but “yes” on a
Bayesian account.
A. WHAT IS THE RISK OF DEATH? A FREQUENTIST ACCOUNT
At the threshold, a conceptual problem arises. Is the risk
of death an intelligible concept for the frequentist? OR is a
150. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (adopting a similar
procedure for analyzing whether death is harmful).
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world in which P is at substantial risk of premature death from
some event E. More precisely, OR is a world in which E occurs
and the proposition “P will die earlier than he would have had
E not occurred” has a high probability.
But does the
frequentist account permit us to attach a probability number to
this kind of proposition—a so-called singular proposition?
Some frequentists (call them “hard-core” frequentists)
would say no.
Consider what Richard von Mises, the
statistician and philosopher whose book Probability, Statistics,
and Truth (1928) is a landmark in the development of the
frequentist view of probability, had to say about the probability
of death.
The rational concept of probability, which is the only basis of [the]
probability calculus, applies only to problems in which either the
same event repeats itself again and again, or a great number of
uniform elements are involved at the same time. Using the language
of physics, we may say that in order to apply the theory of probability
we must have a practically unlimited sequence of uniform
observations [i.e., a suitably large reference class].
....
. . . When we speak of ‘the probability of death,’ the exact
meaning of this expression can be defined in the following way only.
We must not think of an individual, but of a certain class as a whole,
e.g., ‘all insured men forty-one years old living in a given country and
not engaged in certain dangerous occupations.’ A probability of death
is attached to this class of men or to another class that can be defined
in a similar way. We can say nothing about the probability of death
of an individual even if we know his condition of life and health in
detail. The phrase ‘probability of death,’ when it refers to a single
person, has no meaning for us. This is one of the most important
consequences of our definition of probability . . . .151

The hard-core frequentist has a straightforward answer to the
question “Is the risk of death a harm?” The answer is no, she
will claim, because the putative harm (the harm to a particular
person arising from his risk of death) presupposes a “risk” or
“probability” (the risk or probability of a particular person
dying) that in fact does not exist.152 According to von Mises,
“[I]t is utter nonsense to say . . . that Mr. X . . . has [a given]
probability . . . of dying in the course of the next year;”153 a
fortiori, for von Mises and other hard-core frequentists, it
should be “utter nonsense” to say that Mr. X’s risk of death
harms him.
151. VON MISES, supra note 77, at 11 (emphasis added).
152. See id. at 16-18 (discussing the probability of death).
153. Id. at 17-18.
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Yet not all frequentists adopt such a position. For
example, Hans Reichenbach, who along with von Mises is
standardly seen as a leading contributor to the frequentist
school, suggests that a proposition which ascribes an attribute
to a particular object rather than a class of objects might be
assigned a probability as follows: first, subsume the object
under an appropriate reference class; second, calculate the
frequency of the attribute in that reference class. According to
Reichenbach, “If we are asked to find the probability holding
for an individual future event, we must first incorporate the
case in a suitable reference class.”154 He elaborates,
I regard the statement about the probability of the single case, not as
having a meaning of its own, but as representing an elliptic mode of
speech. In order to acquire meaning, the statement must be
translated into a statement about a frequency in a sequence of
repeated occurrences. The statement concerning the probability of
the single case thus is given a fictitious meaning, constructed by a
transfer of meaning from the general to the particular case. The
adoption of the fictitious meaning is justifiable . . . because it serves
the purpose of action to deal with such statements as meaningful.155

Let us call this the “soft-core” frequentist view. The soft-core
frequentist thinks that probability numbers are meaningfully
attachable to singular propositions such as “P will die” or “P
will die as a result of E” or “P will die earlier than he would
have had E not occurred.” Consider the proposition “P will die
earlier than he would have had E not occurred.”
The
probability of that proposition would be seen, by the soft-core
frequentist, as the frequency with which people like P die
prematurely when events like E occur.
To be a bit more precise, we can imagine a large or infinite
reference class of events {E1, E2 . . . En} that includes the
particular event of interest E.156 We can also imagine a large
or infinite class of persons {P1, P2 . . . Pn}, where each Pi is alive
154. REICHENBACH, supra note 79, at 374.
155. Id. at 376-77.
156. As I have mentioned, the events or, more generally, the objects that
the frequentist uses to determine relative frequencies and therewith
probabilities might be conceptualized in different ways: as actual objects,
hypothetical objects, or mathematical constructs that represent actual or
hypothetical objects. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80. Thus the
class of events {E1 . . . En} and matching class of persons {P1 . . . Pn} employed to
determine the frequentist probability that E results in P’s premature death
might be classes of actual or hypothetical events and persons or of
mathematical constructs that represent them. As far as I can tell, nothing in
my argument against the harmfulness of frequentist probability depends on
how the classes are specified.
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when the matching event Ei occurs. In each case we could, in
principle, determine whether the given Pi dies prematurely, i.e.,
dies earlier than he would have had Ei not occurred. The
relative frequency of premature death is the number of
premature deaths, divided by the total number of events in the
reference class {E1 . . . En}—or the limit of the number of
premature deaths divided by the total number of events, in the
case of an infinite reference class {E1 . . . En . . . }.157
A simple example might help clarify how this soft-core
frequentist strategy for ascribing death probabilities would
work. A particular person P eats a food item containing the
food additive sodium nitrite. This event E (P’s ingestion of the
food item) is alleged to impose a high probability of death on P.
A soft-core frequentist would subsume E within some broader
class. For example, E falls within the large class {Ei} including
every ingestion within actual human history of a sodium
nitrite-containing food item. For each Ei within this class, the
matching Pi might be defined as the person who ingested the
food item. For each such Ei, we can ask whether the person Pi
who ingested the item died “prematurely,” i.e., earlier than he
would have had the ingestion not occurred. Imagine that {Ei}
includes 10 million events, and that in 20,000 cases the
ingestor Pi died earlier than he would have had the ingestion
not occurred. Thus, the relative frequency of premature death
within this reference class {Ei} is 20,000/10 million = 1/500.
This relative frequency number, 1/500, might be taken as the
probability of the proposition “P will die earlier than he would
have had E not occurred.”
In sum, the soft-core frequentist would characterize the
difference between the safer world OS and the riskier world OR
as follows:
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account
— OS is a world in which E does not occur.
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) the frequency
with which people like P, exposed to events like E, die
prematurely, is high.
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s
welfare.

157. To put this another way, given our particular event E and person P,
we are subsuming the ordered pair (E, P) in a class of ordered pairs {(E1, P1),
(E2, P2), . . . (En, Pn)}. I am indebted to Paul Edelman for a helpful discussion
on this issue.
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Yet there remains a crucial incompleteness in this
characterization of OS and OR. Given a particular event E,
there are many different reference classes in which E might be
subsumed.
E has multiple characteristics; each such
characteristic, and each conjunction of E’s characteristics,
defines a different reference class that E is “similar to,” in a
certain way. For example, a particular release of uranium by a
nuclear plant upriver from a major city falls in the reference
class of “releases of toxic material,” “releases of radioactive
material,” “releases of uranium,” “releases of uranium by
nuclear plants proximate to large cities,” “releases of toxic
material by facilities proximate to large cities,” and so on. An
analogous point can be made about the person P exposed to the
“risk” of death. That risk depends upon the frequency of
premature death within a class {Pi} including P, but of course
there are many (indeed, an infinite number) of such classes.
[Consider] the probability of a particular man aged 40 living to be 41.
Intuitively the probability will vary depending on whether we regard
the individual merely as a man or more particularly as an
Englishman; for the life expectancy of Englishmen is higher than that
of mankind as a whole. Similarly, the probability will alter depending
on whether we regard the individual as an Englishman aged 40 or as
an Englishman aged 40 who smokes two packets of cigarettes a day,
and so on.158

Because P and E can be characterized in different ways,
there are multiple different probabilities that E will result in
P’s premature death—corresponding to the multiple reference
A
B
classes of events {Ei} , {Ei} . . . and matching classes of persons
A
B
{Pi} , {Pi} . . . that contain E and P, with each such pair of
classes generating a different relative frequency of premature
death. This point might be seen to have quite immediate and
dire implications for the claim that risk, in the relativefrequency sense, is harmful. After all, if the frequentist
probability that E causes P’s premature death is high, relative
to one description of E and P, but low, relative to another

158. GILLIES, supra note 14, at 119. This crucial problem for frequentist
theory—the problem of the reference class and the closely related problem of
singular probabilities—has been much discussed in the literature on
probability theory. See, e.g., id. at 119-25; HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 73,
at 338-42; KYBURG, supra note 14, at 47-51; WESLEY C. SALMON, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE 90-94 (1966); WEATHERFORD, supra
note 14, at 165-67; Howson, supra note 14, at 21-23. The multiplicity of
reference classes subsuming a particular event is crucial to Stephen Perry’s
argument that risk in the frequentist sense is not harmful. See Perry, supra
note 25, at 330-39.
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description, how can it be said that E’s occurrence has really
harmed P? I do not believe, however, that the dependence of
frequentist probabilities on how we describe particular events,
etc., necessarily makes these probabilities irrelevant to our
welfare. The soft-core frequentist can argue as follows: There
is a welfare-relevant way to characterize the event of interest E
and the person of interest P. When we characterize E and P in
WELFARE
the welfare-relevant way, we come up with classes {Ei}
WELFARE
WELFARE
; the frequency with persons in {Pi}
die
and {Pi}
WELFARE
might be high or
prematurely as a result of events in {Ei}
low; if it is high, we can say that the welfare-relevant
characterization of P and E generates a high probability of
premature death; and in this case P has indeed been harmed,
regardless of whether a different (welfare-irrelevant)
characterization of P and E generates a different probability of
premature death.
Does this line of argument work? Is there indeed a
welfare-relevant way to characterize events and persons such
that a high frequency of premature death, relative to this
characterization scheme, is indeed harmful? I suggest that the
answer is “no,” and will try to show why by examining a
number of different ways in which events and persons can be
assigned to reference classes.159
At this juncture, I should register both my great debt to,
but also partial disagreement with, Stephen Perry’s scholarship
on the harmfulness of risk. In a seminal article, Risk, Harm
and Responsibility, Perry rigorously analyzes the harmfulness
of risk for purposes of tort law.160 Perry distinguishes between
Bayesian (what he calls “subjectivist”) and frequentist
conceptions of risk;161 focuses on frequentist risk (on the
grounds that Bayesian risk seems unlikely to have moral
significance);162 explains how ascriptions of frequentist risk are
relative to reference classes;163 and concludes that frequentist
risk is not harmful, at least in a deterministic world.164 The
core of Perry’s argument on this last point, I take it, is that (1)
in a deterministic world a person who is not physically injured
by some action is at zero frequentist risk of injury, relative to
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See infra Part III.B–D.
Perry, supra note 25, at 322-39.
Id. at 322-27.
Id. at 327-28.
Id. at 333-35.
Id. at 334-36.
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what I will term a “physical” reference class, namely one
specifying all the causally relevant features of the action and
person; and therefore (2) the fact that the person has nonzero
frequentist of injury relative to a less finely specified reference
class cannot itself by a welfare setback for her.
[If] the processes that caused or might in the future cause physical
harm are deterministic, then there is no basis for saying that a person
who has been put at risk by another of suffering such harm has, just
by reason of being put at risk, sustained damage distinct in kind from
the physical harm . . . . The basis for saying that a person is at risk of
suffering a certain type of physical harm is that he or she belongs to a
particular reference class with which is associated a known objective
[i.e., frequentist] probability of harm of that type. But there is
nothing magical about the particular reference class selected:
generally it will simply be the narrowest class, given the current state
of our knowledge, for which we are able to determine with some
degree of accuracy the relative frequency of the type of harm in
question.
If we were in a position to describe the objective
probabilities associated with a still narrower reference class to which
we knew the person in question also belonged, presumably we would
do so. Moreover we know, given the assumption of determinism, that
it is in principle possible to partition any such reference class into two
subclasses, one for which the probability of physical harm is one and
one for which the probability is zero. Thus, there is simply no ground
for the claim that the objective [frequentist] probability of harm,
associated with the particular reference class that we are currently in
a position to describe, itself constitutes a distinct form of damage.165

I agree with Perry’s conclusion, here, but think the
argument is too quick. To determine whether someone is
harmed by a high frequentist risk of injury or premature death,
we need to consider different plausible accounts of well-being
and different possible specifications of the reference class
generating the high risk. Perry does not do this. His
assumption, as suggested by the above quotation, seems to be
that our interest in frequentist risk is only epistemic—as an
indicator of whether the person at risk will be injured or not.
However, frequentist risk relative to some reference class (for
example, a conventional class) might be welfare relevant on
some welfare theory (for example, a theory that emphasizes
Value and the role of conventional ascriptions in fixing Value)
independent of its epistemic function. Further, the fact that
frequentist risk is epistemically irrelevant to perfectly informed
agents in a deterministic world does not show that it lacks
epistemic and thereby welfare relevance for imperfectly
informed agents. Why look, in determining welfare, to what
165. Id. at 336.
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the person whose welfare is at issue would believe or prefer
under hypothetical conditions of full information, rather than
to what she actually believes and therefore prefers?
In point of fact, I do think that full-information preferences
are an important part of the welfare analysis, and in part for
that reason ultimately concur in Perry’s conclusion. Yet, I
believe, we cannot establish the harmlessness of risk without
explicitly considering the whole range of plausible welfare
theories (more precisely, the whole range of plausible elements
of welfare theories, namely Experience, Preference, Value and
Integration.) So I will, in my own fashion, reanalyze the
question that he addresses in Risk, Harm, and Responsibility.
My analysis does, at important junctures, overlap with his, and
at every such juncture I have (I hope) noted the debt.
B. STATISTICAL REFERENCE CLASSES
Reichenbach suggests the following principle for
subsuming a particular event within a reference class: choose
“the narrowest class for which reliable statistics can be
compiled.”166
Reichenbach’s principle, and variations thereof, is a
standard proposal within the frequentist literature.167 This
proposal might be used to generate a probability of premature
death, as follows. Given a particular event E and a particular
person P, we consider progressively more detailed (joint)
characterizations of E and P. Imagine that E is the ingestion,
at 10 p.m., on a hot summer day, of an all-beef hot dog
containing sodium nitrite, by a thirty-five-year old Caucasian
man P weighing 200 pounds, with a family history of liver
cancer, and who tends to eat red meat and other high-fat, high-

166. REICHENBACH, supra note 79, at 374. For a similar suggestion, see
A.J. Ayer, Two Notes on Probability, in THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON AND
OTHER ESSAYS 202 (1963). Reichenbach’s approach need not generate a
determinate probability, since there may be multiple classes, none narrower
than any of the others, for which reliable statistics are available and which
include a given event. See GILLIES, supra note 14, at 121. In my analysis
below, I ignore this difficulty, assume that a determinate probability is
generated, and show why—nonetheless—frequentist risk relative to a
Reichenbachian reference class is not harmful.
167. See, e.g., SALMON, supra note 158, at 91 (modifying Reichenbach’s
proposal by stipulating that the reference class should be “homogeneous”—not
further specifiable in a way that changes the frequency of the relevant
attribute—and that the broadest such class should be used to determine a
single-case probability).
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cholesterol foods. We can characterize E as “the ingestion of a
sodium nitrite-containing food item by a man,” and P as “the
man who ingests the item.” We can, with greater specificity,
characterize E as “the ingestion of a sodium nitrite-containing
food item by a man with a family history of cancer” and P as
“the man, with a family history of cancer, who ingests the
item.” With even greater specificity, we can describe E as “the
ingestion of a sodium nitrite-containing food item by a man P
with a family history of cancer and a high-fat diet” and P as
“the man, with a family history of cancer and a high-fat diet,
who ingests the item.” For some characterizations of E and P,
reliable statistics will presumably be available at or around the
time of E, while for other characterizations such information
will be unavailable.168 For example, there might be reliable
statistics about the frequency with which the ingestion of a
sodium nitrite-containing food item results in premature death,
but not about the frequency with which the ingestion of sodium
nitrite-containing hot dogs by large Caucasians with a history
of liver cancer results in premature death. Choose the most
specific characterization of E and P for which reliable statistics
are available. This characterization generates a reference class
for E and P, which I will call the “statistical” class and
STAT
STAT
and {Pi} . If the most specific such
abbreviate {Ei}
characterization of E and P is, say, “the ingestion of a sodium
nitrite-containing food item by a man with a history of liver
STAT
is the set of all ingestions169 of sodium
cancer,” then {Ei}
nitrite-containing food items by men with a history of liver
STAT
is the set of men who ingest those items.
cancer, and {Pi}
168. See REICHENBACH, supra note 79, at 377-78. Reichenbach states,
We can ask only for the best reference class available, the reference
class that, on the basis of our present knowledge, will lead to the
greatest number of successful predictions, whether they concern hits
of bombs, cases of disease, or political events. If no statistics are
available for the common class A.C., we shall base our probability
calculations on the reference class A, and must renounce
improvement in the success ratio that might result from the use of
the reference class A.C.
Id.
STAT
169. More precisely, {Ei}
could be: (1) the finite set of all such ingestions
that have actually occurred; (2) the infinite set of hypothetical ingestions that
would occur, were the right sort of event-generating scenario (here, having a
man with a history of liver cancer eat a sodium nitrite-containing food item) to
occur repeatedly ad infinitum; or (3) a set of mathematical constructs
representing the first or the second. See supra notes 77-80 (discussing
whether the relevant objects, for the frequentist, are actual, hypothetical, or
mathematical).
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These classes can then be used to calculate what I will call the
“statistical” probability that our particular event E will result
in the premature death of our particular person P, namely, the
STAT
die earlier than
frequency with which persons within {Pi}
STAT
not
they would have had the matching events within {Ei}
occurred.
Consider, now, our two outcomes, safer OS and riskier OR,
on the assumption that the high probability of death in OR is a
statistical probability.
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account, with
Statistical Probabilities
— OS is a world in which E does not occur.
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) the frequency
with which people statistically similar to P, exposed to
events statistically similar to E, die prematurely, is
high. In other words, the relative frequency of
STAT
premature death by persons within {Pi} , as a result
STAT
STAT
STAT
(where {Pi}
and {Ei}
are
of events within {Ei}
the narrowest classes for which reliable statistics can be
compiled) is high.
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s
welfare.
Is OR worse for P than OS? I think not.
First, OR need not be worse than OS with respect to the
Experience component of welfare. An event E creates a high
statistical probability of P’s premature death just in case the
most specific characterization of E and P (given currently
available information) generates a high frequency of premature
death. The occurrence of such an event does not entail any
change in P’s mental states.170 E itself could be an event
external to P’s mind (either an event that occurs in the outside
world, or an event that involves bodily but not mental changes
STAT
STAT
and {Pi}
are the
in P). And the statistical classes {Ei}
narrowest classes for which reliable statistics can be compiled;
this may not be information about which P herself is aware.
For example, a dangerous event such as a toxic release, unsafe
behavior by co-workers, or a change in supervisory practices,
could occur in P’s workplace without P’s knowledge or
awareness, and without her knowledge or awareness of the
frequency with which statistically similar events result in
170. Cf. Perry, supra note 25, at 338 (arguing that frequentist risk is not
harmful in itself, but could be once discovered by the person at risk).
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premature death to statistically similar persons. In such cases,
the claim that OR is worse for P than OS runs afoul of the
standard Experientialist principle that welfare supervenes on
mental states.171
To be sure, one can imagine unusual cases where OR is
statistically riskier for P than OS, where the two outcomes are
otherwise identical for P’s welfare, but where OR and OS still
differ with respect to P’s experience. This will occur when the
event of interest, E, itself involves a change in P’s mental life.
For example, E might be a shockingly scary nightmare, and it
might emerge that the statistical frequency with which
shockingly scary nightmares result in the premature death (by
heart attack, say) of the persons experiencing such nightmares
is high. Even here, however, an Experientialist would deny
that the statistical probability of premature death is itself
harmful. What makes OR worse for P, if anything, is the scary
nightmare—not the statistical probability of death thus
produced, i.e., the fact that statistically similar nightmares
often result in premature death to persons statistically similar
to P. That fact, itself, need not enter P’s experience. Further, if
we imagine a case in which P does become aware of the
statistics about the risky event, then we have added something
to OR other than the high statistical probability of P’s
premature death—namely, P’s awareness of that probability—
and it is this additional feature, not the probability itself, that
makes OR worse for P.
Second, the claim that statistical probabilities are harmful
runs afoul of the Preference component of welfare. Why? After

171. Conceivably, the Experience component of welfare might be specified
in a form weaker than a supervenience requirement. See supra text
accompanying note 61 (noting this possibility).
For example, the
Experientialist might stipulate that two outcomes can differ for P’s welfare
only if they differ in some way accessible to P’s experience. The Experience
requirement, thus weakened, is consistent with the harmfulness of statistical
and more generally frequentist risk. But is the requirement, in this form, a
plausible part of a welfare account? Why hew to the intuition that welfare has
something to do with our mental states and yet flesh it out in such a minimal
way? I do not pursue these issues here because even if the view that
statistical and, more generally, frequentist risk is harmful is consistent with
the best construal of the Experience requirement, it is problematic on other
grounds. See infra text accompanying notes 172-83, 186-90, 195-200 (arguing
that frequentist risk relative to statistical, physical, and conventional
reference classes does not satisfy the Value, Preference, and/or Integration
elements of welfare, and raising further objections to the claim that
frequentist risk in the physical or conventional sense is harmful).
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all, people can prefer or disprefer anything. P might prefer the
nonoccurrence of events which impose a high statistical
probability of premature death on him.
If P has this
preference, then P prefers OS to OR, and won’t the
Preferentialist therefore conclude that OS is better for P’s
welfare than OR? The problem is that Preferentialists, quite
typically (and quite plausibly), stipulate that welfareconstitutive preferences must be fully informed.172 Yet it is
very hard to see why P, under conditions of full information,
would prefer OS to OR.
Consider once more the case where E is the ingestion, at 10
p.m., on a hot summer day, of an all-beef hot dog containing
sodium nitrite by a thirty-five-year old Caucasian man P
weighing 200 pounds, with a family history of liver cancer, and
who tends to eat red meat and other high-fat, high-cholesterol
STAT
for which reliable
foods. The narrowest reference class {Ei}
statistics are available might be all “ingestions of a sodium
nitrite-containing food item by a man with a history of liver
cancer.” Yet P, under full information, would also know the
relative frequency of premature death given a much more
specific reference class including all the causally relevant
features of E—namely, “ingestions of sodium nitrite-containing
food items by Caucasian men who weigh 200 pounds, who
subsist on high-fat diets, who have a family history of liver
cancer, and who . . . .” I will use the term “physical probability”
to mean frequencies relative to classes of events and persons,
PHYS
PHYS
and {Pi} , that share all the causally relevant features
{Ei}
of E and P—not merely the features about which good
statistical data is actually available.173 I submit that P’s
preferences, under conditions of full information, would be
driven by the physical probability of death and not the
statistical probability.
Statistical and physical probabilities are gauges or
indicators of P’s security; they indicate whether E is a
substantial or insubstantial threat to P’s continued existence.
It is plausible that P (both in his actual state and his fully
informed state) would prefer his continued existence not to be
insecure. Thus P would plausibly prefer that the best available
gauge not indicate a high level of insecurity. But the physical
172. See sources cited supra note 45.
173. For rigorous discussions of what I am calling physical probability, see
GILLIES, supra note 14, at 125-29; HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 73, at 33842.
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probabilities are a better gauge of P’s security than the
STAT
statistical probabilities. The statistical reference class {Ei}
includes events that are roughly similar, in their causal
PHYS
includes
features, to E; the physical reference class {Ei}
events that are perfectly similar, in their causal features, to
E.174 Any deviation between the statistical and the physical
probabilities reflects a lacuna in the stock of information used
to generate the statistical probabilities. Society, at or around
the time of E, simply lacks reliable relative-frequency data
about the correlation between some of E’s casually relevant
features, and premature death; and thus those relevant-butpoorly-understood features are ignored in generating the
STAT
statistical reference class {Ei} .175
The third plausible component of well-being, along with
Experience and Preference, is the Value component. Here, too,
serious difficulties arise for the claim that a high statistical
probability of premature death is harmful. How can I say
anything definitive about the comparative value of OR and OS?
After all, various philosophers of well-being including Martha
Nussbaum, John Finnis, George Sher, and others have
proposed diverse lists of putative welfare values and have
grounded these lists in different foundational considerations
(the human essence, near-universal and -unavoidable goals,
shared understandings of the good life).176
Notwithstanding this continuing scholarly disagreement
about the content of welfare-values, and about their basis, it is
174. Reichenbach himself was quite straightforward about the fact that
statistical probabilities reflect our imperfect information. See REICHENBACH,
supra note 79, at 375 (“[T]he probability of a single case [generated using the
narrowest class for which reliable statistics can be compiled] is . . . dependent
on our state of knowledge . . . .”). Perry generally argues that frequentist
probabilities, other than physical probabilities, are not welfare relevant
because our interest in such probabilities does not persist as our information
increases. See Perry, supra note 25, at 334-37.
175. I am conceding here that a high physical probability of premature
death does satisfy the Preference component of well-being—more precisely,
that two outcomes differentiated by a high physical death probability are
(consistent with Preference) different for the subject’s welfare.
That
concession may be unwarranted. Arguably the preferences over outcomes of a
fully informed agent, concerned about her own physical security, would be
driven neither by the statistical probability of premature death, nor by the
physical probability, but just by the occurrence of premature death itself. See
infra note 185. But this point, if true, hardly rehabilitates the case for the
welfare relevance of statistical probability.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56 (discussing these proponents
of a Value-based theory of welfare).
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(I think) possible to make a claim that all value theorists would
assent to, namely, that welfare values are objective.177 Values
do not merely reflect what P himself prefers or wants; they
have a more robust normative status than that.178 In turn, it is
quite plausible that there is a deep connection between
objective values and the preferences of idealized agents.
Plausibly, one outcome is objectively more valuable than
another only if all persons (or perhaps all persons within a
certain type of group, for example a society), under ideal
conditions, would prefer the first outcome. The philosopher
Michael Smith, among others, has argued persuasively for this
account of “objective value.”
[W]hat it is desirable for us to do is what we would desire that we
do if we were fully rational. In other words . . . what it is desirable for
us to do in certain circumstances—let’s call these circumstances the
‘evaluated possible world’—is what we, not as we actually are, but as
we would be in a possible world in which we are fully rational—let’s
call this the ‘evaluating possible world’—would want ourselves to do
in those circumstances. . . .
Typically, of course, the evaluated world will be the actual world.
Thus, what it is desirable for us to do in our actual circumstances is
what our more rational selves, looking down on ourselves as we
actually are from their more privileged position, would want us to do
in our actual circumstances.179

Assume Smith’s account of objective value is correct. Then
OS is better for P than OR only if all persons, fully informed (or
at least the appropriate group of persons, fully informed) would
177. See, e.g., HURKA, supra note 49, at 5 (describing his account as
“objective”); PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499 (presenting a list of plausible
welfare goods under the rubric of an “Objective List Theory” of well-being);
SHER, supra note 49, at 229 (describing his account as “objective”); SUMNER,
supra note 8, at 45-80 (discussing and criticizing objective theories of wellbeing, including Finnis’s and Nussbaum’s). Griffin declines to describe his list
of welfare values as “objective,” meaning that these obtain independent of
desires, but he would, I think, agree that the values do not reduce to the
subject’s own desires and, in that sense, are objective. See GRIFFIN, supra
note 23, at 29, 35-36.
178. On the nature of value, see generally GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 52-67;
JOEL J. KUPPERMAN, VALUE . . . AND WHAT FOLLOWS 1-83 (1999); NOAH M.
LEMOS, INTRINSIC VALUE: CONCEPT AND WARRANT 3-100 (1994); RAMON M.
LEMOS, THE NATURE OF VALUE: AXIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1-71 (1995).
179. MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 151-52 (1994); cf. David Lewis,
Dispositional Theories of Value, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY 63 Supplemental Vol. 113 (1989) (defining value in terms of secondorder desires); Connie S. Rosati, Internalism and the Good for a Person, 106
ETHICS 297, 307 (1996) (defining the good for a person P as roughly what P
hypothetically would care about under idealized conditions that P actually
regards as welfare relevant).
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prefer to be P in OS rather than P in OR. But I have already
argued that P, if fully informed, would focus on the physical
probability of his premature death rather than the statistical
probability. The physical probability of P’s premature death is
a better indicator of P’s security than the statistical probability
of his premature death. For just the same reason, other fully
informed agents (if contemplating the choice between being P
in OR, and being P in OS) would care about the physical and not
the statistical probability of premature death. Therefore, the
fact that OR is statistically riskier for P than OS does not make
OR less valuable for P.180
We come now to the fourth and final component of welfare:
Integration. Integration demands that welfare changes occur
“within” the subject’s life.181 They must be changes in the
world that make it worse “for the subject,” not worse (merely)
for someone else or in some detached, impersonal way. The
Integration requirement poses real difficulties for the claim
that probabilities, in the frequentist sense, can be harmful or
beneficial.
Consider OS and OR. What differentiates the two outcomes
is the following fact: in OR, an event E occurs such that a high
proportion of events “similar to” to E result in premature death
to people “similar to” P. The notion of “similarity,” here, may
be cashed in statistical terms, in physical terms, or in some
other terms. However we generate our classes {Ei} and {Pi}, the
essential point remains: A high “probability” of premature
death for P, in the frequentist sense, means a high frequency of
premature death within some group of persons, {Pi}, that
includes P. But this “group fact” does not change P’s own life—
or so it seems.182 Although a group including P may have a
high frequency of some harmful attribute, what matters for P’s
well-being is whether she herself has the attribute. If P has
the attribute, then she is harmed, and the fact that only a few
other members of the group share the attribute does not lessen
180. But see Finkelstein, supra note 25 (manuscript at 13) (arguing that
the risk of harm in the frequentist sense is itself a harm, in the sense of being
a setback to an “interest,” where “an agent’s interests [are] an expanded set of
goods derivable in some way from the preferences the agent actually has”).
181. See supra text accompanying note 61.
182. See Perry, supra note 25, at 335 (“[Frequentist probabilities] have
been defined with respect to a certain class of persons . . . . But it is
individuals who are said to suffer risk damage, not classes of persons, and
therein lies the fallacy of the claim that risk damage constitutes injury in its
own right.”).

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1356

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

the harm. Likewise, if P lacks the attribute, then she is
unharmed, and the fact that many other members of the group
have the attribute does not amount to a harm for P herself.
The high relatively frequency of premature death, or some
other negative attribute, within a group of persons {Pi} that
happens to includes P, is a feature of an outcome that
(seemingly) is too remote from P’s own life to satisfy
Integration.
P is, let us imagine, a redhead; the first letter of his last
name is “S”; and he owns a truck. Imagine a world in which
many redheaded truck owners whose last names begin with “T”
suffer from terrible cluster headaches. Imagine another world
in which few or no redheaded truck owners whose last names
begin with “T” incur such headaches. In short, in the first
world there is a high relative frequency of cluster headaches
among a group of persons excluding P, and in the second world
there is a low relative frequency of cluster headaches among
that group. Does this difference between the two outcomes
change P’s well-being? No—at least not if the Integration
requirement has any bite.
Now change the example slightly so that P’s last name
begins with “T.” Thus, in the first world there is a high relative
frequency of cluster headaches among a group of persons
including P, and in the second world there is a low relative
frequency of cluster headaches among that group. Does the
sheer fact of P’s inclusion in the group satisfy the Integration
requirement, so that we now can say the second world is better
for P than the first world? All that P shares with his “fellow”
group members is truck ownership, red hair, and a last name
beginning with T. In the first example, an increase in the rate
of cluster headaches did not suffice to change P’s own life.
Why, in the second example, should an increase in the rate of
cluster headaches among a group of persons tenuously linked to
P (redhaired, T-named truck owners) suffice to do so?
The lesson of these examples, I submit, is that a high
relative frequency of premature death or some other negative
attribute within some group {Pi} does not satisfy the
Integration requirement, with respect to P, merely because P is
included within the {Pi}. On the other hand, we can imagine
much stronger links between P and the {Pi} than mere
inclusion.183 For example, imagine that P identifies with the
183. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
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{Pi}. P is a male Sephardic Jew; a high proportion of male
Sephardic Jews suffer cluster headaches; and P self-identifies
as a male, Sephardic Jew. In this case, the Integration
requirement arguably permits the high rate of cluster
headaches among the {Pi} to be counted as a harm to P himself.
The “group fact” about male Sephardic Jews is also, arguably, a
fact about P’s own life. Even if P avoids the headache, he
himself is arguably worse off in a world in which many of his
fellow male Sephardic Jews—a group that not only includes P,
but is defined by characteristics that are highly salient to P—
suffer the headache.
Now back to statistical probabilities. OR is a world in
which the relative frequency of premature death, among the
STAT
who are “statistically” similar to P, is
class of persons {Pi}
STAT
is
high. What P shares with the other members of {Pi}
having a particular set of characteristics whose correlation with
premature death is relatively well documented. P need not
STAT
identify with {Pi} . Indeed, where an event generates a high
statistical probability of premature death for P, P need not
(and, in the normal case, will not) have any idea what the
defining characteristics of the statistical similarity class are.
For that matter, P need not (and, in the normal case, will not)
have any idea what a statistical similarity class is. The linkage
STAT
is not personal (P’s own
between P and the {Pi}
identification), nor is it social (how ordinary members of P’s
society would characterize P), nor is it physical (the group
sharing all of P’s causally relevant characteristics). The
STAT
is the grouping that would
linkage is, rather, forensic—{Pi}
be salient to qualified statisticians, operating at a particular
point in time, with a particular information base—and this
linkage is probably not strong enough to satisfy any nonminimal Integration requirement.
C. PHYSICAL REFERENCE CLASSES
Is a high physical probability of premature death a welfare
setback?184 Consider our two outcomes, OS and OR, with the
PUB. AFF. 107, 148-49 (1976) (defining “social group” and arguing that harms
to social groups are harms to their members).
184. Perry suggests that a high physical probability of premature death, in
an indeterministic universe, could well be a welfare setback. See Perry, supra
note 25, at 336-37. I disagree, for reasons elaborated in the text immediately
below. See infra text accompanying notes 185-88. In brief, the problems of
Experience and Integration do not disappear with the shift from statistical to
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difference between the two now specified in terms of physical
(rather than statistical) probability.
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account, with
Physical Probabilities
— OS is a world in which E does not occur.
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs, and (2) the physical
probability that E results in P’s premature death is
high. In other words, the relative frequency of
PHYS
premature death within {Pi} , as a result of events
PHYS
PHYS
(where {Pi}
is the class of persons
within {Ei}
sharing all of P’s causally relevant characteristics, and
PHYS
the class of events sharing all of E’s causally
{Ei}
relevant characteristics) is high.
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s
welfare.
In my discussion above, I suggested that physical probabilities
of premature death are plausibly dispreferred (even under full
information) and that these physical probabilities are plausibly
value reducing. In short, OR is plausibly worse for P than OS,
with respect to the Preference and Value components of wellbeing.185 Should we conclude that risk, in the physicalprobability sense, is indeed a welfare setback?
This conclusion would, I think, be too hasty. First, the
physical probability of premature death—like the statistical
probability of premature death—is not a setback with respect
to the Experience component of well-being. Unless E is itself a

physical probabilities.
185. It could be argued that OR is not worse than OS with respect to
Preference, to the extent that the preferences must be fully informed, and
therefore not worse with respect to Value either. It seems quite plausible that
a fully informed agent would ex ante disprefer the occurrence of an event
involving a high physical probability of her premature death, as compared to
nonoccurrence—but this is not the same as saying that she would disprefer an
outcome characterized by a high physical probability of premature death, as
compared to an otherwise-identical outcome characterized by a lower physical
probability. Insofar as she is motivated by physical security, her preference
against the occurrence of such an event is purely instrumental, not intrinsic,
and thus outcomes differentiated solely by the occurrence of that event are
just the same for her welfare. A possible response here, I suppose, is that P’s
preferences over outcomes are determined by looking to her fully-informed ex
ante preferences. This response raises deep issues about the nature and
determination of preferences over outcomes—over whole possible worlds—
which I will not pursue, since even if OR and OS are different with respect to
Preference and Value, the putative welfare relevance of physical probability
encounters further difficulties discussed in this section.
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mental event (say, a shockingly scary nightmare), P’s mental
states will not be different in OS and OR. And in the case where
E is itself a mental event, it will be that experiential feature of
OR, not the physical probability of premature death associated
with E, that (according to the Experientialist) makes OR worse
for P than OS.
Second, it is doubtful, or at least very unclear, whether OR
is worse than OS with respect to the Integration component of
well-being. In OR, an event E occurs such that physically
PHYS
similar events (events within {Ei} ) frequently cause
premature death to persons physically similar to P (persons
PHYS
within {Pi} ). Is this “group fact” about OR sufficient to make
OR worse for P? In discussing statistical probabilities, I
suggested that a high frequency of harm within some group {Pi}
could not be taken as a harm to P—given the Integration
requirement—merely because {Pi} includes P. I conceded,
however, that a high frequency of harm within some group {Pi}
could be taken as a harm to P—consistent with that
requirement—if P identifies with the {Pi}.186 Clearly, P need
not identify with the class of persons physically similar to him.
A high physical probability of premature death does not entail
P’s awareness of that probability; likewise, it does not entail P’s
awareness of the causally relevant characteristics that he
PHYS
shares with the other members of {Pi} , or his identification
with that group.
PHYS
is too
Perhaps my demand that P identify with the {Pi}
robust. Could there be some linkage between a person and a
group suffering a high frequency of harm, weaker than
identification, which suffices for that group fact to be counted
as a welfare loss for the person himself? One such linkage
might be social. If P is conventionally or socially linked to the
group, then arguably a high frequency of harm within the
group is sufficiently integrated within P’s life to be welfare
reducing for him, even if P himself does not identify with the
group.187 Does the linkage of physical similarity between P and
a group also function to integrate the group’s harm into P’s own
186. See supra text accompanying note 183.
187. Cf. Fiss, supra note 183, at 148.
Fiss points to individual
identification in determining an individual’s membership in a “social group”
but also suggests that social identification plays a role: “Blacks are viewed as a
group; they view themselves as a group; their identity is in large part
determined by membership in the group; their social status is linked to the
status of the group; and much of our action, institutional and personal, is
based on these perspectives.” Id.

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1360

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

life?
I doubt it. Imagine that P has two genetically identical
siblings, Q and R, who were separated from P at birth and live
in a different country. P considers Q and R to be virtual
strangers to him; they mean little more to him than a stranger
he might meet on the train.188 In short, P does not identify
with Q and R; nor do the members of P’s society identify him
with Q and R, given their residence elsewhere. We might
imagine that P prefers that Q and R not suffer harm, just as we
might imagine that P prefers the stranger he meets on the
train not to suffer harm. Even if the stranger on the train does
suffer harm, and P learns of that, P himself will be no worse off
(if welfare includes an Integration requirement). Imagine,
instead, that Q and R are harmed, and P learns of that. What
differentiates Q and R from the stranger on the train is their
genetic similarity to P; but neither P nor others in P’s society
see this similarity as creating a stronger bond between P and
Q/R, than between P and the stranger. If so, I suggest, harms
to Q and R are just as remote from P’s own life as harms to the
stranger. To be sure, physical similarity and genetic similarity
are conceptually different, but it is very hard to see why
physical similarity absent individual identification or social
linkage should satisfy Integration, while genetic similarity
absent individual identification or social linkage does not.
Third and finally, even if the objections from Experience
and Integration are answered, and a high physical probability
of premature death is properly viewed as a welfare setback, it
is unclear how much relevance this type of harm would have
for risk regulators. Why? Consider the following crucial
feature of physical probabilities. Physical probabilities can lie
between 0 and 1 only if causal laws are indeterministic.189 In a
world with deterministic causal laws, where every occurrence is
in principle predictable, with certainty, from preexisting
conditions, the physical probability of an event having some
attribute is either 1 (if the event ends up having the attribute)
or 0 (if it does not).
To see this point, imagine that the pitch of a canary’s song
is completely determined by the canary’s weight, length, and
188. See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing the “stranger on the
train” example, which illustrates that people can have preferences for
outcomes detached from their own welfare, viz., the stranger’s success).
189. See sources cited supra note 173 (discussing the link between physical
probabilities and indeterminism).
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eye color. For a given combination of weight, length, and eye
color, the casual laws necessitate that the canary’s pitch will
either be high or low. What is the physical probability that the
song a particular canary, Candy, sings tomorrow will have a
high pitch? Note that the statistical probability of Candy’s
song having a high pitch might lie between 0 and 1. It might
be, say, 0.3. If we only have reliable statistics linking weight
and pitch, and if the frequency with which canaries statistically
similar to Candy—canaries weighing the same amount—have a
high-pitched song is 0.3, then the statistical probability of
Candy’s song having a high pitch is 0.3. However, the physical
probability of Candy’s song having a high pitch is necessarily
either 1 (just in case the song will, in fact, turn out to be highpitched) or 0 (just in case the song will, in fact, turn out to be
low-pitched). Assume the song will have a high pitch. Then
Candy has a combination of weight, length, and eye-color
characteristics necessitating a high-pitched song. The class of
canaries physically identical to Candy is the class of canaries
that are the same weight, length, and eye color as Candy. And
the relative frequency of high-pitched songs within this class is
1 (since the causal laws necessitate, for each and every member
of this group, that its song be high pitched). Similarly, if
Candy’s song will turn out to be low pitched, the relative
frequency of low-pitched songs within the class of physically
similar canaries is 1, and the relative frequency of high-pitched
songs within that class is 0.
Modern physics tells us that determinism does not obtain
at the level of quantum mechanics. But it could well be the
case that causal laws at the level of human physiology—causal
laws linking the large-scale events of interest to risk
regulators, with premature human death—are deterministic.
As Stephen Perry explains,
It seems clear . . . that true indeterminism exists at the level of subatomic particles, but there is some reason to think that random
deviations in different directions compensate for one another, in effect
washing indeterminism out of the system at the macroscopic level. If
that were the case then interactions among what J.L. Austin called
medium-sized dry goods would, for all intents and purposes, be
deterministic in character.190

190. Perry, supra note 25, at 337; see HOWSON & URBACH, supra note 73,
at 341 (similarly distinguishing between macro-level determinism and microlevel indeterminism); Kenneth F. Schaffner, Causing Harm: Epidemiological
and Physiological Concepts of Causation, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE
AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 204, 208 (1991) (same); Alvin Goldman,
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In short, notwithstanding the indeterminacy of quantum
mechanics, it is quite unclear whether the physical probability
of some macroscopic event E resulting in a given person’s
premature death—where E is, say, a toxic release, the ingestion
of some food, an industrial practice, the emission of some
pollutant or some such event targeted by regulatory agencies—
ever takes a numerical value other than 1, in the case where
death results, or 0, in the case where it doesn’t. If the causal
laws relevant to risk regulators are indeed deterministic, it is
incoherent to conceptualize a high physical probability of
premature death as a harm that is separate from, and
additional to, the harm of death itself.
D. CONVENTIONAL REFERENCE CLASSES
The probability that E results in P’s premature death could
be determined by placing E and P within classes of events and
persons that are conventionally similar to E and P, rather than
statistically similar or physically similar.191 We might ask how
an ordinary person, within P’s society, would characterize E
and P—more precisely, how an ordinary person, concerned to
gauge the risk that E imposes on P, would characterize E and
P. For example, if E is the ingestion, at 10 p.m., on a hot
summer day, of an all-beef hot dog containing sodium nitrite by
a thirty-five-year old Caucasian man P weighing 200 pounds,
with a family history of liver cancer, and who tends to eat red
meat and other high-fat, high-cholesterol foods, then the
ordinary person might see this as a case of a large white man
CONV
, the class of events
eating a meat product. {Ei}
conventionally similar to E, would be the class of all eatings of
CONV
is the class of men
meat products by large white men; {Pi}
CONV
CONV
and {Pi}
are
who eat these products. Clearly, {Ei}
STAT
STAT
PHYS
PHYS
and {Pi} , and {Ei}
and {Pi} ,
different from {Ei}
respectively.192 The “conventional” probability that E results in
Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence 14-15 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (same).
191. Sociologists, in particular, have emphasized the conventionality of risk
ascriptions. For reviews of the sociological literature on risk, see SHRADERFRECHETTE, supra note 5, at 27-52; Kasperson, supra note 69; Palmlund,
supra note 69; Rayner, supra note 69; Renn, supra note 69.
192. The huge literature on the discrepancy between “lay” and “expert” risk
perceptions bears out my point that the conventional (i.e., lay) and statistical
(i.e., expert) reference classes used to generate probabilities in the frequentist
sense can differ. See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 5, at 1071-85
(discussing the lay/expert discrepancy and citing sources); Richard H. Pildes &
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P’s premature death is, let us say, the frequency with which
CONV
die earlier than they would have had the
persons within {Pi}
CONV
not occurred.
matching events within {Ei}
Is OR worse than OS for P, when the difference between the
two outcomes is specified in terms of conventional probability?
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Frequentist Account, with
Conventional Probabilities
— OS is a world in which E does not occur.
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs, and (2) the
conventional probability that E results in P’s premature
death is high. In other words, the relative frequency of
CONV
, as a result of events
premature death within {Pi}
CONV
, is high.
within {Ei}
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s
welfare.
Note that the conventional probability of premature death, like
the statistical probability of premature death—and unlike the
physical probability of premature death—can take a value
other than 0 or 1, and can be distinguished from the actual
occurrence of premature death, even in a world where causal
laws are deterministic. Note too that a high conventional
probability of premature death—unlike a high statistical or
physical probability—arguably satisfies the Integration
requirement. As I have already suggested, it is arguable that a
high frequency of harm to some group is sufficiently integrated
into P’s own life, to count as a welfare setback to him, if P is
socially or conventionally linked to the group even if P himself
does not identify with the group.193
Nonetheless, it is problematic to claim that a high
conventional probability of premature death is itself a welfare
setback. First, that claim runs afoul of the Experiential
component of welfare, for just the same reason that the parallel
claims with respect to statistical and physical probability do.194
Second, I am not persuaded that OR—specified in terms of
conventional probability—is worse than OS as a matter of
Preference or Value. P might prefer OS to OR, but would he
prefer OS under conditions of full information? Physical
probability is a better gauge of P’s security from premature
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4864 (1995) (same).
193. See supra text accompanying note 187.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71, 185.
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death than either statistical or conventional probability, so why
think that fully informed P would care about a high
conventional probability of a premature death? Similarly, why
think that agents under ideal conditions (including full
information) would converge on the judgment that it is better
to be P in OS than P in OR?
The answer could be that fully informed P, and ideal
agents more generally, would care about a high conventional
probability of P’s premature death under some heading other
than “security from premature death.” Consider this analogy.
An outcome in which P is conventionally thought to be stupid is
worse for P, with respect to Value and Preference, than an
outcome in which P is not conventionally thought to be stupid.
But this is not because conventional judgments of stupidity are
the best gauge of stupidity. Rather, it is intrinsically bad to be
thought stupid; and thus fully informed P, and ideal agents,
would disprefer an outcome in which the ordinary member of
P’s society takes him to be stupid, even though there are much
better indicators of P’s real intelligence than this ordinary
judgment.195
I am not persuaded that the analogy works. Certain
beliefs that others might hold about P—in particular, the belief
that P is less than a full person, or lacks some characteristic
ordinarily held by full persons, or has acted in a way that full
persons do not or ought not act—surely do satisfy the Value
and Preference components of well-being. Fully informed P,
and ideal agents considering the prospect of being P, would
disprefer outcomes in which others have such beliefs about P—
quite apart from other, negative consequences with which such
beliefs might be linked. Yet beliefs about P’s security are not, I
think, like this. P’s stupidity detracts from her full personhood;
her vulnerability to premature death does not, since even the
fullest of (human) persons must die, and indeed will die
prematurely as a result of some event, relative to the time of
death had the event not occurred. Imagine two outcomes
differentiated solely by the fact that, in one outcome, P’s fellow

195. Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1422-25, 1432-33, 1445-47 (2000)
(describing the widespread argument, within constitutional and criminal-law
scholarship, that draws a link between the lowered social status for a given
category of individuals constituted by prevalent beliefs that they lack full
personhood, and the harm of lowered self-respect suffered by those
individuals).
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citizens believe him to be at high risk of an early heart attack,
while in the second outcome they do not possess this belief.
The citizens’ remaining beliefs, and their actions, are identical
in both outcomes. Would P under full information disprefer the
first outcome, even if (as he knows under full information) the
physical probability of an early heart attack is low? It is hard
to see why he would.
Finally, it is an open question whether conventional
probabilities actually exist. Given some event E, E has a
conventional probability (high or low) of some attribute only if
there are existing norms, practices, or understandings, within
When we
the relevant society, for characterizing E.196
hypothesize how an “ordinary” person would envision the
threat that E poses to P’s security, we mean a person who
follows the prevailing norms for characterizing risky events.
Absent some such norms, there would be no reason to expect
any consensus in the characterization of E—no single reference
class that all or most members of the society would deploy in
judging E’s riskiness.
Much work in sociology suggests that collective norms for
characterizing risky events (if they ever existed) have broken
down, at least in the United States and other developed
countries. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, in their socalled “cultural” theory of risk, famously argue that three
divergent “cultures,” or socially constructed forms of life and
world-views—a market culture, a hierarchical culture, and a
sectarian culture—coexist in the United States and
substantially shape risk perception.
[P]ublic perception of risk and its acceptable levels are collective
constructs, a bit like language and a bit like aesthetic judgment . . . .
....
. . . Analysis of this kind recognizes different types of cultures
resulting from their members’ sustained attention to feasible social
goals. Three have seemed sufficient for the thesis being argued. Two
of these derive from the established stock of political thought in the
West, market individualism and hierarchy. Neither encompasses the
structure and goals of the environmental movement. [That movement
exemplifies] the [cultural] type we have called sectarian. . . . [T]he
risks of war are not acceptable to the hierarchist because he is

196. On social facts in general, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION
SOCIAL REALITY 1-126 (1995). Social norms, in particular, have garnered
much recent attention by legal scholars. See Adler, supra note 195, at 1373
n.44. Helping to define a legally operative concept (in this case, risk) is
certainly the kind of legal role that social norms could play.
OF
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focused on dangers of foreign relations . . . . Risks of economic collapse
are ever present to the mind of the market individualist . . . . Risks
from technology are uppermost in the sectarian mind . . . .197

In short, whether an individual tends to perceive a high
level of “risks of human violence,” as opposed to “risks from
technology,” or “risks from economic failure,” depends on her
“cultural” type (hierarchical, sectarian, market).198 To be sure,
Douglas and Wildavsky’s reduction of risk perception and
evaluation to three cultural types, thus specified, is quite
controversial within the sociological literature on risk.199 But
their work advances a broader point: that in a modern society
there exist multiple and competing socially constructed entities
that guide risk perception and evaluation. These socially
constructed entities are what I referred to above as norms for
characterizing risky events. They might be specified as “ways
of life,” perspectives, world-views, or cultural patterns. In any
event, the broader Douglas/Wildavsky thesis that in a
developed society divergent norms will produce divergent
perceptions of the riskiness, and appropriate response to, a
given event is not controversial among sociologists. To quote
one recent review article,
By going beyond purely psychological analyses, the social
approaches to risk perception highlight . . . that the notion of a ‘lay’
public as an undifferentiated risk-perceiving entity is a misnomer: a
society is always composed of many groups with very different
attitudes towards, and appraisals of, what risk is, which risks should
be run, and what values are relevant to making acceptability
decisions.200

E. HYBRID ACCOUNTS
I have repeatedly noted that risk, in the frequentist sense,
is not harmful with respect to the Experience component of
welfare.201 The reader might wonder why the complaint is not
answered by hybridizing a frequentist probability with a

197. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY
SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 186-88
(1982).
198. Id. at 187.
199. See, e.g., SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 5, at 29-39; Rayner, supra
note 69, at 83.
200. Nick F. Pidgeon & Jane Beattie, The Psychology of Risk and
Uncertainty, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT 289, 302 (Peter Calow ed., 1998).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71, 185, 194.
ON THE
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mental state, such as a belief.202 In other words, construe OR
and OS as follows:
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Hybrid Account, with
Frequentist Probabilities
— OS is a world in which E does not occur.
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) the
frequentist probability (in some sense) of P dying
prematurely as a result of E is high, and in addition (3)
P “experiences” the difference between the outcomes,
i.e., believes he is subject to a high frequentist
probability of dying prematurely as a result of E.
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s
welfare.
Isn’t it now the case that OR is worse for P than OS? After all,
the Experientialist demand for supervenience is satisfied, since
P in OR has a mental state (a belief) which he lacks in OS. Note
further that the Integration component of welfare is also
satisfied, since (as I shall argue at greater length below)203
differences in someone’s mental states are plausibly sufficient if
not necessary to satisfy Integration.
Still, it is not clear that OR is really worse for OS. Here
again is a point that shall be developed at greater length below,
in the course of my analysis of the Bayesian view of risk: it is
open to question whether mere differences in what someone
believes can change the value of outcomes for him. 204 To begin,
assume that mere beliefs do not change the value of outcomes.
If so, and if the high frequentist “probability” in OR is either a
high statistical probability or a high conventional probability,
the upshot will be that OR is not worse than OS with respect to
the Value and Preference components of welfare. As I have
already argued, neither a high statistical probability of
premature death, nor a high conventional probability, is a
202. It is a standard view, within the philosophical literature on value, that
things can be valuable as parts of larger wholes. See, e.g., NOAH M. LEMOS,
supra note 178, at 32 (articulating the “principle of organic unities,” namely
“that the value of some wholes is not the same as the sum of the values of
their parts”); RAMON M. LEMOS, supra note 178, at 41-52 (discussing
“contributory value”). By extension (or equivalently), it is plausible that the
welfare impact of a hybrid entity is not always separable into the welfare
value of its parts. In the economic tradition, this problem goes under the
heading of “separability.” See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS 60-89 (1991)
(discussing separability).
203. See infra text accompanying notes 208-10.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 214-22.
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setback with respect to either Value or Preference.205 If,
alternatively, the high frequentist probability in OR is a high
physical probability, the problem of determinism emerges—a
problem that besets any physicalist defense of the “risk is
harm” claim, be it a hybrid or simple defense.
Next, let us assume that mere differences in what someone
believes can change the value of outcomes from him. Now,
OR—construed as a hybrid of a high frequentist probability of
premature death for P, plus P’s belief that this probability
obtains—is worse for P than OS. Experience and Integration
are satisfied and, given our altered assumption about value, so
are Value and Preference. But by altering the assumption
about Value (and Preference), we have made frequentist
probability superfluous to any harm that P suffers. Imagine a
world OR*, in which (1) E occurs, and (2) P is subject to a
trivially low frequentist probability of premature death as a
result of E, but (3) P has the same belief as in OR, namely that
he is subject to a high frequentist probability of premature
death. Given the altered assumption about the power of mere
belief-differences to affect value, it follows that OR* is worse for
P than OS. Further, OR is not worse for P than OR*; the two
outcomes differ only in the frequentist probability, and that
difference (without more) does not constitute a welfare
difference.206
205. See supra text accompanying notes 172-80, 194-95.
206. It might be objected that my analysis fails to consider (1) the
possibility that frequentist risk plus a belief is harmful even though neither is
harmful alone, and (2) the possibility that, although beliefs alone can be
harmful, frequentist risk compounds the harm. My response is that neither
possibility is warranted by the nonepistemic values I have considered or will
consider, e.g., the value of security or freedom from fear. See supra text
accompanying notes 174-75, 185, 195; infra Part IV.B. As for epistemic
values, such as the putative values of knowledge, justified belief, or true belief,
these values do allow the welfare importance of beliefs to change depending on
other factors (truth and/or justifiability), but they would not warrant the
conclusion that OR is worse for P than OS in virtue (in part) of the frequentist
risk. If, for example, the relevant epistemic value is avoiding false beliefs,
then OR may not be worse than OS (because in OR P truly believes that a high
frequentist probability obtains, although falsely believes he will die
prematurely), and in any event OR* is even worse (because in OR* P both falsely
believes he will die prematurely and falsely believes there is a high frequentist
probability). If the relevant epistemic value is avoiding unjustified beliefs,
then OR is no worse than OS (because P’s belief in his premature death is
justified by the frequentist probability) and again OR* is worse than OR
(because there the belief in premature death is not justified). In short, the
strategy of adding a belief about frequentist probabilities to the outcome in
which P is (without awareness) subject to a high frequentist probability of
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In sum, the flaws in the frequentist version of the risk-isharm claim, elaborated in sections B, C, and D above, are not
cured by hybridizing relative frequencies with beliefs. More
generally, these flaws are not cured by hybridizing relative
frequencies with any mental states, be they beliefs, feelings,
affects, urges, preferences, or something else.
IV. IS THE RISK OF DEATH A HARM? BAYESIAN
THEORIES OF RISK
The prior Part argued that risk in the frequentist sense is
not harmful.
More precisely, there are a plurality of
frequentist accounts of risk, corresponding to different types of
reference classes: statistical, physical, and conventional. The
claim advanced above was that no such account makes risk a
welfare setback.
This Part examines the Bayesian view of risk. Here too, as
we shall see, there are a plurality of accounts. The Bayesian
views risk as a “degree of belief,” a partial belief or state of
uncertainty that can be represented by numbers conforming to
the probability calculus.207 But whose beliefs are at issue? Are
they actual or hypothetical? Are they separated from other
mental states, or rather packaged together with feelings,
volitions, desires, or other non-belief states to create a
psychological hybrid? Different answers to these questions
generate different Bayesian accounts of risk.
Since we are concerned with the risk of premature death,
the probabilistic beliefs underlying the various accounts are
(actual or hypothetical) probabilistic beliefs about premature
death—more precisely, beliefs that a particular event E will
result in the premature death of some particular person P. I
will argue that P’s own probabilistic belief that E will result in
P’s premature death, taken alone, may not be a welfare setback
for P. However, this belief, as part of a complex psychological
hybrid that amounts to a kind of fear on P’s part—a hybrid
including not only P’s probabilistic belief about his premature
death, but also the distress or other such negative affective
state occasioned by P’s belief—does constitute a welfare setback
for P. Finally, I will suggest that Bayesian accounts that

premature death tends to improve, not degrade, the outcome with respect to
plausible epistemic values because the frequentist probability functions as a
truth maker or justification maker with respect to the belief.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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prescind from P’s actual beliefs, and look instead to his
hypothetical beliefs, or to the actual or hypothetical beliefs of
other persons, face more substantial difficulties in explaining
why risk is harmful.
A. FIRST-PERSON ACTUAL BELIEFS
Throughout this Part, we will be comparing two outcomes,
OS and OR, that differ only in the occurrence of an event (E)
such that someone has a high degree of belief that E will result
in P’s premature death. That person might be P himself. If so,
and if this belief is taken to be actual not hypothetical, the
Bayesian account will specify the difference between OS and OR
as follows:
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Bayesian Account, with
Actual First-Person Beliefs
— OS is a world in which E does not occur.
— OR is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) P actually
believes, to a high numerical degree, that E will result
in P’s premature death.
— OR and OS are otherwise identical with respect to P’s
welfare.
Is OR, thus specified, worse for P’s welfare than OS?
Consider once more the four plausible components of a
welfare account: Experience, Integration, Preference, and
Value.
Experientialists (at least those who specify the
Experience component in terms of a supervenience
requirement) will readily agree that OR can be worse for P than
OS. There is a psychological difference between OR and OS. P
possesses a particular probabilistic belief in the first outcome,
but not the second. Because belief is a mental state, and
because the Bayesian equates risk with a certain kind of belief,
a mental-state supervenience requirement poses no substantial
obstacle to a Bayesian’s claim that risk is harmful.
The Integration component of welfare stipulates that the
difference between OR and OS must concern P’s own life. This is
very vague, but still I think we can see that OR and OS (as here
specified) do thus differ. More generally, I suggest that two
outcomes differing in P’s psychological properties are different
“for P.” A psychological difference is sufficient, if not necessary,
for Integration. 208 What could be more intimately part of P

208. See Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Well-Being, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 169,
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than his own mental states? Mark Overvold’s version of
Integration, which remains the leading version within the
philosophical literature, bears out my suggestion that
psychological differences will always satisfy the Integration
demand.209 Overvold suggests that O* is better or worse for P
than O only if some proposition is true in O* but not O, where
this proposition concerns P because it entails P’s existence.210
The fact that P possesses a given psychological state in O*—
such as a probabilistic belief—clearly entails that P exists in
O*. Many propositions would not have this entailment. For
example, the pains and pleasures of other persons cannot, on
Overvold’s view, change P’s own welfare, because these pains
and pleasures might obtain without P ever existing. So the
Integration requirement, in Overvold’s hands, is quite
demanding—but the requirement is structured in such a way
that psychological changes in a person, including the cognitive
changes highlighted by Bayesians, will always satisfy it.
Value and Preference pose more serious obstacles to the
claim that OR is worse for P than OS. Consider Value first.
Values, as already discussed, plausibly satisfy a condition of
convergence under idealized conditions.211 OS is more welfare
valuable for P than OR only if everyone, deliberating under
these conditions, would prefer to be P in OS rather than P in OR.
In general, there is nothing puzzling in the claim that mental
states are valuable or disvaluable. Take the case of physical
pain. Assume that P is in a state of pain in O*, but not O.
Presumably our idealized agent will not himself be in a state of
pain. Still, it is straightforward that the agent could prefer to
be P in O, rather than P in O*. Pain feels bad; idealized
agents, contemplating the prospect of being various persons in
various non-ideal scenarios, could readily prefer non-ideal

182-87 (1992) (suggesting that changes in our mental states paradigmatically
satisfy the Integration demand because they are changes in our intrinsic
rather than relational properties).
209. See sources cited supra note 61.
210. This is a rough formulation of Overvold’s view. More precisely, he
proposes,
[T]he only desires and aversions that are logically relevant to the
determination of an individual’s self-interest are those in which (1) it
is logically necessary that the individual exist at t for the object of
one’s desire or aversion to obtain at t, and (2) the reason for this
desire is due to one’s essential involvement in the state of affairs.
Overvold, Self-Interest, supra note 61, at 190.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
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scenarios that are less painful.212
Could the same be said about P’s beliefs, specifically his
probabilistic beliefs concerning his own premature death? In
OS, E does not occur; in OR, E occurs and P believes to a high
degree that this event will result in his premature death. Let
us assume that our idealized agent is perfectly informed and
thus knows the truth about E and P, namely, that E will not
result in P’s premature death. Still, the idealized agent could
prefer being P in OS to being P in OR. The idealized agent’s
knowledge does not erase the psychological difference between
the two non-ideal states under comparison: the fact that P
possesses a certain belief in OR, and not in OS.213 Perfectly
informed agents, choosing between life histories where the
subjects of these histories will be imperfectly informed, could
prefer life histories in which those subjects lack certain
beliefs—for example, beliefs that the choosers, in their position
of perfect information, know to be false. There is no conceptual
incoherence in the claim that false beliefs, or some other class
of beliefs, are per se disvaluable.
But is the claim correct? Is the possession of false beliefs
really an intrinsic setback to welfare value? Or are such beliefs
only instrumentally disvaluable, in that the choices of ignorant
actors produce consequences which are typically worse for
those actors than the consequences that would have resulted
from better-informed choices?214 I see no clear, intuitive
answer to this question. Beliefs, unlike pains, are affectively
neutral.215 False beliefs do not feel worse than true beliefs.
Indeed, beliefs (unlike pains) need not be occurrent. I need not
be conscious of my beliefs, be they full beliefs or partial

212. While the Benthamite reduction of happiness or welfare to pleasure
and the avoidance of pain is implausible, those quite plausibly “belong instead
in our inventory of the (typical or standard) sources of happiness or misery.”
SUMNER, supra note 8, at 142.
213. See SMITH, supra note 179, at 151-52 (distinguishing between the
“evaluating possible world,” where the evaluator has full information, and the
“evaluated possible world,” where the person whose choices or life history are
being evaluated does not).
214. See, e.g., NOAH M. LEMOS, supra note 178, at 3-31 (analyzing the
concept of intrinsic value); RAMON M. LEMOS, supra note 178, at 34-71 (same).
215. See Ramsey, supra note 76, at 71 (considering and rejecting the notion
of equating a person’s degree of belief with the intensity of his feeling of
conviction in the proposition believed—“the beliefs which we hold most
strongly are often accompanied by practically no feeling at all; no one feels
strongly about things he takes for granted”).
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(probabilistic) beliefs.216
A number of prominent value theorists have argued that
knowledge is an intrinsic welfare value. For example, George
Sher writes,
[D]espite our manifest differences, each of us has both a native
capacity to understand the world and an inescapable tendency to try
to exercise that capacity. We seek such understanding not only when
we propose a scientific hypothesis or try to predict the stock market,
but when we idly read the newspaper, engage in conversation, or
simply look about us. . . . In each case, our mental activity centers on
some proposition, or some structured set of propositions, that has
engaged our attention; and in each case, our guiding question is
whether these propositions are true. Even when we try to avoid all
truth seeking, our success is temporary at best. . . . Thus, if what has
inherent value is the successful exercise of fundamental capacities, it
would be very surprising if reason-based true belief—or, in other
words, knowledge—were not inherently good.217

John Finnis, James Griffin, and Derek Parfit also include
“knowledge” or “understanding” on their lists of objective
values.218 On the other hand, Martha Nussbaum suggests that
value inheres in the process of thinking, in intellectual activity,
not in the sheer possession of knowledge.219 Thomas Hurka has
shown, in a systematic way, that a value theory predicated (in
part) on the intellectual capacities of persons need not end up
valuing knowledge. Instead, such a theory could focus on the
justifiability or reasonableness of beliefs, or even on the simple

216. See JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 13-14, 158 (1996)
(explaining that beliefs and desires are “propositional attitudes,” which have
no distinctive “feel” and can be unconscious); see also Wayne A. Davis, The
Varieties of Fear, 51 PHIL. STUD. 287, 287 (1987) (noting that “propositional
fear”—meaning a desire that some harm not occur plus a belief that it may
occur—“need not be occurrent, and may have no physiological effect”).
217. SHER, supra note 49, at 203.
218. See FINNIS, supra note 49, at 59-80 (arguing for intrinsic value of
knowledge); GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 29-30 (including “understanding” on a
list of basic welfare values, and stating that “[s]imply knowing about oneself
and one’s place in the world—certain important anthropocentric knowledge—
is part of a good life”); PARFIT, supra note 18, at 499 (proposing a list of
objective values that includes “knowledge”).
219. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 78-79. Nussbaum includes “Senses,
Imagination, and Thought” on a list of basic values and specifies this series of
values as follows:
Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and to
do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and
cultivated by an adequate education . . . . Being able to use
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and
producing self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice . . . .
Id.
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number of beliefs (true or false), rather than on the truth of
belief.
[We have a] choice between four views that I call attempt, deserving
attempt, success, and deserved success. . . . [These] views would say a
person has one state of theoretical perfection [and thereby produces
intrinsic value] for every:
1. belief he has (attempt);
2. justified belief he has (deserving attempt);
3. true belief he has (success); [or]
4. justified true belief, that is, item of knowledge, he has (deserved
success).220

In defense of Hurka’s second option, “deserving attempt,” note
the following. It may be essentially human, and unavoidable
for humans, to aim at true belief, but humans (except in
unusual cases) lack direct access to truth, and regulate their
intellectual activities by criteria to which they do have access,
namely “justifiability” or “reasonableness.”221 Arguably, then,
it is the possession of justified beliefs, and the activity of
testing beliefs for justification, not true belief (or true justified
belief) that constitutes a kind of welfare value.
In sum, both sides of the Value issue are plausible, given
the current state of philosophical writing about Value. Neither
the claim that OR is worse than OS with respect to welfare
value, nor the claim that the two outcomes are just the same, is
clearly correct.222 Therefore it is also unclear whether OR is
worse than OS with respect to the Preference component of
welfare—given the tight linkage between Value and fully
informed preferences.
220. HURKA, supra note 49, at 103. But see id. at 112 (suggesting that the
“deserved success” view is intuitively most appealing).
AN INTRODUCTION TO
221. See
generally
JONATHAN DANCY,
CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY (1985) (discussing concepts central to
epistemology, including knowledge and justification).
222. Note that, strictly, the view that knowledge (justified true belief) is
beneficial would not entail a welfare difference between OS and OR as here
described. In OS, P lacks a belief about E’s connection to her premature death;
in OR, she falsely believes that E will cause her premature death. In neither
outcome does she possess knowledge about E. Still, the view that knowledge
is beneficial sits comfortably with the further claim that false beliefs are
harmful relative to a no-belief state. On this view, persons at risk in the
Bayesian sense are thereby harmed, except in the unusual case where their
beliefs are correct—the risky event will in fact kill them—in which case,
assuming the belief is justified, the beliefs actually benefit them! On Hurka’s
“deserving attempt” view, some persons merely at risk are also actually
benefited, not harmed, by their beliefs (insofar as the beliefs are justified);
only those whose beliefs are unjustified are not.
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I should emphasize that I have not definitively concluded
that OR and OS are equal with respect to Value or fully informed
Preference. P’s probabilistic belief that E will result in his
premature death is arguably disvaluable, without more.
Readers who think it is—because false beliefs are intrinsically
disvaluable, or perhaps on other grounds—should conclude that
OR is worse for P than OS. But readers who doubt that false
probabilistic beliefs, or other categories of probabilistic beliefs,
are intrinsically disvaluable, taken alone, should not conclude
that Bayesian risk is harmless. Bayesian risk, although
harmless on its own, could be harmful as part of a larger
psychological hybrid such as fear or cognate emotional states.
This is the possibility I shall now consider.
B. FEAR
What is fear? It is a standard view within experimental
psychology and philosophy that fear and other emotions have
cognitive, attitudinal, and affective components.223 Wayne
Davis offers a crisp and paradigmatic analysis along these
lines.224 He distinguishes between “propositional fear” and
“experiential fear.” As for propositional fear,
[p]ropositional fears have attitudinal and cognitive components. If I
am afraid that it will rain, then I must not want it to rain; indeed, I
must desire (on balance) that it not rain. Moreover, I must be neither
certain that it will rain, nor certain that it will not. Fear, in other
words, entails aversion and uncertainty.225
223. The literature on emotions is vast.
Important works in the
philosophical literature include: RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF
EMOTION (1987); PETER GOLDIE, THE EMOTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLORATION (2000); ROBERT M. GORDON, THE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS:
INVESTIGATIONS IN COGNITIVE PHILOSOPHY (1987); O.H. GREEN, THE
EMOTIONS (1992); PATRICIA GREENSPAN, EMOTIONS & REASONS: AN INQUIRY
INTO EMOTIONAL JUSTIFICATION (1988); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF
THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001); RICHARD WOLLHEIM, ON
THE EMOTIONS (1999); John Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions, 104
ETHICS 824 (1994). This literature is, in turn, dwarfed by the psychological
literature. For an overview, see RANDOLPH R. CORNELIUS, THE SCIENCE OF
EMOTION: RESEARCH AND TRADITION IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION (1996).
Economists have also begun to study emotions, see Eric A. Posner, Law and
the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1978 n.2 (2001) (citing scholarship), as have
legal scholars, see Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt and Securities Regulation, 151
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); Posner, supra, at 1978 n.1; cf. George F.
Loewenstein et al., Risks as Feelings, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 267, 267-71 (2001)
(focusing on role of affect in explaining behavior under uncertainty).
224. See Davis, supra note 216; see also Wayne Davis, A Causal Theory of
Experiential Fear, 18 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 459 (1988).
225. Davis, supra note 216, at 289.
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There is an obvious connection between what Davis calls
“propositional fear,” and risk in the Bayesian sense. Risk in
the Bayesian sense is a kind of uncertainty—an uncertainty
whose degree can be expressed in terms of numbers conforming
to the probability calculus. If a person (1) has a probabilistic
belief that he will die prematurely, and (2) prefers not to die
prematurely, then—according to Davis—that person has a
“propositional fear” of premature death. “Propositional fear”
does not entail bad feelings, or other affective states, on the
subject’s part. A subject may not even be aware of his
“propositional fears,” since he need not be aware of his beliefs
or his preferences. By contrast, “experiential fear” necessarily
includes an affective component. Davis defines “experiential
fear” as a combination of occurrent propositional fear plus
“involuntary arousal” and “unhappiness”:
A subject experiencing fear must have some propositional fears.
These fears must, furthermore, be occurrent: they must be before the
subject’s mind; he must be thinking about them. . . .
An occurrent propositional fear is not sufficient for experiential
fear, however. If Alan is having the time of his life with Monique, and
the thought that he might fail his exam just pops into his mind for an
instant, it does not follow that he is in a state of fear. What else is
required? For one thing, the propositional fear must cause a
particular condition characterized by symptoms like rapid heartbeat,
increased respiration rate, perspiration, abdominal distress, pallor,
restless sleep, channeled and disorderly cognition, muscular tension,
and impulsive or reflexive motor action. I refer to this condition as
involuntary arousal. . . . It must be stressed that the symptoms of
involuntary arousal are not perfectly correlated with each other, and
that no one symptom is necessary for fear. A subject with a pounding
heart but no abdominal distress, for example, could still be afraid.226

Davis stipulates that “experiential fear” involves propositional
fear plus both (1) involuntary arousal and (2) “unhappiness”
(that is, a sense of distress), so as to distinguish the genuine
experience of fear from cases where people enjoy scary thrills.
People seek out scary thrills to enjoy themselves. The involuntary
arousal is part of the fun. Similarly, a performer suffering from
stage-fright may be ecstatic because this is his “big break.” Fear,
however, is a type of mental pain or anguish. Subjects must be
miserable or distressed because they fear that some harm will
occur.227

In short, according to Davis, “S is experiencing fear iff [if and
only if] S is in a state of involuntary arousal and unhappiness

226. Id. at 299.
227. Id. at 301.
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as a direct result of the occurrent propositional fear that
something will be harmed.”228
Davis’s analysis, and the numerous similar accounts of fear
within the psychological and philosophical literatures,229
suggests a modification to the Bayesian account that will make
risk an essential component of harm, if not harmful on its own.
Combine the cognitive state of probabilistic belief with a
negative affective state (paradigmatically, one that involves
both “involuntary arousal” and “unhappiness”), and then add
suitable preferences.230 In other words, replace outcome OR
with OR+A (risk plus affect), as follows:
Riskier and Safer Outcomes: A Bayesian Account, with
Actual First-Person Beliefs Plus Negative Affect
— OS is a world in which E does not occur.
— OR+A is a world in which (1) E occurs and (2) P
experientially fears that E will result in P’s premature
death. Specifically, P believes, to a high numerical
degree, that E will result in his premature death; this
probabilistic belief is occurrent; and it causes P to
experience involuntary arousal plus a sense of distress
or unhappiness.
— OS and OR+A are otherwise identical with respect to P’s
welfare.
— In both outcomes, P disprefers premature death and the
experiential fear of premature death.
I suggest that OR+A is worse for P than OS.
In the preceding section, I argued that OR (an outcome
involving P’s probabilistic belief about premature death, but no
negative affect) is worse than OS with respect to Experience
and Integration, but might not be worse than OS with respect to
Value and Preference. What do these arguments imply for the
comparison of OR+A (an outcome involving P’s experiential fear
of premature death, including both probabilistic belief and
negative affect) and OS? First, the arguments imply that OR+A,
like OR, is worse than OS with respect to Experience and
228. Id. at 302.
229. See, e.g., AHARON BEN-ZE’EV, THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 473-89
(2000); GREENSPAN, supra note 223, at 15-36; Barrie Falk, What Are We
Frightened of?, 25 INQUIRY 165, 186-95 (1982); Robert Gordon, Fear, 89 PHIL.
REV. 560 (1980); O.H. Green, Fear of Death, 43 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES. 99, 105 (1982); Mohan Matthen, Biological Universals and the Nature of
Fear, 95 J. PHIL. 105, 121-32 (1998).
230. On hybrids, see supra note 202.
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Integration. The difference between OR and OS satisfies the
Experientialist demand for supervenience; a fortiori, the
difference between OR+A and OS does, since these outcomes now
differ with respect to two aspects of P’s psychology, his affect
and his cognitions, not just with respect to his cognitions.
Similarly, if the difference between OR and OS concerns P’s own
life, then it follows a fortiori that the difference between OR+A
and OS does.
How about the Value component of welfare? It is here that
the shift from OR to OR+A becomes important. Experiential fear
involves a physically “aroused” sense of unhappiness or
distress. That affective state is, intuitively, a bad state to be in:
not just bad in some impersonal sense, but bad for the unhappy
subject, bad for her well-being. Many (although perhaps not
all) value theorists would recognize experiential fear as a
disvaluable state.
In her list of welfare constituents,
Nussbaum explicitly singles out “fear” and “anxiety” as welfare
setbacks.
[The] Central Human . . . Capabilities [include] . . . Emotions.—Being
able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; . . .
in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and
justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by
overwhelming fear and anxiety . . . .231

Griffin’s list includes “enjoyment”; he writes under this rubric
that “[w]e value pleasures, the perception of beauty, the
enjoyment of the day-to-day textures of life,”232 and presumably
would agree that pain or suffering (including the physically
aroused type of distress that is partly constitutive of fear) are
bad things. Sher argues,
[T]he elements of a good life include knowledge, rational action, close
relationships, and various other forms of contact with the world. This
means that whether someone lives a good life cannot depend
exclusively on the quality of his experience. But neither is the quality
of his experience irrelevant. We can hardly deny that happiness,
pleasure, and enjoyment are among life’s goods, so any satisfactory
unifying theory must appeal to a property or relation that is capable
of belonging to experiential as well as nonexperiential states.233

Sher’s own theory of value—one that sees value in those
activities, experiences, etc., closely connected to “near-

231. NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 79.
232. GRIFFIN, supra note 23, at 30; see also id. (including under the value
of human agency “the basic capabilities that enable one to act,” including
“freedom from great pain and anxiety”).
233. SHER, supra note 49, at 229.

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

2003]

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

RISK, DEATH AND HARM

1379

universal, near-unavoidable goals”234—supports the view that
fear and other unpleasant experiences are harmful, since “no
one can altogether suppress his impulses to pursue pleasant
sensations and escape unpleasant ones.”235 By contrast, value
theorists such as Hurka who ground value in the human
essence236 might not recognize fear as a welfare setback, since
the capability to experience pain or negative feelings, as
opposed to the capability to think and to plan, might not be
essentially human. A human person who could think and plan,
but couldn’t experience fear or other emotions, would still be a
human person237—or perhaps she wouldn’t be, in which case an
essentialist view of Value might be able to recognize the
disvalue intrinsic to fear. In any event, powerful arguments
have been advanced that essentialism is an overly narrow view
of Value.238
As for Preference: a person could, in principle, be
indifferent to (or even prefer) a state of experiential fear. It is
certainly possible for P to be indifferent to or even prefer
painful, unpleasant, distressing, or unhappy experiences. Thus
the theorist who builds actual preferences into her account of
welfare will only agree that experiential fear is harmful on the
contingent condition that it is actually dispreferred.239 I have
specified OR+A and OS accordingly. What of the theorist who
looks to fully informed or otherwise idealized preferences, in
lieu of or in addition to actual preferences? Given the
conceptual links between Value and idealized preference, the
arguments just advanced to show that experiential fear is
disvaluable also demonstrate that this complex of mental states
is ideally dispreferred.240 A stipulation that P not only
disprefers but ideally disprefers OR+A would be otiose.
In sum, the experiential fear of premature death (including
as components both an occurrent probabilistic belief that
premature death is likely, and a physically powerful sense of
distress occasioned by this belief) is harmful, at least if actually
234. Id.
235. Id. at 231.
236. HURKA, supra note 49, at 9-51.
237. Cf. id. at 44, 139-40 (suggesting that emotions are valuable in virtue
of the beliefs and desires but not the feelings that they incorporate).
238. See, e.g., SHER, supra note 49, at 225-26; SUMNER, supra note 8, at
194-95.
239. On the need to incorporate actual preferences within welfare accounts,
see Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 200-02.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
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dispreferred. OR+A is worse than OS with respect to all four of
the now-familiar dimensions of welfare.241 Nor should this
conclusion be surprising to lawyers and legal scholars, since the
law has long recognized fear as a welfare setback. Consider the
tort of assault. At common law, the infliction of emotional
distress without physical injury was not generally tortious,242
but the infliction of fear was—at least if that infliction was
intentional and was produced by the threat of immediate
physical injury, thereby constituting an assault.243 Richard
Epstein goes so far as to suggest that the fright/shock
paradigm—“A frightened B”—is one of four basic paradigms of
tortious conduct, along with paradigms that express the
causation of harm through force, compulsion, and the creation
of a dangerous condition.244 Modern tort doctrine recognizes a
tort of “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” including
although not limited to the infliction of fear. 245 If fear is not
harmful, then assaults and fear inflictions ought not be
tortious, unless the widely held view that harm is a
precondition for tort liability is rejected. A similar point could
be made about the compensability of fear as an element of tort
damages, under the rubric of “pain and suffering.” If A causes
physical injury to B, causing him pecuniary loss, physical pain,
and emotional distress such as fear, then B is entitled to
compensation from A for all three of these setbacks, not just the
pecuniary loss and physical pain.246
What objections might be raised to my claim that risk is
harmful as a component of a hybrid psychological state, namely
experiential fear? One objection runs as follows. Fear, as
defined by Davis and by other philosophers who offer similar
241. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87
GEO. L.J. 2025, 2030-41 (1999) (describing the dread-reduction benefits of
environmental regulation). Heinzerling argues that “reducing risk is itself a
benefit, separate and apart from the prevention of illness and death,” in part
because “a reduction in risk carries with it a decrease in dread and its
debilitating effects on individuals and communities.” Id. at 2030. But see
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 249-71 (1990) (arguing that
belief-mediated distress is not harmful).
242. See 2 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.1 (2d ed. 1986)
(noting “the older rule that there could be no recovery for mere mental
distress,” with the exception of assault).
243. See 1 id. §§ 3.4-.5 (3d ed. 1996).
244. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A
REFORMULATION OF TORT LAW 22-46 (1980).
245. See 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 242, §§ 9.1-.7.
246. See 4 id. § 25.10.
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accounts, is a hybrid of a cognitive state, namely uncertainty—
the subject’s uncertainty whether he, or something else he
cares about, will be harmed—and an affective state.247 But
people can be uncertain without being at risk.248 Risk, in the
Bayesian sense, is a state of uncertainty, or partial belief, that
can be assigned a precise number satisfying the axioms of the
probability calculus.249 For various reasons, it might be
impossible to assign P’s partial belief this sort of number.250
Therefore, risk is not an essential component of fear. If P is
uncertain whether E will cause his premature death, and this
uncertainty causes P involuntary arousal and unhappiness,
then P is fearful of dying prematurely whether or not his
uncertainty is measurable on a numerical scale.
My response to this objection is as follows. According to
Davis’s definition, fear has an essential, cognitive component.
Some kind of uncertainty is a necessary part of fear;251 mere
arousal and unhappiness is not sufficient. The cognitive
component of fear might take different forms. It might take the
form of P’s probabilistic belief, or it might take the form of a
partial belief of P’s that is not a probabilistic belief, where (for
whatever reason) P’s belief cannot be assigned a precise
number satisfying the probability calculus. By claiming that
P’s risk of premature death is harmful as a component of P’s
fear of premature death, I do not mean to suggest that the
fearful P who possesses a probabilistic belief concerning
premature death is worse off than the fearful P whose
uncertainty about premature death cannot be assigned a

247. See supra text accompanying notes 223-28.
248. See generally MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE AND UNCERTAINTY:
EMERGING PARADIGMS 41-151 (1989) (discussing both Bayesian probability
and other approaches to conceptualizing uncertainty).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
250. If probability numbers are assigned along with the assignment of a
“utility function,” it might emerge that P’s preferences are not sufficiently well
behaved to be represented by such a function. If probability numbers are
assigned by asking what odds P would demand for various sorts of bets, it
might emerge that P is just not the betting type—or that he is, but that his
betting odds are radically incoherent, and cannot be easily adjusted to satisfy
the probability calculus. If probability numbers are assigned by asking P to
express his degree of uncertainty on a zero-one scale, he might be unwilling or
unable to do that, or able only to generate numbers that, once more, are
radically inconsistent with the axioms of probability.
See supra text
accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing different methods for assigning
Bayesian probabilities).
251. See Davis, supra note 216, at 289-90.
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number. OR'+A may well be just as bad for P as OR+A, where OR'+A
and OR+A are identical but for the fact that in OR'+A P is
nonprobabilistically uncertain whether E will result in his
premature death.
However, it remains true that fear
(including risk as a component) is harmful, since OR+A is worse
for P than OS. Perhaps a more precise formulation of my “risk
is harmful as part of fear” claim would be this: The fear of
premature death is harmful; fear essentially includes a
cognitive component, namely uncertainty; and this cognitive
component is realized, inter alia, by a state of probabilistic
belief, i.e., by risk in the Bayesian sense.
A second objection to my “risk is harmful as part of fear”
claim is more troubling: Whatever might be the cognitive
component of fear, that component is irrelevant as far as
welfare is concerned. In OR+A, P possesses a partial belief that
E will result in his premature death, and he also experiences a
negative affective state (analyzed by Davis as “involuntary
arousal and unhappiness”252). Imagine OA, where P experiences
that very same affective state, but lacks the partial belief he
possesses in OR+A. OA is just as bad for P as OR+A—or so the
critic of my account might argue. What makes fear bad is its
affective component, not its cognitive component. Although
OR+A is worse for P than OS, it is worse than OS solely in virtue of
the affective states (“involuntary arousal and unhappiness”)
that differentiate the two outcomes. Risk, or uncertainty more
generally, is no essential part of the welfare story.
A number of philosophers have pointed out that a person
can indeed experience the affective state characteristic of fear
without possessing the characteristic cognitive state, namely
uncertainty.253 Consider the phobic person: she is aroused and
made unhappy by the object of her phobia, even though she
believes quite definitely that the object will not harm her. Or
consider the person who is “scared” by a scary movie. She
might experience all the feelings of the truly frightened, yet be
completely certain that nothing depicted in the movie will
actually occur.
A heavy smoker may believe an article in a medical journal giving
statistics on the correlation of smoking with cancer, but that belief
may not scare her in the way watching an autopsy on a smoker with

252. Id. at 302.
253. The seminal article here is Kendall L. Walton, Fearing Fictions, 75 J.
PHIL. 5, 6-10 (1978). For more recent discussions, see Deigh, supra note 223,
at 835-42; and John Morreall, Fear Without Belief, 90 J. PHIL. 359 (1993).
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lung cancer would. Indeed, watching a fictional scene in a movie of
such an autopsy might well be able to scare her more than believing
the statistics would. Some “mere thoughts” about danger . . . are
better able to cause fear than some beliefs about danger. . . . David
Hume gave the example of how, as we look over a cliff, we can become
afraid by imagining falling to our death: “[W]e tremble on the brink
of a precipice, tho’ we know ourselves to be in perfect security, and
have it in our choice whether we will advance a step farther.”254

Although I agree that the distress and arousal
characteristic of fear might occur without a concomitant belief,
I would deny that fear is harmful solely in virtue of its affective
component. Phobia about premature death may be a bad thing,
but full-blooded fear of premature death is worse. OS is our
baseline outcome, where P is neither distressed and aroused
about the prospect of premature death, nor has a probabilistic
belief that premature death will occur. OA is our affectively
charged outcome, where P is distressed and aroused at that
prospect, even though he is quite certain it will not occur. OR+A
is the outcome where P fully fears premature death, since he
experiences distress and arousal as a result of the risk, i.e., his
probabilistic belief that death will occur. Then, OA might be
worse for P than OS, but in any event OR+A is worse for P than
The harmfulness of fear is partly grounded in its
OA.
characteristic cognitions; it is not solely grounded in fear’s
characteristic affects.
What warrants my claim that OR+A is worse for P’s welfare
than OA? Consider that P’s distress in OR+A is a warranted
response to his belief state; while in OA P recognizes, or would
recognize if he considered the matter, that he lacks any
epistemic basis for these feelings. Wholehearted distress is
worse, ceteris paribus, than ambivalent distress. It is clear that
the wholehearted distress/ambivalent distress distinction
satisfies Experience, Integration, and (if wholehearted distress
is dispreferred) actual Preference, so the only real sticking
point is Value and its close cousin, fully informed Preference.
Here I would suggest that our inability to discount the
frightening situation as riskless—the fact that there is genuine
uncertainty about whether harm will occur—is one essential
part of fear’s characteristic disvalue.
Consider the parallel with pain. P’s feeling of pain,
coupled with a belief that the pain results or may result from
some permanent damage to his body, is worse for P than the
254. Morreall, supra note 253, at 365 (quoting DAVID HUME, A TREATISE
445 (L.A. Selby-Brigge ed., Oxford 1888) (1739)).

OF HUMAN NATURE
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very same pain coupled with assurance that his bodily integrity
is intact. Pain plus a belief that bodily integrity has been
damaged amounts to a kind of suffering;255 pain itself does not,
except in special cases where pain is chronic or very severe.
Similarly, P’s distress and arousal plus a belief that harm may
occur amounts to fear, and fear is worse, ceteris paribus, than
P’s distress and arousal coupled with a firm belief that
everything is safe.256
In closing, I should note that the hybrid account of risk’s
harmfulness, presented in this section, might be broadened to
include other emotions besides fear. Arguably, there are a
range of negative emotions that are welfare setbacks, that
essentially include uncertainty as a cognitive component, and
that P’s probabilistic belief concerning premature death will
give rise to, when combined with a suitable negative affect. For
example, that belief might make P anxious about premature
death, rather than fearful of premature death, assuming
anxiety and fear have the same cognitive component but differ
in the way they feel.257 If so, the arguments presented in this
section carry over to the case of anxiety. P’s anxiety about
premature death will be a welfare setback for him if

255. See Eric J. Cassel, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine,
306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 639, 640-41 (1982) (distinguishing between pain and
suffering).
256. Crucial to my claim here is the “ceteris paribus” clause: Wholehearted
distress is worse, ceteris paribus, than ambivalent distress. We may be
tempted to think that phobia is just as bad as fear, or even worse, by
imagining the intense distress and arousal that phobics often feel. We may
also be tempted to think that phobia or other epistemically ungrounded
affective states are worse than fear states by imagining that these states are
accompanied by frustration—that is, by higher-order feelings of distress
occasioned by the fact that the subject is feeling first-order distress without
any reason. Clearly, intense phobia may be worse than low-level fear; and
phobia plus second-order distress may be worse than fear without secondorder distress. But these comparisons are irrelevant to the claim I am
advancing that the cognitive component of fear contributes to its harmfulness,
in other words that OR+A is both worse than OS and worse than OA. OR+A is an
outcome in which P’s negative feelings are just as intense as in OA, and which
is otherwise identical to OA except for the belief state which characterizes P in
OR+A but not in OA. Hold fixed the intensity of feeling, and the emotional
background, and it becomes quite plausible that fear is worse than phobia, the
feelings one experiences during scary movies, and other such epistemically
ungrounded affective states.
257. Cf. Davis, supra note 216, at 300, 302 (noting that “[f]ear is closely
related to anxiety” and delineating affective and cognitive distinctions between
these two emotions: “anxiety requires arousal but not unhappiness; and the
arousal may result from any fear, not just from the fear of harm”).
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dispreferred, and P’s probabilistic belief concerning premature
death will contribute to the harmfulness of anxiety (that is,
anxiety will be worse than a state in which P lacks both the
belief and anxious affect and worse than a state in which P is
certain that premature death will not ensue, but nonetheless
experiences the negative feelings associated with anxiety).
Risk in the Bayesian sense is harmful as part of any welfarereducing emotional complex, including but not necessarily
limited to fear, that is predicated on the subject’s uncertainty
about harmful occurrences such as her own death.
C. OTHER BAYESIAN ACCOUNTS: THIRD-PERSON BELIEFS AND
HYPOTHETICAL FIRST-PERSON BELIEFS
The Bayesian account just considered conceptualizes the
“risk” of premature death as the actual, probabilistic belief of
the very person whose death is at issue. Arguably, that
person’s probabilistic belief is itself a harm, without more; and
in any event that belief may constitute the cognitive component
of fear, which is a harmful package of mental states. This
Bayesian account is an actual, first-person account—by
contrast with hypothetical, first-person accounts and thirdperson accounts.
Hypothetical, first-person accounts are
Bayesian accounts that conceptualize the “risk” of premature
death as the hypothetical, probabilistic belief of the very person
whose death is at issue. Third-person accounts conceptualize
the “risk” of premature death as the actual or hypothetical
probabilistic belief of other persons concerning the premature
death of the person “at risk” of that misfortune. Neither
hypothetical, first-person accounts, nor third-person accounts,
construe “risk” in a way that makes the risk of premature
death a welfare setback.
Consider, to begin, the hypothetical, first-person account of
risk. OR, the risky world, is here construed as a world identical
to OS but for the fact that E occurs and P hypothetically would
possess—under appropriate conditions—the numerically high
probabilistic belief that E will result in his premature death.258
Is OR worse for P than OS? OS and OR do not differ with respect
to P’s actual mental states; thus, the supervenience
requirement, standardly invoked by Experientialists, is not
satisfied here. Integration is doubtful. For any event, P could
258. See Ramsey, supra note 76, at 67 (distinguishing between actual and
hypothetical degrees of belief).
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be brought to have all manner of hypothetical beliefs or other
mental states concerning the event, given the right
specification of the hypothetical condition. If the occurrence of
some event that hypothetically would prompt P to have a
particular reaction, under some condition, is taken as a welfare
setback for P, then every event harms P—which is absurd, and
erases the Integration requirement. If the occurrence of some
event that hypothetically would prompt P to have a particular
reaction, under a specified condition, is taken as a welfare
setback for P, then we will need to understand why the
specified condition is special—more intimately connected to P’s
welfare than other hypothetical conditions. As far as I am
aware, the only hypothetical condition that philosophers have
singled out as specially connected to P’s welfare is the condition
At this juncture, the problem of
of full information.259
determinism reemerges. If the connection between macroscopic
events and human death is deterministic, only those persons
who will actually die as a result of such events are “put at risk”
by them in the hypothetical full-information Bayesian sense.
As for Value, Value theorists who argue that knowledge
possession is a welfare value, and false beliefs a welfare
setback, look to actual beliefs, not hypothetical beliefs.260 And
value theorists who argue that fear is a welfare setback look to
actual fears—actual beliefs packaged with actual affect—not
hypothetical fears.
The arguments just advanced strongly suggest that
Bayesian risk in the hypothetical, first-person, sense is not a
welfare setback. They also carry over, in part, to the case of
Bayesian risk in the third-person sense. Third-person accounts
divide into two subcategories: accounts that look to the
hypothetical probabilistic beliefs of some third person
concerning P’s premature death, and accounts that look to the
actual probabilistic beliefs of some third person concerning P’s
premature death. If P’s own hypothetical probabilistic beliefs
concerning his premature death are not welfare-reducing for
him, then a fortiori the hypothetical, probabilistic beliefs of
some third party concerning P’s premature death are not
welfare reducing for P.
We are left with Bayesian accounts that construe P’s “risk”

259. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 179, at 155-61; sources cited supra note
45.
260. See sources cited supra notes 217-18.
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of premature death as the actual probabilistic beliefs of some
third person concerning that eventuality. Is risk, in this sense,
harmful for P? The answer depends upon who the third person
is. Risk might be construed as the actual probabilistic beliefs of
ordinary members of P’s society; but “risk” on this construal is
vulnerable to all the objections leveled against the frequentist
view of risk as conventional relative frequencies plus more.
The ordinary members of P’s society may not have convergent
probabilistic beliefs about the harmfulness of a given event;
even if they do, such beliefs are not value reducing for P,
because they neither constitute the best gauge of his security,
nor detract from his full personhood. Further, P would not
prefer under full information that ordinary members of his
society lack such beliefs; and Integration fails because the
beliefs and fears of the ordinary members of P’s society do not,
without more, fall inside the boundary of P’s own life. Shifting
from the actual probabilistic beliefs of “ordinary” third persons,
to the actual probabilistic beliefs of those persons who are
expert in some specified domain, does not solve any of these
problems—certainly not the last three.261
A somewhat more promising approach is to identify the
relevant third parties as those persons with whom P is linked
by ties of love and affection—his friends and family—or a
subcategory of this group.262 However, the “friends and family”
account, like the others just considered, runs up against the
problem that the third persons whose probabilistic beliefs are
defined as P’s “risk” may not have convergent beliefs. Consider
that one friend of P’s might ascribe a high probability to the
prospect of E causing P’s premature death, while another
friend might ascribe that a low probability. There are also
conceptual difficulties with the “friends and family” account.
Assume P has a single, best friend Q, such that Q’s beliefs or at
least fears are harms for P himself. Let us say that P faces a

261. Cf. William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51
DUKE L.J. 629, 630-31 (2001) (arguing that the legal system should be
cautious in relying on expert judgments of risk).
262. In short, P’s “risk” of premature death could be equated with the
actual, probabilistic beliefs of his circle of intimates. Some Integrationists
might insist that no third party’s beliefs or fears can constitute a welfare
setback for P, but this seems too strong. The fact that P’s good friend, spouse,
or child is scared that P will die prematurely can—intuitively—constitute a
harm for P. Experientialists, too, may balk here, but we might resolve this
objection by stipulating that P becomes aware of the beliefs and fears of his
loved ones.
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high, low, or intermediate risk of premature death from event
E depending on whether Q has a numerically high, low, or
intermediate probabilistic belief that E will result in P’s death.
The conceptual problem here is that we have lost our
placeholder for P’s own beliefs concerning his premature
demise. We will need to construct some artificial term for those
first-person beliefs—since it is those beliefs (not Q’s) that
explain P’s actions, and since those beliefs (not just Q’s)
constitute a welfare setback for P. Another conceptual oddity is
that P ends up being harmed by his “risk” of premature death
(Q’s beliefs) only if P is an altruist. If P does not care about Q’s
beliefs or fears, they do not harm P. But surely, the risk of
premature death—like death itself—should, if harmful, be a
harm that can befall altruists and egoists alike.
The conceptually simpler course, and one that does much
less violence to our pretheoretical understanding of “risk,” is to
equate the Bayesian “risk” to P with his own actual
probabilistic beliefs. The actual beliefs of certain other persons
(friends and family) may be harmful to P, but those beliefs are
not, properly speaking, “risks.” They constitute a third and
additional kind of harm that can result if fatal activities are left
unregulated—call this harm flowing from third-party beliefs—
where the first is the harm to those who die prematurely, and
the second is the harm to those at risk in the Bayesian sense of
dying prematurely, i.e., those who actually possess a
probabilistic belief (and resultant fear) that they will die
prematurely.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Death is a harm to the person who dies. The risk of death,
on a Bayesian account that equates risk with actual, first-party
probabilistic beliefs, is a harm to the person at risk—at least
where those beliefs are packaged together with appropriate
affective states and preferences and create a condition of fear,
anxiety, or some such negative emotion. The risk of death, on a
Bayesian account that equates risk with hypothetical, firstparty probabilistic beliefs, or with third-party probabilistic
beliefs, is not a harm to the person at risk. The risk of death,
on a frequentist account that equates risk with statistical,
conventional, physical, or other such relative frequencies, is not
a harm to the person at risk. 263
263. By “harm,” as already explained, I mean to denote a setback to
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These propositions are the fruits of the analytic labors
undertaken in Parts II, III and IV of this Article. To
summarize this analysis even more compactly: risk regulation
properly rests on what might be called a Hybrid (Bayesian)
View of risk, death, and harm, not a Risk View, a Death View,
a Null View, or a Hybrid (Frequentist) View.
Is the Risk of Death a Harm?
No

Yes

No

Null View

Risk View (Frequentist
and/or Bayesian)

Yes

Death View

Hybrid View (Frequentist
and/or Bayesian)

Is Death
a Harm?

What, concretely, are the implications for risk regulation of
the Hybrid (Bayesian) View? Answering this question in detail
would take another article, or more. But the reader is entitled
to wonder whether the philosophical claims defended in the
main body of this Article have genuine relevance for the
decisions of real risk regulatory agencies, such as the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), and others. I submit that the Hybrid
(Bayesian) View has very large implications for the actual
practices of risk regulators, and in this Part I will sketch what
those implications are.
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Decisions by risk regulators are, increasingly, a product of
cost-benefit analysis (CBA).264 Federal risk regulators now

lifetime well-being in the ex post sense: a feature of a possible life history that
makes that life history worse for the subject than alternatives. See supra text
accompanying notes 101-09, 147-48.
264. On CBA, see generally Adler & Posner, supra note 2. For a brief
overview of the use of CBA in the federal government, see id. at 169-76. For
more detailed empirical studies on how federal agencies use CBA and what its
effects are—both econometric studies and qualitative studies—see Matthew D.
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standardly engage in CBA when faced with large-scale
regulatory choices, those with substantial economic impacts.265
Systematic federal use of CBA dates to 1981 when the Reagan
administration issued Executive Order 12,291, requiring that
most regulations issued by federal executive agencies satisfy a
cost-benefit test (in contexts where that test was statutorily
permissible) and directing agencies to submit written costbenefit analyses of “major rules” to the President’s Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).266 The Bush administration
kept Order 12,291 in force. The Clinton administration
replaced it with Executive Order 12,866, which retains the
central features of the earlier order, namely a general costbenefit test for regulation by executive agencies and OMB
review of major rules.267 Specifically, Order 12,866 requires
that executive agencies adhere to the following principle, “to
the extent permitted by law”:
Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of [a
proposed] regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits
are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a
reasoned determination that the benefits of the . . . regulation justify
its costs.268

Where an agency is considering a “significant regulatory
action,” centrally a rule whose annual costs exceed $100
million, the agency must prepare a written cost-benefit analysis
of the proposed rule, for review by OMB.269
Adler, The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Comment on
Johnston, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1450 n.46 (2002).
265. See, e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, Conducting an Economic Analysis:
Rationale, Issues, and Requirements, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA:
ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 25, 25 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA] (noting that the EPA has
conducted more than 100 formal cost-benefit analyses since the issuance of
Executive Order 12,291); Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact
Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 861 (2000) (studying 48 formal cost-benefit
analyses issued for environmental, health, and safety regulations between
1996 and 1999).
266. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988).
267. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000). For a comparison of the two executive orders, see Peter M.
Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case
of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 174-92 (1995).
268. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. § 601.
269. Id. §§ 3(f), 6(a)(3); see also Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2
U.S.C. § 1532 (2000) (requiring the preparation of cost-benefit analyses for
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Despite the recent change of administration, Executive
Order 12,866 remains governing law.270
The current
presidency has reaffirmed the general commitment to CBA
expressed first by Order 12,291 and now by 12,866. To be sure,
these orders apply a cost-benefit test to agency rules only
where that test is statutorily permissible. Some federal
statutes, in the area of risk regulation, do clearly preclude
CBA.271 Instead, these statutes give priority to health and
safety benefits over economic and other costs. For example, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act stipulates that OSHA shall
regulate toxic substances in the workplace so as to ensure, to
the extent feasible, that no worker suffers “material
impairment of health or functional capacity.”272 The pre-1990
version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which covers
“hazardous air pollutants,” instructed the EPA to set
permissible emissions of each such pollutant at a level that
“provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health.”273
On the other hand, a substantial number of federal
statutes permit or require risk regulators to use CBA. One or
two do so quite explicitly;274 others do so by using balancing
language that courts and agencies quite straightforwardly have
interpreted as permitting or requiring CBA.275 For example,
the Toxic Substances Control Act allows the EPA to ban or
restrict chemicals that the agency has “a reasonable basis to
conclude . . . will present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment”;276 the Consumer Product Safety

significant regulatory actions).
270. See Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002) (making
amendments to Executive Order 12,866, mainly with respect to the Vice
President’s role).
271. For a general discussion of the legal status of CBA under current
environmental and other social regulatory statutes, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1663-67 (2001).
272. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§ 301 (1990); see Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk
from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 300-04 (1992)
(describing the original version of § 112 of the Clean Air Act).
274. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6)
(2000).
275. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1666-67 (discussing statutes that
clearly or arguably permit or require CBA).
276. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2000).

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1392

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

Act employs a similar “unreasonable risk of injury” standard;277
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
instructs the EPA to license pesticides that will not cause
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”278 Finally,
numerous federal statutes in the area of risk regulation are
ambiguous with respect to CBA; they neither clearly permit it,
nor clearly preclude it.279 Consider the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act provision governing pharmaceuticals, which
requires them to be “safe” and “effect[ive],”280 or the provision of
the same statute applicable to foods, which prohibits foods
containing “poisonous or deleterious” substances “unless the
quantity of such substance . . . does not ordinarily render it
injurious to health.”281 The emerging trend in the case law is to
read ambiguous statutes as permitting or even requiring
CBA.282 Cass Sunstein has gone so far as to suggest that there
is now a canon of statutory interpretation favoring the use of
CBA unless Congress’s intent to prohibit CBA is clearly
expressed.283
It bears emphasis that CBA is not confined to the federal
government. A recent survey of state regulatory review
structures notes that some states “strongly encourage the use
of cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis” by state
administrative agencies, and that “[o]ver half of the states
require agencies to assess the economic impact of all proposed
rules.”284
277. Id. § 2056(a).
278. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (2000).
279. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1666 (“A large number of statutes ask
agencies to ‘take into consideration’ various factors, including cost, in addition
to the principal factor to which the statute draws the agency’s attention . . . .”).
280. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
281. Id. § 342(a)(1).
282. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1668-82; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Regulating Risks After ATA, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27-30 (reading Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), to embrace the principle
that agencies are allowed to consider costs absent a clear statutory
prohibition). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Appropriate Role of Costs in
Environmental Regulation 19-22 (Geo. Wash. U.L. Sch., Pub. L. Res. Paper No.
36) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301479
(last visited Feb. 11, 2003) (reading American Trucking to suggest that agency
consideration of costs is disfavored, and concluding that the opinion gives no
useful guidance as to the applicability of this “anti-cost” canon versus the “procost” canon previously recognized by lower courts).
283. Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1668.
284. Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A
Comparative Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
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Why should federal and state agencies, including risk
regulatory agencies, rely on CBA to assess their options? CBA
is traditionally linked to economic efficiency, more precisely to
the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.285 Eric Posner and I
have argued that this linkage is mistaken, since Kaldor-Hicks
Rather, CBA is a
efficiency lacks moral significance.286
workable proxy for the criterion of overall well-being.287 The
regulatory option favored by CBA will typically (if not always)
be the option that maximizes overall well-being. And overall
well-being does have moral significance, if not conclusively so.
It is one moral factor, among others, that bears upon what
agencies morally ought to do, all things considered.
This view helps explain what “costs” and “benefits” are, for
purposes of CBA. A regulatory outcome involves a “cost,”
relative to some alternative, if it involves a setback to some
aspect of well-being. A regulatory outcome involves a “benefit,”
relative to some alternative, if it improves human well-being in
some way. And distinct categories of “costs” or “benefits”
represent different aspects or dimensions of welfare—different
ways in which human welfare can be advanced or impeded.
CBA
comes
in
two
versions:
monetized
and
nonmonetized.288 Both versions start by describing the costs
and benefits of possible regulatory outcomes along various
dimensions of welfare, with different, easily measurable units
used for each dimension. For example, it might be calculated
that an air pollution regulation will prevent 360 deaths, 6800
cases of chronic bronchitis, 1300 hospital admissions for
congestive heart failure, and 106,000 lost days of work; will
improve visibility, measured in kilometers of visual range, by
11%, for an affected population of 50 million; will impose
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 37, 38 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner
eds., 2001) [hereinafter COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS].
285. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 187-94 (discussing the
conventional defenses of CBA).
286. Id. at 190-91.
287. This view of CBA is presented and defended in Matthew D. Adler &
Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are
Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 284, at 269, 272-80; Adler,
Incommensurability, supra note 96, at 1371-83; Adler & Posner, supra note 2,
at 194-238.
288. See, e.g., LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION:
DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 17-19, 23-25 (1981) (describing these two
variants of CBA); Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 177-87, 233-36 (describing
“CBA,” meaning monetized cost-benefit analysis, and “qualitative direct
multidimensional assessment,” meaning nonmonetized cost-benefit analysis).
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financial costs of $100 million on the regulated companies; and
will result in 20,000 fewer jobs. The monetized version of CBA
then reduces each cost and benefit of the regulatory proposal to
a dollar figure, and calculates a net monetary cost or benefit for
the proposal. The nonmonetized version of CBA relies on
intuition and judgment rather than formal commensuration to
balance the divergent costs and benefits of the proposal. No
attempt is made to reduce all these welfare impacts to a
common scale, be it a dollar scale or some other.289
The analysis presented in the earlier parts of this Article
has large and quite obvious implications for CBA, in both the
monetized and nonmonetized versions. The analysis clarifies
what the appropriate dimensions of CBA are—what properly
counts as a cost or benefit.
Imagine that some risky activity or substance E produces
(1) X premature deaths; (2) Y cases in which persons are at
substantial risk, in the actual first-party Bayesian sense, of
dying prematurely as a result of E, i.e., they actually believe to
a high probabilistic degree that they will die prematurely as a
result of E; and (3) Z cases in which persons have a high risk,
in some frequentist sense, of dying prematurely as a result of
E.290 An agency is choosing between the status quo, with the
289. For a series of case studies that nicely illustrate how agencies actually
do both monetized and nonmonetized CBA, see ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA,
supra note 265.
290. This is a simplified case, similar to those presented in welfare
economics and CBA textbooks, where the outcome of the proposal is certain (in
this case with respect to the number of adverse events, if not the identities of
the persons involved). See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE
ECONOMICS 226-34 (1984) (discussing monetary measurement of individual
welfare effects under uncertainty after discussing valuation under certainty);
E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION 375-419
(4th ed. 1988) (discussing uncertainty at the end of the text). This simplified
case is designed to show how the views defended in this Article concerning the
harmfulness of death, Bayesian risk, and frequentist risk bear upon the CBA
valuation of outcomes. More realistically, a regulatory agency will be
considering various possible choices or “options,” the possible outcomes of
which are uncertain. (For example, the agency might be uncertain about the
number of premature deaths prevented by each regulatory option. Perhaps a
given option might prevent between zero and 100 deaths, with the agency
ascribing frequentist or Bayesian probabilities to each such possible outcome.)
In this more realistic case, applying CBA will involve a view about how one
“translates” the CBA valuation of possible outcomes into a CBA valuation of
the possible choices facing the decision maker—a view about how one moves
from the ex post to the ex ante. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
This is an issue which I have deliberately avoided discussing in this Article,
given space constraints. See id. Still, it seems clear that, on any plausible
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activity or substance left unregulated, and a regulatory scheme
that will control it—and thereby prevent the X premature
deaths, Y cases of first-person Bayesian risk, and Z cases of
frequentist risk. According to the Null View of risk regulation,
neither the X premature deaths, nor the Y cases of Bayesian
risk, nor the Z cases of frequentist risk count as a cost of
leaving the status quo in place (or, reciprocally, as a benefit of
the regulation). According to the Death View, the X premature
deaths count as a cost of leaving the status quo in place (and,
reciprocally, as a benefit of the regulation), but the Y cases of
Bayesian risk and the Z cases of frequentist risk do not.
According to a Risk (Bayesian) View, only the Y cases of
Bayesian risk count as a cost of the status quo; according to a
Risk (frequentist) View, only the Z cases of frequentist risk
count as a cost.
Finally, under the view defended here—the Hybrid
(Bayesian) View—both the X premature deaths and the Y cases
of first-person, Bayesian risk count as costs of the status quo,
for purposes of CBA. Reciprocally, the regulation has two
benefits: eliminating the deaths and eliminating the Bayesian
risk. But the Z cases of frequentist risk are irrelevant to the
CBA analysis.
Clearly, the choice between the Null View, Risk Views,
Death View, and Hybrid Views has large implications for the
proper practice of CBA.
How revisionary are these
implications? To what extent does CBA, as actually practiced
by risk regulatory agencies, deviate from the Hybrid (Bayesian)
View? Let us consider first the monetized and then the
nonmonetized versions of CBA.
1. CBA: Monetized Version
Faced with a risky substance or activity E that produces X
cases of premature death, Y cases in which persons actually
believe to a high degree that E will result in their premature
deaths, and Z cases in which persons have a high frequentist
risk of dying prematurely, the monetized cost of that substance
or activity is properly calculated as follows: ∑iVdeath,i + ∑jVBayesianaccount of the ex post/ex ante “translation,” the CBA valuation of outcomes
will be a crucial ingredient in determining the CBA ranking of possible actions
facing an uncertain regulator. Thus, I feel quite confident that the choice
between the Death, Null, Risk, and Hybrid Views has much relevance for the
real-world regulatory application of CBA, and more generally for real-world
regulatory choice.
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risk,j. Vdeath,i represents the monetized cost of death for person i,
where person i is one of the X persons who will die prematurely
as a result of E. VBayesian-risk,j represents the monetized cost for
person j of actually believing to a high degree that E will result
in his premature death, where person j is one of the Y persons
who possess this belief. VBayesian-risk,j will presumably depend on
what probability person j attributes to premature death. Note
that there is no third term, in this formula, for the putative
“cost” of the Z cases of high frequentist risk, since on the proper
view of welfare frequentist risk is no cost (welfare setback) at
all.
How do we calculate VBayesian-risk,j and Vdeath,i? CBA standardly
monetizes costs and benefits by asking what the individuals
affected would be willing to pay, or accept, for these welfare
changes.291 This technique is plausibly applied to monetize the
cost of first-person, Bayesian risk. If person j believes that the
risky event or substance creates a given probability of her
premature death, then VBayesian-risk,j is plausibly the amount that
person j would pay to prevent an event with that probability
(and with no other welfare impact on her), or would accept in
compensation for the occurrence of such an event. Indeed there
is now a large econometric and survey literature documenting
the amounts that persons are willing to pay or accept in return
for small probabilities of premature death.292
We might think that first-person Bayesian risk is not a
harm, taken alone, but is only harmful as a component of fear,
anxiety, or cognate affectively laden states. On that view,
VBayesian-risk,j is zero if person j is not fearful of the risky event. If
she is fearful, VBayesian-risk,j is the amount she would be willing to
pay to eliminate an event causing her to experience that level
of fear (and with no other welfare impact on her), or to accept
in compensation for the occurrence of such an event.293

291. A standard textbook on monetized CBA is MISHAN, supra note 290.
Numerous other such works are cited in Adler, supra note 58, at 249-51 nn.29,
34 & 36-37.
292. Much of this literature is summarized in W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL
TRADEOFFS 34-74 (1992). I say “plausibly” because it might be argued that
what is being measured here is the ex ante cost of death, not the ex post cost of
being under a risk (assuming the latter can be a cost without associated
affective states). Whether the two kinds of monetary valuation indeed differ,
and if so how to measure the latter rather than the former, cannot be
addressed here.
293. There are surely many subtleties in the monetization of fear, which
unfortunately I do not have space to discuss here. The issue merits much
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Calculating Vdeath,i is much trickier.294 We cannot ask what
person i would be willing to pay to avoid premature death or to
accept in return for premature death, since in many cases these
numbers will be infinite, or bounded only by the person’s total
wealth. Nor are the financial consequences of person i’s death,
e.g., lost wages or income, an appropriate measure of Vdeath,i. It
is tempting to think that Vdeath,i is simply incalculable295—that
death cannot be priced in dollars, for CBA purposes. This
temptation should be resisted. CBA is a rough proxy for
judgments of overall well-being. The proper method for
calculating Vdeath,i takes account of this construal of CBA. Vdeath,i
is the amount of money that tracks the effect of person i’s death
on overall welfare. It is the amount of money that—used as an
input into a CBA analysis—minimizes the deviation between
the output of that analysis, and the underlying criterion of
overall well-being.
This definition of Vdeath,i is vague, but it can be made more
precise. Assume that each person’s lifetime well-being, in
various outcomes, can be represented by a “utility” function Ui.
This is a standard assumption of welfare economists. Further,
assume that these “utilities” are interpersonally comparable.
In other words, assume that outcome O1 is better for overall
well-being than outcome O2 if and only if the cumulative utility
of O1, across the population, is larger than the cumulative
utility of O2. For welfare effects other than death—welfare
effects that are monetized, for purposes of CBA, using the
willingness to pay/accept methodology—we can calculate a
ratio between the monetized value of the welfare effect and its
utility value.
For example, if a new car has a monetary value for some
person of $10,000, and improves his utility by 200 units, then
the ratio of monetary value and utility value here is 50. If
eliminating annoying noise has a monetary value for some
more scholarly attention than it has received. On the closely related issue of
valuing anxiety, see Mordechai Shechter, Incorporating Anxiety Induced by
Environmental Episodes in Life Valuation, in 2 APPLIED BEHAVIOURAL
ECONOMICS 529 (Shlomo Maital ed., 1988); and Bruce H. Smith, Anxiety as a
Cost of Commuting to Work, 29 J. URB. ECON. 260 (1991). Cf. Loewenstein et
al., supra note 223, at 267-71 (focusing on the role of affect in explaining
behavior under uncertainty).
294. For an overview of the problem of monetizing the value of life, see
JOHN KLEINIG, VALUING LIFE 145-63 (1991).
295. See John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 91-95
(1978).
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person of $600, and improves his utility by 10 units, then the
ratio of monetary value and utility value for this welfare effect
is 60. Now, calculate the average ratio between monetary value
and utility value, for all welfare effects (other than death)
priced by CBA. Then Vdeath,i is the loss of utility incurred by
person i, multiplied by this average ratio.296
Of course, it is very difficult to know what person i’s
particular loss of utility will be—especially since risk regulators
almost never know, in advance, who in particular will die
prematurely as a consequence of some risky substance or event.
Yet economists and public policy analysts might try to calculate
what the typical or average loss of utility is when people die
prematurely as a result of the kinds of substances or activities
generally targeted by risk regulators, and then multiply this
typical utility loss by the ratio described in the preceding
paragraph to arrive at a typical or average cost of death, Vdeath.
Using this average or typical value, the cost for CBA purposes
of an activity or substance E that results in X premature
deaths is: X*Vdeath. And our formula for calculating the
monetized cost of an activity that results in X premature
deaths, Y cases of first-person Bayesian risk, and Z cases of
frequentist risk, becomes:
X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j
We are finally in a position to assess the actual practices of
risk regulators. The standard approach to monetizing the costs
of a risky substance or activity such as E—as explained in the
economics literature on CBA and now generally employed by
regulatory agencies—is to multiply the number of premature
deaths resulting from E by the so-called value of statistical life
(VOSL).297 The current best estimate for VOSL is $6 million.298
296. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A Comment on Judge
Williams’ Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 285-86
(2001) (proposing such an approach to valuing life).
297. This approach derives from the work of E.J. Mishan and Thomas
Schelling. See E.J. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical
Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687 (1971); T.C. Schelling, The Life You Save May
Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel
Chase, Jr. ed., 1968). The current literature on VOSL is vast. For good
surveys, see, for example, A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS 314-66
(1993); VISCUSI, supra note 292, at 34-74; W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK
POLICY 45-68 (1998); M.W. Jones-Lee, Safety and the Saving of Life: The
Economics of Safety and Physical Risk, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 290, 290318 (Richard Layard & Stephen Glaister eds., 2d ed. 1994); David Pearce,
Valuing Risks, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND
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Further, as a matter of standard CBA practice, the Bayesian or
frequentist “risks” resulting from a hazardous substance or
activity are not monetized separately from the premature
deaths that the activity or substance causes.299 In other words,
the monetized cost of E causing X premature deaths, Y cases of
first-person Bayesian risk, and Z cases of frequentist risk
would be calculated as: X*VOSL. No separate terms for the Y
belief states or Z instances of frequentist risk appear in this
formula.
VOSL, in turn, is calculated as follows. A premature death
resulting from some substance or activity is seen as imposing a
small “risk” of death on each person who is “exposed” (in some
sense) to the substance or activity. For example, if one person
dies out of an exposed population of 1 million, then the “risk” of
death for each person is seen to be 1 in 1 million. If the
exposed population is 100,000, then the “risk” of death for each
person is seen to be 1 in 100,000. The VOSL is the dollar
amount that the members of the population would be willing to
pay, in the aggregate, to avoid these “risks.” As Kip Viscusi, a
leading proponent of the VOSL method, explains,
[I]magine a group of 10,000 people, such as an audience in a
stadium. . . . If there was one expected statistical death from this
large audience of 10,000 participants, and if each of the participants
is willing to pay $500 to eliminate the risk, then it would be possible
to raise $5 million collectively from this audience to eliminate the one
statistical death to the group, thus establishing the value of life.300

On the assumption that (1) the exposed population is large, and
that (2) the willingness to pay/accept for risk increases in a
linear fashion with the risk level, given small risks, this
aggregate amount—the VOSL—will be the same number
regardless of the precise population size. “[T]he statistical
value of life is the total amount of compensation n workers
would require to face one expected death from their group,
where n is a large number.”301
How does the standard formula for monetizing the costs of
a risky substance or activity (X*VOSL) compare with the
MANAGEMENT 345, supra note 200, at 345-75; and W. Kip Viscusi, The Value
of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1912 (1993).
298. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 33, at 1-2.
299. See ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 265 (providing case
studies illustrating how the EPA performs monetized CBA); sources cited
supra note 297 (explaining VOSL methodology).
300. VISCUSI, supra note 297, at 46.
301. Viscusi, supra note 297, at 1930.
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approach recommended here, namely, X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j?
First, X*VOSL should not be taken as an approximation for the
second term in my equation, ∑jVBayesian-risk,j. This second term,
∑jVBayesian-risk,j, asks how much those who actually have certain
probabilistic beliefs about E would pay to prevent it. For
example, if E is a toxic release which occurs in a population of 1
million and will kill 1 person, but only 3000 are actually aware
of E, then at most 3000 people can be at risk in the actual, firstperson Bayesian sense. Only a person in this small group of
3000 can actually possess a high probabilistic belief that his or
her death will occur prematurely as a result of E. Y, in this
example, is no greater than 3000. But the VOSL calculation, as
explained above, assumes that everyone in the population of 1
million is “at risk” of dying prematurely. The term “risk” is—in
effect—used by VOSL proponents to mean a hypothetical firstperson Bayesian risk, not an actual first-person Bayesian risk.
We calculate VOSL by asking what each person in the
population would, hypothetically, pay to prevent E, were she to
believe that her probability of dying prematurely as a result of
E were the number of premature deaths (1 in the example here)
divided by the population size (1 million)—and then
aggregating the amounts. This produces a dollar sum very
different from the sum of willingness to pay/accept among those
actually aware of, or afraid of, the hazard. For instance, while
X*VOSL in the example under consideration is $6 million,
∑jVBayesian-risk,j might well be as low as $18,000!302
Even if X*VOSL were a decent approximation for ∑jVBayesianrisk,j, this would hardly vindicate CBA as currently practiced.
The appropriate formula for calculating the costs of a risky
substance or activity E is: X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j. If X*VOSL
does approximate ∑jVBayesian-risk,j, the upshot would be that CBA
as currently practiced dramatically underestimates the costs of
risky substances and activities, and dramatically understates
the benefits of risk regulation. Why? Consider that, if the
approximation just described were to obtain, then CBA as
currently practiced would include a cost term roughly equaling
∑jVBayesian risk,j (namely X*VOSL), but would lack any cost term at
all for X*Vdeath.
A better argument in defense of current practice runs as
302. A $6 million VOSL implies a willingness to pay $6 to avoid a 1 in 1
million risk. If this amount is used to calculate ∑jVBayesian risk,j in the example at
hand, where 3000 people are actually aware of the risky event, that equals
$18,000.
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follows. For complicated reasons that cannot be elaborated
here, it turns out that VOSL may be a decent approximation for
Vdeath303—on the premise that people price small risks of death
in accordance with the standard economic theory of individual
decision making known as “expected utility” theory. Further, it
seems reasonable to assume that ∑jVBayesian-risk,j will often be
small. After all, many individuals are unaware of (let alone
fear) the dangerous substances and activities that regulatory
agencies target. So X*VOSL could be a decent approximation
for the formula advocated here: X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian risk,j.
Does this line of argument succeed? It is beyond the scope
of this Article to evaluate whether VOSL really is a decent
approximation for Vdeath. Let me note, however, that the
premise on which the argument rests—that expected utility
theory successfully predicts how individuals price small risks of
death—is highly contestable. Much literature in experimental
psychology suggests that expected utility theory is a poor
predictor of individual behavior, including pricing behavior.304
VOSL is predicated on econometric studies of the incremental
wages that workers demand to work in hazardous jobs, and on
other such evidence of what individuals are willing to pay or
accept in return for fatality risks. If this pricing behavior is not
driven by expected utility calculations, but instead by social
norms, by altruistic considerations, or by other psychological
mechanisms inconsistent with expected utility theory, then the
approximate equivalence of VOSL and Vdeath is undermined.305
To sum up, there is considerable reason to think that the
current approach to monetizing the costs of death and risk, in
the area of risk regulation, is incorrect. The correct formula
(X*Vdeath + ∑jVBayesian-risk,j) is conceptually quite different from the
currently employed formula (X*VOSL), and it is far from clear
whether the two formulae are even approximately equal.

303. See Adler, supra note 296, at 285-86.
304. For an accessible introduction to this literature, see PLOUS, supra note
68, at 79-161.
305. The point that individuals do not actually price fatality risks in
accordance with expected utility theory is developed in PETER DORMAN,
MARKETS AND MORTALITY: ECONOMICS, DANGEROUS WORK, AND THE VALUE
OF HUMAN LIFE 142-50 (1996). It should be noted that expected utility theory
has different variants. One variant—the variant required to make VOSL a
decent approximation for Vdeath—presumes self-interested behavior, and is
therefore inconsistent with altruistic behavior.
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2. CBA: Nonmonetized Version
Agencies engaged in CBA pursuant to Executive Order
12,866, or in other contexts, do not invariably reduce the “costs”
and “benefits” of proposed rules to monetary amounts. Indeed,
a recent study found that a majority of cost-benefit analyses
submitted by health, safety, and environmental agencies to
OMB failed to monetize at least some of the welfare impacts
delineated therein.306 Because there is no scholarly work
documenting in any systematic way how agencies actually
perform nonmonetized CBA—how they actually identify and
commensurate costs and benefits that are measured on diverse
scales and not rescaled in terms of dollars or some other
common metric—it would be overreaching for me to make
claims about the “normal” or “average” practices of agencies
here. It appears, however, that at least some risk-regulatory
agencies engaged in nonmonetized CBA count the elimination
of risk in the frequentist sense as a benefit of regulatory
proposals, distinct from the prevention of premature death.307
This
represents
an
important
divergence
between
nonmonetized and monetized CBA, since as explained above
the standard methodology for monetized CBA is to calculate
and monetize the premature deaths prevented by a regulatory
proposal, and to ignore frequentist risk.
Why might frequentist risk become a factor in agency
decision making? A good answer requires some attention to the
role of so-called “risk assessment” within the modern
administrative state.308 A risk assessment is, in effect, a
systematic and carefully structured description of the fatalities,
fatality risks, and other health or safety setbacks caused by
some hazard.309 Risk-regulatory agencies that use CBA (either

306. See Hahn et al., supra note 265, at 866-70.
307. See infra text accompanying notes 319-22.
308. On that role, see CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES
103-51 (1993); QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION (Lester Lave
ed., 1982); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk
Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89, 95-126 (1988); Rosenthal et al., supra note 273,
at 295-322; Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk
Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 417-68 (1995); Symposium, Risk, 63
U. CIN. L. REV. 1531 (1995); and Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal
Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium, Risk
Assessment].
309. See generally VINCENT T. COVELLO & MILEY W. MERKHOFER, RISK
ASSESSMENT METHODS: APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS (1993); HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
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the monetized or nonmonetized version) to evaluate policy
alternatives frequently employ risk assessment as an initial
step in that analysis. Indeed, the OMB guidance document
issued pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 states that the
documentation for major rulemakings should include a risk
assessment.
The risk assessment should generate a credible, objective, realistic,
and scientifically balanced analysis [of risks to health, safety, and the
environment]; present information on hazard, dose-response, and
exposure . . . ; and explain the confidence in each assessment by
clearly delineating strengths, uncertainties, and assumptions, along
with the impacts of these factors on the overall assessment.310

Risk assessments are used in other contexts as well, for
example when federal agencies implement statutes that
preclude CBA but still require or permit a systematic agency
review of the fatalities, illnesses, etc., caused by hazardous
substances or activities.311
The techniques of risk assessment have become quite
standardized—in part because risk analysis has become a
distinct academic discipline with its own norms and practices,
including a conventional framework for risk assessment,312 and
in part because that framework was articulated and codified by
the National Research Council in a highly influential 1983
study, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing
the Process.313 This study, known as the Red Book, divided risk
assessment into the following steps: hazard identification, doseresponse assessment, exposure assessment, and risk
characterization.314 “Hazard identification,” crudely, means
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 200, at 9-245; HUMAN AND
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-366 (Dennis J.
Paustenbach ed., 2002); THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS: A TEXTBOOK OF CASE STUDIES 1-328 (Dennis J.
Paustenbach ed., 1989).
310. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 at § III.A.4, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html (Jan. 11, 1996).
311. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 295-322 (describing the EPA’s
use of risk assessment in a variety of statutory contexts).
312. On the history of risk assessment, see Dennis J. Paustenbach,
Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How Others Can Benefit, 6
RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 283, 285-87 (1995).
313. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983).
314. See id. at 19-20; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND
JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 4-6 (1995) (summarizing the Red Book
framework).
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identifying some substance or activity for which there is
scientific evidence of a causal link to fatalities and other health
or safety setbacks.
“Dose-response assessment” means
quantifying that causal link.
Paradigmatically, risk
assessment focuses on toxic substances (such as air or water
pollutants, pesticides, toxic food additives or naturally
occurring food constituents, workplace carcinogens or other
workplace toxins, or substances used in consumer products)
and the dose-response assessment takes the form of a graph or
mathematical equation showing the relationship between the
dose of the toxic substance and the percentage of individuals
exposed to that dose who develop an adverse effect. “Exposure
assessment” means characterizing the pattern of exposures to
the toxic substance or other hazard that would occur if the
status quo were left unregulated and if various regulatory
alternatives were put in place. Finally, “risk characterization”
means integrating the dose-response assessment and the
exposure assessment so as to generate a prediction of the
fatalities, illnesses, etc., that would occur in the status quo
outcome and in the various outcomes of the regulatory
alternatives under consideration.315
Risk assessments typically generate two kinds of
predictions, insofar as fatalities are concerned: (1) a prediction
of the total number of premature deaths that would occur as a
result of different regulatory choices; and (2) a prediction of the
distribution of the frequentist risk of premature death that
would occur as a result of these choices. This frequentist risk is
what risk assessments typically call “individual risk.” As one
textbook on risk assessment explains,
Most [risk assessments] include several common measures of
individual and societal risk, in particular:
• Individual risk, which is the probability of a specified individual
dying prematurely as a result of exposure to the risk agents. . . .
• Individual risk contours show the geographical distribution of
individual risk . . . .
• Maximum individual risk is the individual risk to the person
experiencing the highest risk in the exposed population. . . .
• Various measures of societal risk, such as . . . the expected number

315. On the meaning of “hazard identification,” “dose-response
assessment,” “exposure assessment,” and “risk characterization,” see, for
example, COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 309, at 27-29; and NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 313, at 19-20.
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of fatalities as a function of location or population subgroup . . . .316

To see why the “individual risk” numbers generated by
traditional risk assessment are frequentist, not Bayesian risks,
and to understand why risk assessment readily lends itself to
this kind of prediction, consider the following simple example.
Imagine that our “hazard identification” has identified some
chemical compound that has accumulated in a waste dump and
that is causally linked to an inevitably fatal cancer. One
million people drink water that is contaminated, to some
degree, by the dump.
Our “dose-response assessment”
determines that the relationship between the amount of the
compound ingested (over a lifetime) and the percentage of a
group ingesting this particular dose that would incur fatal
cancer as a result can be represented by the following graph.
Figure 1: Dose-Response Curve for Carcinogen in Waste Dump

Finally, our “exposure assessment” determines that, absent
regulation, the one million people drinking the contaminated
water would in fact be exposed to the following lifetime doses.

316. COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 309, at 231.
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Exposure Level
Very Low Low
Moderate
(1 gram)
(5 grams) (15 grams)
Number of
Individuals

500,000

400,000

80,000

High
(25 grams)
20,000

Combining the “dose-response assessment” and the “exposure
assessment,” we can predict that absent regulation (1) the total
number of premature deaths caused by the compound would be
12; and (2) the Very Low Exposure, Low Exposure, Moderate
Exposure, and High Exposure segments of the population
would face the following “individual risks.”
Exposure Level
Very Low
Low
Moderate High
Individual
Risk
1 in 250,000 1 in 100,000 1 in 20,000 1 in 10,000
These “individual risks” are frequentist risks. They are a
function of the individual’s dosage of the toxic substance
concerned—indeed, can be read directly off the dose-response
curve—and equal the frequency with which persons (or persons
of a particular type) exposed to that dose die prematurely as a
result. In this example, the dose-response curve is quite crude
and shows the percentage of a group consisting of all persons
exposed to a particular dose of the toxin that would die
prematurely as a result of the toxin. A more refined doseresponse curve might display the percentage of a group
consisting of all persons (1) with characteristics C1 . . . Cn, and
(2) exposed to a particular dose of the toxin that would die
prematurely as a result. (For example, a risk assessment could
have one dose-response curve for adults, and another for
children.) Whether the dose-response curve is simple or
refined, the “individual risks” generated by risk assessments
have nothing to do with degrees of belief (actual or
hypothetical), but instead are calculated by subsuming the
given individual, P, within some class of persons exposed to the
toxic substance, and determining what percentage of that class
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would die prematurely because of it.317
How are the dual predictions of the typical risk
assessment—a prediction concerning total premature deaths,
and a prediction concerning the frequentist risk of premature
death incurred by various members of the population—
employed by agencies conducting monetized or nonmonetized
CBA? In the case of monetized CBA, the prediction concerning
frequentist risk is typically ignored. As I have already
explained, monetized CBA takes the number of premature
deaths prevented by a regulatory proposal, multiplies that
number by VOSL ($6 million) to determine the monetized value
of lifesaving, and moves on; there is no separate term for the
Bayesian or frequentist risks that would be eliminated by the
However, at least some agencies conducting
proposal.318
nonmonetized CBA do give weight to the risk assessor’s
prediction concerning frequentist risk. Alon Rosenthal, George
Gray, and John Graham surveyed the use of risk assessment by
the EPA with respect to carcinogenic chemicals, and identified
several instances in which that agency, in the course of
implementing “balancing” statutes, took account of “individual
risk” in making regulatory choices.319 For example, the authors
found that the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was
administered as follows:
The OTS [the office within EPA that administers the TSCA] has not
formalized its risk management criteria, in part because TSCA
requires a discretionary, judgmental balancing of numerous factors.
Generally, the OTS believes that situations in which lifetime
-6
individual risk is less than 10 , or in which population risk (i.e., the
number of expected cases of cancer per year) is less than one, do not
warrant the attention of the agency. . . . [T]he OTS considers both
individual risk and population risk [total deaths] in deciding whether
to regulate. For example, in deciding to phase out the use of asbestos
in almost all products over a seven-year period, the OTS concluded
that the rule would prevent 200 cases of cancer and would also relieve
-3
certain highly exposed individuals of a 10 lifetime excess cancer risk.
It cited both of these factors as justifying the costs caused by the
suspension.320

Similarly, the authors found that the EPA, in applying the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—
another balancing statute—placed some emphasis on
317. See, e.g., COVELLO & MERKHOFER, supra note 309, at 151-68
(discussing dose-response models).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 297-99.
319. Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 295-322.
320. Id. at 308-09 (citations omitted).
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“individual risk.” “The [EPA under FIFRA] tends to set
acceptable risk levels for the food-consuming population within
-5
-6
or below the range of 10 to 10 , while it tends to accept
-4
-5
occupational risks that are less than 10 to 10 .”321 Several
further examples where the EPA has counted the elimination of
frequentist risk as a benefit of regulation, for purposes of
nonmonetized CBA, are provided in a recent study describing
the use of economic analysis by that agency.322
The cases I have just described are not cases in which (1)
the frequentist risk information simply recapitulates
information about the number of premature deaths in different
outcomes, and is not given additional weight by the agency; or
(2) frequentist risks are the “bridging” probabilities that an
agency, uncertain about which outcomes will result from its
various possible choices, employs to move from the “ex post”
ranking of outcomes to the “ex ante” ranking of choices.323
Rather, it appears, these are cases in which agencies take the
level of frequentist risk to be an independent dimension of
welfare—a welfare-relevant feature of a possible outcome that
has independent negative weight, quite apart from the
occurrence of premature death, in determining the ranking of
that outcome.
This practice should be ended.
Agencies that use
nonmonetized CBA to evaluate regulatory proposals should not
give independent weight to frequentist risk in determining the
CBA ranking of outcomes. CBA is a proxy for overall wellbeing—genuine “costs” and “benefits” track genuine dimensions
of welfare. Frequent risk, however, is not a genuine welfare
setback, and the elimination of frequentist risk is not a genuine
welfare improvement. Part III of this Article argued that
neither a high statistical probability of some person’s
premature death, nor a high physical probability, nor a high
conventional probability, diminishes that person’s well-being.324
The frequentist risk numbers that are predicted by risk

321. Id. at 306 (citations omitted).
322. See Peter Caulkins & Stuart Sessions, Water Pollution and the
Organic Chemicals Industry, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA 87, supra note
265, at 108, 110-11, 115; Ronnie Levin, Lead in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSES AT EPA 205, supra note 265, at 225; Mahesh Podar et al., Municipal
Sewage Sludge Management, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA 365, supra note
265, at 371.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
324. See supra Part III.B-D.
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assessment documents and sometimes figure within agency
decision making—so-called “individual risks”—are in fact
either statistical or conventional probabilities, not physical
probabilities. “Individual risk” is not calculated by subsuming
the individual within a reference class sharing all of his
causally relevant characteristics. Rather, as I explained above,
the reference class is much cruder, often consisting simply of all
persons exposed to a particular dose of the toxic substance
under assessment,325 and in any event will be heterogeneous
with respect to some characteristics that affect individual
responses to that dose. Consider the crude calculation that P,
who consumes a lifetime dose of 1 gram of some carcinogen C,
has an “individual risk” of 1 in 20,000 of dying as a result,
because the frequency with which members of the reference
class of “all individuals who consume a lifetime dose of 1 gram
of C” die prematurely is 1/20,000. This 1 in 20,000 probability
will be P’s statistical probability of dying prematurely from C if
and only if the narrowest P-containing reference class for which
reliable frequency information is available is the crude class
defined in terms of lifetime dosage. That might not be the case;
better information could be available. Even so, the 1 in 20,000
probability is a kind of conventional probability. P’s lifetime
dosage represents a conventionally salient casual feature,
albeit not the only causal feature or the only one about which
statisticians might be informed.
Whether statistical, conventional, or both, the frequentist
probabilities of premature death that are predicted by risk
assessments should not be used—within the context of
monetized or nonmonetized CBA—as a partial determinant of
the agency’s ranking of outcomes and therewith its ranking of
the regulatory choices possibly resulting in those outcomes. A
change in someone’s level of frequentist risk, be it statistical,
conventional, or even physical, is neither a welfare setback nor
an improvement and therefore is not a cost or benefit for CBA
purposes.326

325. See supra text accompanying note 317.
326. Nor can the frequentist risks predicted by risk assessments be
reinterpreted as hypothetical Bayesian risks or as actual third-party Bayesian
risks (for example, the probabilistic beliefs of experts concerning the likely
death of persons exposed to toxic substances), and thereby given a legitimate
outcome-ranking role within CBA.
As I demonstrated in Part IV.C,
hypothetical Bayesian risk and third-party Bayesian risk, like frequentist
risk, are not welfare setbacks.
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B. RISK-RISK ANALYSIS
I have shown that the Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk has
large implications for cost-benefit analysis. What are the
implications if we shift from CBA to competing frameworks for
regulatory choice? I have argued at length, elsewhere, that
CBA is the appropriate framework,327 as have numerous other
scholars,328 and CBA is now widely practiced by administrative
agencies.329 But it is still premature to suggest, as does Cass
Sunstein in a recent article, that we have moved from “first
generation” to “second generation” debate about CBA—where
“second generation” debate concerns “how (not whether) to
engage in cost-benefit analysis.”330 CBA remains controversial,
particularly among academics.331 One competing framework,
for purposes of risk regulation, is the framework known as
“risk-risk” analysis (RRA).332 RRA focuses on the health and
safety effects of regulatory options, rather than on other types
of costs or benefits.
One way of stating the objective [of RRA] is that society desires to
minimize the adverse health effects associated with a given food such
as bacon [or with other toxic substances or activities]. Thus society
would permit nitrite [a carcinogen] in bacon if the improvement in the
health of consumers from botulism protection exceeded the decrement
in health from the risk of cancer. Yet it is evident that the direct riskrisk framework takes only the first step of considering the health of
the person consuming the food. People are also associated with the
production and distribution of food; society [under RRA] desires to
minimize the adverse health effects associated with producing as well
as consuming bacon . . . .333

RRA has a robust version and a weak version. The robust
version of RRA ignores all nonhealth effects of regulatory
options: financial costs, employment, aesthetic effects,

327. See sources cited supra note 287.
328. See, e.g., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 284. This book is an
anthology of papers on CBA, many of which defend the practice.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 264-84.
330. Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1655-56.
331. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 170-72 nn.12-18 (citing sources).
332. See, e.g., LAVE, supra note 288, at 15-17; Frank B. Cross, When
Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 729 (1995); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener,
Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK 1, supra note 5, at 1-41;
Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1538-52
(1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-7
(1994).
333. LAVE, supra note 288, at 16.
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convenience, and so on.334 The weak version of RRA accords
priority to health and safety—it gives these dimensions of wellbeing more weight than they would have within CBA—but does
not wholly ignore nonhealth effects.335 The case for RRA is
either a moral case (namely, that agencies are morally obliged
not to maximize well-being, but instead to give special weight
to health and safety)336 or an institutional case (that RRA turns
out to be a more administrable proxy for overall well-being
than CBA, given the limited resources, information, and
capabilities of agencies).337
What is the legal status of RRA? Some statutes governing
risk-regulatory agencies are best interpreted as requiring those
agencies to use RRA rather than CBA.338 Other statutes use
general balancing language without clearly choosing between
RRA and CBA.339 Proponents of RRA would argue that these
statutes, too, should be read as setting forth RRA (not CBA) as
the framework for agency choice.
The view of risk, death, and harm defended in this Article
has substantial relevance for RRA. Consider the choice
between the Null View, the Death View, the Hybrid
(Frequentist) View, and the Hybrid (Bayesian) View. On the
Null View, RRA should focus on illness or injury, not on death
itself or the risk of premature death. The fact that a policy
reduces the incidence of, say, emphysema, headaches, or
paraplegia, would legitimately count in favor of the policy.340
However, the fact that a policy reduces fatalities or fatality
334. See, e.g., id. at 15-18 (contrasting risk-risk framework, which on
Lave’s construal “precludes consideration of non-health effects,” and “riskbenefit” framework, which does consider non-health effects).
335. See Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the
Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 116-28
(2001) (arguing for a modified version of CBA that gives extra weight to safety
interests but does not ignore other interests).
336. See id.
337. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 229-33.
338. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1664-65.
339. See id. at 1666-67.
340. For discussions of valuation of morbidity, see generally Mark Berger
et al., Framework for Valuing Health Risks, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY
23, supra note 29; Richard Clemmer et al., Household Health Production,
Property Values and the Value of Health, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY 105,
supra note 29; Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR
POLICY 118, supra note 29; Donald Kenkel et al., Contingent Valuation of
Health, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY 72, supra note 29; and Donald
Kenkel, Cost of Illness Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY 42, supra
note 29.

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1412

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

risks would not. Morbidity is policy relevant, but mortality is
not. On the Death View, mortality as well as morbidity is
policy relevant, but the risk of mortality is not. On the Hybrid
(Frequentist) View, mortality, morbidity, and, arguably, the
frequentist risk of mortality or morbidity would all be
legitimate factors for RRA.
Finally, and interestingly, the Hybrid (Bayesian) View has
the same implications for RRA as the Death View. Death is a
welfare setback, pace the Null View. If so, it is exceedingly
difficult to see why RRA should be structured as a technique
that aims at, or gives priority to, the reduction of morbidity, but
does not aim at or give priority to the reduction of mortality.
Death is, typically, a more serious welfare setback than injury
and illness. Death is the more extreme result of the processes
that produce injury and illness, namely, injurious events and
disease. Death, like injury and illness, reduces the subject’s
well-being in (broadly speaking) the same way, namely, by
intruding on her physical integrity. All these considerations
suggest that RRA should focus on reducing death as well as
reducing injury and illness.
Fear and Bayesian risk are different. These are welfare
setbacks, according to the Hybrid (Bayesian) View, but are
typically less serious setbacks than injury, illness, and death;
and fear and Bayesian risk do not, except in very unusual
cases, represent a bodily dysfunction or failure of physical
integrity. Bayesian risk is merely a kind of belief; fear is a kind
of emotion.
Well-functioning humans have beliefs and
experience emotions.
It is hard to see what moral or
institutional considerations could counsel agencies to (1) ignore
or give lower priority to financial costs, unemployment,
convenience, ecosystem disruption, and other serious nonhealth
effects, but (2) aim at or give high priority to emotional and
epistemic well-being. Finally, since risk in the frequentist
sense is not a welfare setback, frequentist risk should be no
more relevant to RRA than it is to CBA.
In short, assuming that there are good moral or
institutional grounds for agencies to engage in RRA rather
than CBA, agencies should aim at or give priority to the
reduction of premature death (along with illness and injury)
but should not aim at or give priority to the reduction of risk in
the frequentist or Bayesian sense.341
341. By “aim at,” here, I mean to maintain the focus on outcomes that has
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I do not know how this recommendation squares with the
actual practices of agencies engaged in RRA. However, it is
inconsistent with the view taken by John Graham and
Jonathan Wiener in a major scholarly work on RRA, Risk
Versus Risk. Wiener and Graham argue that all of the
following considerations should be relevant to risk-risk
tradeoffs: “magnitude [of risk], degree of population exposure,
certainty, type of adverse outcome, distribution, and timing.”342
They elaborate as follows:
Magnitude (Probability) of Risk. Recall that risk is defined as the
probability of an adverse outcome. . . . If the adverse outcomes are
similar or identical (for example, fatal cancer vs. fatal cancer) . . . the
relative probabilities of the adverse outcomes become critical.
. . .[I]t is important for decisionmakers to recognize the difference
between a lifetime probability of, say, 1 in 100 and a lifetime
probability of 1 in 100,000. . . .
....
Size of Population. If we hold constant the probability of adverse
outcome to a specified individual . . ., the relative size of the exposed
populations is an important consideration.
Statistics such as
aggregate cancer incidence (sometimes called “population risk” in
contrast to “individual risk”) are useful in capturing the importance of
the size of an exposed population.343

In short, Graham and Wiener claim that both “individual risk”
(in the frequentist sense) and “population risk” (the total
number of deaths, illnesses, or injuries) should figure in
RRA.344 Imagine that in outcome O1 one cancer death occurs,
out of a population of 100 unknowingly exposed to the
carcinogen; and in outcome O2 two cancer deaths occur, out of a
population of 10,000,000 unknowingly exposed to the
carcinogen. According to Graham and Wiener, as I read them,
the policy maker here has prima facie reason to favor the
outcome, O2, with more deaths, since the other outcome exposes
individuals to a much higher frequentist risk. Indeed, given
the stark disparity between the two outcomes on the risk

characterized this entire Article. Neither frequentist risk nor Bayesian risk
should bear on the RRA ranking of outcomes. Death should bear on the RRA
ranking of outcomes; and so the Bayesian or frequentist probabilities of
different regulatory choices resulting in outcomes characterized by death are
potentially relevant—relevant “ex ante”—to the RRA analyst. See supra text
accompanying notes 95-100.
342. Graham & Wiener, supra note 332, at 30.
343. Id. at 30-31.
344. For a similar claim, see Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks
Thoughtfully, 7 RISK 325, 342-44 (1996).

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1414

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

dimension, and the smaller disparity on the death dimension, it
seems likely that—under the Graham and Wiener approach—it
would be best, all things considered, for outcome O2 to obtain.
O1 has one premature death, and 100 cases of a very high (1 in
100) frequentist risk of premature death, while O2 has two
premature deaths, and ten million cases of a trivially low (2 in
10 million) frequentist risk of premature death.
One upshot of the Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk defended
in this Article is that the Graham and Wiener conception of
RRA—the leading conception within the scholarly literature—
is mistaken. In applying RRA to the hypothetical outcomes
just described, the policy maker should unequivocally rank O1,
the outcome with fewer premature deaths, over outcome O2; he
has no reason whatsoever to give a higher ranking to O2. More
generally, although “distribution,” “timing,” “type of adverse
outcome,” and perhaps other considerations could properly
figure in RRA along with “degree of population exposure” (the
number of actual deaths, illnesses and injuries), risk in the
frequentist sense should not.
C. HEALTH AND SAFETY THRESHOLDS
Numerous regulatory statutes set health or safety
thresholds; they direct agencies to determine whether a
particular level of some substance, or amount of some activity,
would be “safe” or “unsafe,” “healthy” or “unhealthy,” or
cognate terms. These thresholds arise in a variety of statutory
contexts. Sometimes, the health or safety thresholds function
as statutory goals and seem entirely to displace a balancing
analysis. In such instances, the agency is seemingly enjoined
by statute to eliminate health or safety threats above the
threshold, regardless of countervailing costs, financial or
other.345 For example, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
requires food additives to be “safe.”346 Section 112 of the Clean
Air Act, until its amendment in 1990, instructed the EPA to set
345. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1663-64. I say “seemingly” because,
arguably, even statutes that facially require agencies to maximize health or
safety should be interpreted to incorporate some cost considerations, absent
very clear language to the contrary. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (interpreting the pre1990 version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act to authorize the EPA to give
limited consideration to cost and technological feasibility). But see Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001) (reading section 109(b)
of the Clean Air Act to preclude the EPA from considering costs).
346. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000).
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emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants at a level that
would “protect the public health” with an “ample margin of
safety.”347
In other cases, statutes create health or safety thresholds
that function as goals and preclude CBA- or RRA-type
balancing, but place a constraint of technological or economic
“feasibility” on regulation; since regulations that are so costly
as to cause widespread bankruptcy among regulated firms
would be economically “infeasible,” and since the elimination of
safety risks where that necessitates a complete cessation in the
production of some good or service is often seen as
technologically “infeasible,” this “feasibility” constraint
amounts to a crude type of balancing.348 Section 6(b)(5) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act is a good example of this
type of statute. OSHA is directed to set a standard for each
toxic substance in the workplace that “most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity.”349
Another example is the pre-1996 version of the Safe Drinking
Water Act. The EPA was required first to set nonenforceable
“maximum contaminant level goals” (MCLGs) for water
pollutants, which are concentrations at which no adverse
human health effects are believed to occur, and then to
promulgate enforceable standards, “maximum contaminant
levels,” which were to be set as close to the MCLGs as is
“feasible with the use of the best technology, treatment
techniques, and other [available] means.”350
Finally, statutory health or safety thresholds are
sometimes integrated with a CBA- or RRA-type balancing
analysis, in more or less complex ways. A statute might set a
threshold, preclude regulation of substances or activities below
the threshold,351 and instruct the agency to engage in CBA- or
RRA-type balancing to determine whether to regulate
347. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549,
§ 301 (1990); see Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 300-04 (describing the
original version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act).
348. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1665-66.
349. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
350. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 309-13 (describing the pre1996 version of the Safe Drinking Water Act) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4),
(5) (1988)). The Act has subsequently been amended to include a cost-benefit
provision. See supra note 274.
351. See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1664 (discussing statutes that
require “significant” risk as a prerequisite for regulation).

ADLER.3FMT.DOC

1416

4·28·2003 7:23 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1293

substances or activities above the threshold. The threshold, in
this context, might be seen as the outcome of a legislative
balancing sensitive to deliberation costs: The benefits of
regulating activities or substances below the threshold are
likely to be so small that they do not justify the (substantial)
administrative deliberation costs involved in full-fledged CBA
or RRA.352 Consider section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, which generally authorizes OSHA to issue
standards that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment.”353 This statutory language arguably requires or
permits OSHA to employ CBA or RRA in regulating dangerous
activities or conditions—as opposed to toxic substances, which
are covered not only by section 3(8) but also by the antibalancing language of section 6(b)(5)354—and indeed has been
so interpreted by several circuit courts.355 However, section
3(8) has also been read by a plurality of the Supreme Court as
setting a health/safety threshold.
In Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene case),
Justice Stevens famously determined that OSHA lacked the
power to regulate “insignificant” health or safety risks.356
By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards that are
“reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment,” the Act implies that, before
promulgating any standard, the Secretary must make a finding that
the workplaces in question are not safe. But “safe” is not the
equivalent of “risk-free.” There are many activities that we engage in
every day—such as driving a car or even breathing city air—that
entail some risk of accident or material health impairment;
nevertheless, few people would consider these activities “unsafe.”
Similarly, a workplace can hardly be considered “unsafe” unless it
threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm.
Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent health or
safety standard, the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding
that a place of employment is unsafe—in the sense that significant

352. On the deliberation costs involved in CBA, see Richard D.
Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs,
Implications, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA 455, supra note 265, at 460-62;
and Paul R. Portney, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Analysis, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER 226 (V. Kerry
Smith ed., 1984).
353. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8).
354. Id. § 655(b)(5).
355. See Cross, supra note 332, at 769-70 (discussing section 3(8) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act and relevant case law).
356. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in
practices.357

In short, the statutory regime governing OSHA regulation of
dangerous activities and conditions is arguably the following:
no regulation of activities or conditions posing “insignificant”
safety risks, and cost-justified regulation of activities or
conditions posing “significant” safety risks.
A more complicated statutory structure, combining a
health/safety threshold with a balancing test, is found in the
current version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act, as amended
in 1990.358 The Act lists various air pollutants. For new
sources of each pollutant, the EPA is required to set the most
restrictive emission standard that is achievable under the best,
currently utilized technology.
If this technology-based
standard would still allow a level of pollution posing a nonminimal health risk—if that level exceeds a health/safety
threshold—and if a balancing analysis supports lowering the
pollution level, then EPA must enact a more restrictive
standard.
In sum, health/safety thresholds appear in numerous
federal statues, either as regulatory goals that displace a
broader balancing test (perhaps hedged by a feasibility
constraint), or as tests of significance that precede balancing, or
in some more complicated way. How are these thresholds
implemented? What does it mean for some substance or
activity to be “unsafe,” or to pose a “substantial” or “significant”
threat to health or safety, or to rise above a “de minimis” level
of danger? The answer: Agencies often (if not always) construe
statutory safety or health thresholds as levels of frequentist risk.
This practice was fueled by the Benzene case, where Justice
Stevens not only interpreted section 3(8) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act as precluding the agency from
regulating “insignificant” workplace hazards, but also
suggested that OSHA look at individual risk to determine
whether this safety/health threshold was exceeded. In a crucial
passage, Justice Stevens wrote,
[T]he requirement [under section 3(8)] that a “significant” risk be
identified is not a mathematical straitjacket. It is the Agency’s
responsibility to determine, in the first instance, what it considers to
be a “significant” risk. Some risks are plainly acceptable and others

357. Id. at 642.
358. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000); see Cross, supra note 332, at 770-72
(discussing the structure of the current version of section 112).
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are plainly unacceptable. If, for example, the odds are one in a billion
that a person will die from cancer by taking a drink of chlorinated
water, the risk clearly could not be considered significant. On the
other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation
of gasoline vapors that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable
person might well consider the risk significant and take appropriate
steps to decrease or eliminate it.359

OSHA now generally uses a 1 in 1000 level of “individual risk”
as its test of significance for carcinogens: If some such
substance in the workplace creates more than a 1 in 1000 risk
of premature death to any worker, that substance exceeds the
health/safety threshold of section 3(8) and can be regulated.360
The EPA interpreted the original version of section 112 of the
Clean Air Act—which required an “ample margin of safety” for
the public—as setting a 1 in 10,000 risk threshold: The
permissible amount of a covered air pollutant would need to be
set sufficiently low that the “maximally exposed individual”
would face less than a 1 in 10,000 risk of premature death from
the pollutant.361 The current version of section 112 explicitly
states that its health/safety threshold should be specified in
terms of “individual risk.” The EPA must “reduce lifetime
excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to
emissions . . . to less than one in one million.”362 EPA also uses
“individual risk” (either risk to the maximally exposed
individual, or some average of individual risk across the
population) in specifying safety thresholds under the Clean
Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the “Superfund”
statute (CERCLA), and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).363 The FDA has at various junctures
interpreted the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as including a “de
minimis” safety threshold and defined that threshold as a 1 in
1 million individual risk of premature death.364
359. Indus. Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 655.
360. See March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer
Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK 17, 24-25
(1995). This valuable survey of agency threshold setting was published more
than a half-decade ago; I am not aware of a more recent one. It is possible
that some of the agency practices which are described in the Sadowitz and
Graham survey, and which I note here and immediately below, have changed
since its publication.
361. See id. at 25-26; Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 300-04.
362. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A); see Cross, supra note 332, at 771 (discussing
this provision).
363. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 273, at 309-22; Sadowitz & Graham,
supra note 360, at 26-30.
364. See Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 360, at 21-24. For a discussion of
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The FDA, EPA, OSHA, and other agencies that specify
health/safety thresholds in terms of “individual risk” (from 1 in
1000 at the high end, to 1 in 1 million at the low end) implicitly
or explicitly understand “individual risk” in frequentist terms.
A 1 in x risk of cancer, for these purposes, means a 1 in x risk
as predicted by the methodology of risk assessment; but, as I
have already explained, that methodology equates “individual
risk” with the percentage of some exposed population that dies
or becomes ill or injured.
The Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk, defended in this
Article, therefore has quite straightforward and dramatic
implications for the pervasive agency practice of setting
health/safety thresholds in terms of individual (frequentist)
risk. The practice cannot be justified, and ought not continue.
The fact that an individual’s frequentist risk of premature
death lies above or below a given level makes no difference to
her well-being. Therefore, it makes no sense for agencies to
aim at health/safety thresholds defined in frequentist terms, or
to specify the thresholds that trigger balancing in frequentist
terms, or to equate the thresholds that play a more complicated
statutory role with a frequentist risk of premature death.
Consider the case of a health/safety threshold that functions as
a regulatory goal and displaces balancing, for example, the
original version of section 112 of the Clean Air Act. Assume the
EPA sets the health/safety goal for each pollutant at some level
of frequentist risk L, say, 1 in 10,000. This means the
following: Given two outcomes O1 and O2, such that some
individuals in O1 would have an above-L risk of premature
death from the pollutant, while no individuals in O2 will have
an above-L risk of premature death from the pollutant, EPA
will prefer O2 to O1. Unless, however, O1 and O2 differ with
regard to some metric other than frequentist risk (for example,
the aggregate number of deaths, or the level of fear), the
Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk defended in this Article implies
that the two outcomes are identical with respect to well-being.
No one is worse off in O1 than in O2, absent some divergence
between the outcomes other than the divergence captured by
the EPA’s risk threshold L.365
the use of “individual risk” by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and state
agencies to set safety thresholds, see id. at 18-21, 31-33.
365. How can O1 and O2 differ with respect to the risk-threshold L but not
the number of deaths? As a simple example, imagine that in O1 n persons die
out of a small exposed population, while in O2 n persons die out of a large
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In the case of a health/safety threshold that serves as a
trigger for balancing, or that plays a yet more complicated
statutory role, the specification of that threshold in frequentistrisk terms is vulnerable to the very same objection. Why
should the fact that one outcome lies below the risk threshold,
while another lies above it, affect the regulatory status of the
outcomes? That difference between the outcomes does not, in
itself, change anyone’s welfare.
One possible response is that while the level of frequentist
risk lacks welfare significance, it remains morally significant in
some other way. For example, safety and health might be
understood as “primary goods” or “resources”; a “primary good”
or “resource” is a precondition for welfare or a means to welfare
rather than a part of welfare itself.366 Money is the classic
example: Having more money does not itself improve someone’s
welfare, but rather enables her to realize welfare improvements
that would otherwise not be feasible for her. However, given
the arguments set forth in Part III of this Article, it is very
hard to see how a lower frequentist risk of premature death
could be a “resource” analogous to money or, for that matter,
actual health and longevity.367 A high frequentist risk of
premature death does not (at least if the individual is unaware
of that risk) prevent her from living a perfectly good life, by
contrast with ill health, hunger, fear, or death; nor can a low
risk be traded for welfare improvements, by contrast with
money.
Alternatively, a high frequentist risk of premature death
for some person could be seen as an infringement of his moral
rights, rather than as a diminution of his welfare or
resources.368 Arguably, rights infringements do not entail
exposed population, with the frequentist risk equaling n divided by the
population size. A somewhat more complicated example is as follows: For one
toxic substance the “maximally exposed individual” has an above-L risk, but
most of the population has a small risk; while for another toxic substance most
of the population has a larger risk, still below L, and the “maximally exposed
individual” now also has a below-L risk. Further, the probability distributions
are such that the regulators predict the same number of deaths to occur as a
result of each substance. Examples like these help clarify that frequentist risk
and the number of deaths are analytically distinct features of outcomes.
366. For a discussion of “primary goods” or “resources” and citations to the
philosophical literature, see Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 211-12.
367. See supra Part III.B-D.
368. For an argument that risk imposition is indeed a kind of wrongdoing
(rights violation), see McCarthy, supra note 64, at 208-15. But see Stephen
Perry, Imposing Risk 48-67 (unpublished paper, on file with author)
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welfare or resource reductions. For example, if I trespass on
your property without damaging anything, and without
harming you, I may still have violated your moral rights.369
Might not I do the same by, say, playing a game of Russian
Roulette with you as the unwitting target, or more generally by
imposing a high frequentist death risk on you? Perhaps so.
The arguments presented in Part III focus on welfare, not
rights, and thus do not settle the issue whether risk
impositions (in the frequentist sense) can be rights violations.
That important issue is beyond the scope of this Article. It
seems intuitively clear, however, that rights-violating risk
impositions (if they exist) would involve a high frequentist risk
plus other elements, for example a lack of voluntariness on the
part of the victim. If I sell you a dangerous substance, and tell
you that, and you are a competent adult who understands my
warning, then your rights have not been violated even though I
may have a imposed a high frequentist risk of premature death
on you. Yet agencies that specify health and safety thresholds
in terms of frequentist risk do so without reference to the
further elements that would (seemingly) be required to
establish a rights violation;370 and they do so in contexts where
the statute is focused on welfare not rights.
How should statutory health/safety thresholds be
interpreted by regulatory agencies, if not as levels of
frequentist risk? This is a complicated question, whose answer
may vary depending on the statutory role of the threshold. In
the case of a statute that instructs the agency to regulate a
particular product or activity by aiming at safety or health, and
ignoring cost considerations, one plausible answer is that the
agency should set regulatory standards such that no one dies
prematurely as a result of the product or activity. In other
words, the health/safety threshold could be specified as a
maximum permissible number of deaths resulting from the
product or activity, rather than a maximum “individual risk”
level; since even one premature death is “unsafe” for the person
who dies, the maximum permissible number should,
intuitively, be zero. One objection to this approach is that
(criticizing McCarthy’s account).
369. For an in-depth, critical discussion of the possibility of harmless
wrongdoing, focused on criminal law, see 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).
370. See Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 360 (surveying agency use of
frequentist risk to set health and safety thresholds).
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achieving a zero-death goal might be practically impossible.
The objection becomes more powerful, the more broadly the
regulated activity or product is defined. Regulating “food
additives” so that no premature deaths result from food
additives is eminently possible. If food additives are prohibited
(and the prohibition is complied with), then they cause no
deaths. Regulating “foods” so that no premature deaths result
from food consumption is not possible, short of banning all
foods. In any world in which people do consume food, there will
be acts of food consumption such that the consumer dies earlier
than she would have had she refrained. Another objection is
that a zero-death goal is misconceived, even if health and safety
are given priority over other aspects of welfare. Consider that,
by banning a food additive which would cause deaths in some
cases, the regulator might prevent the additive from blocking
fatal processes that will result in many more deaths if the
additive is banned.371 Imagine that Additive A is a carcinogen
which, if permitted for use in foods, would cause one death but
also prevent twenty botulism deaths. Another way of phrasing
this objection is that regulators instructed to prioritize health
or safety should aim to maximize aggregate health or safety
(concretely, to maximize aggregate longevity or health-adjusted
longevity), rather than to eliminate deaths from particular
causes (cancer versus botulism). A plausible response to the
objection is that some statutes not only displace cost
considerations but quite explicitly focus on the deaths that
result from particular products or activities, rather than on
global longevity, and that minimizing the number of deaths of
this type—regardless of countervailing costs, including deaths
of other types—is what legislative supremacy requires of
regulators operating under these statutes. 372
Further complications arise when a statute articulates a
health/safety threshold but permits some regulatory
consideration of cost. Consider the case where regulators are
instructed to employ CBA in setting standards, but are
precluded from regulating activities or products that are
already “safe.” In effect, “safe” activities or products are those
that a full cost-benefit analysis likely would recommend leaving
unregulated. Here, too, the health/safety threshold could be
specified in terms of a maximum permissible number of deaths
371. See, e.g., LAVE, supra note 288, at 15-16.
372. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 271, at 1663-68 (describing the varying
structures of safety-oriented statutes).
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resulting from the activity or product. Note, however, that the
maximum permissible number, in this statutory context, could
well be greater than zero. Assume that an agency, to date, has
regulated 100 different dangerous chemicals. The average cost
of regulation has been, say, $55 million. If Vdeath is $6 million,
and if it is assumed that the main benefit of regulation is the
avoidance of premature death, then the agency or a court
reviewing its decisions could reasonably determine that
substances causing fewer than ten deaths are “safe.”
In sum, agencies need not apply health/safety thresholds
by looking to the levels of frequentist risk that occur in
different regulatory outcomes.
The thresholds might be
construed in other ways, as tracking the number of premature
deaths that occur in different outcomes, or the aggregate
adjusted or unadjusted longevity. The current, risk-focused
regulatory practice can and should change, given the welfare
irrelevance of frequentist risk. What the revised practice ought
to look like is a subtle and context-sensitive matter that
deserves much greater attention than I have been able to give
it here.
D. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Arguably, risk regulators should not simply aim to
maximize aggregate welfare (CBA), or to maximize aggregate
health and safety (RRA), or to prevent health and safety
setbacks of a particular kind, but should also take account of
distributive considerations in shaping policy and setting
regulatory and enforcement priorities. This might be disputed,
either on the basis of a moral view, such as utilitarianism, that
makes distributive justice irrelevant,373 or on the institutional
grounds that distributive justice is best achieved through the
tax-and-transfer system, not regulation.374 These objections to
redistributive regulation cannot be evaluated here. Suffice it to
say a wide range of moral theories, including but hardly limited
to John Rawls’s, incorporate distributive criteria;375 and that
our tax-and-transfer system is seemingly far too insensitive to
373. See KAGAN, supra note 88, at 48-54 (discussing the possible moral role
of distributive considerations).
374. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
667, 667-69 (1994).
375. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 211 nn.126-30 (citing
philosophical defenses of egalitarianism).
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individual circumstance to warrant risk regulators in believing
that inequities flowing from their policy choices will be
corrected elsewhere.376
The idea of incorporating distributive justice into risk
regulation is hardly novel.
Activists in the so-called
“environmental justice” movement, as well as numerous
scholars writing about “environmental justice,” have argued
quite vigorously that the geographic distribution of air and
water pollutants, toxic waste sites, and other health and safety
hazards is unfair to racial and low-income groups, and that risk
regulation should be structured to eliminate this inequity.377
The Clinton administration was responsive to these arguments.
In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898,
entitled “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.” The order
states,
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, . . . each
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations
and low-income populations in the United States . . . .378

This directive is reinforced by the broader mandate, set
forth in Executive Order 12,866—the order generally requiring
376. See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency
Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1013 (2001) (noting that the existing
income tax is quite imperfect with respect to redistribution).
377. The literature on “environmental justice” is vast.
See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE (1998); FENG LIU, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS: THEORIES,
METHODS AND PRACTICE (2001); Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It:
Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Robert D. Bullard, Leveling the Playing Field
Through Environmental Justice, 23 VT. L. REV. 453 (1999); Sheila R. Foster,
Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10992 (2000); Robert R.
Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681 (2000)
[hereinafter Kuehn, Taxonomy]; Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice
Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103
[hereinafter Kuehn, Environmental Justice]; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing
“Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental
Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable
Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1995); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 7, supra note 284, at 7; Rae Zimmerman, Social
Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 649 (1993).
378. Exec. Order No. 12,898 § 1-101, 3 C.F.R. 859, 859 (1995), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
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federal executive agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis—
that “distributive impacts” and “equity” should be considered as
part of this analysis.
“[I]n choosing among alternative
regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches
that maximize net benefits (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages;
distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires
another regulatory approach.”379
Executive Orders 12,898 and 12,866 could not trump the
statutory framework that governs risk regulators, nor do these
orders purport to do so. Instead, they enjoin regulators to
weigh distributive considerations only where statutorily
permissible. Yet the EPA, FDA, OSHA, CPSC, and other riskregulatory agencies do have substantial statutory discretion to
take account of the racial or socioeconomic pattern of death,
illness, injury, and exposure that their policy choices would
produce.380 Statutes that enjoin agencies to balance health and
safety against economic costs and other factors are typically
open-ended enough to permit the incorporation of distributive
justice into the balancing. For example, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act all articulate an
“unreasonable risk” standard.381 An activity or substance that
produces a higher rate of illness, injury or death for blacks, as
compared with whites, can be characterized as “unreasonable”
by virtue of this distributional inequity. Some statutes that
give priority to health and safety can also be read to license
distributive sensitivity. Consider the pre-1990 version of
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which required EPA to set
legal emissions of hazardous air pollutants at a level that
“provide[s] an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health.”382 Assume that at the level proposed by industry for a
given pollutant, virtually no premature deaths or serious
illnesses will result but certain less serious impacts, such as
mild illness or physical discomfort, will not be eliminated and

379. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-39 (1994) (emphasis
added), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
380. See Foster, supra note 377, at 10994-97; Richard J. Lazarus &
Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA Permitting
Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617, 625-50 (1999); Lazarus, supra note 377, at
825-55.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 276-78.
382. See supra text accompanying note 273.
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will be concentrated in areas populated by low-income groups
and racial minorities. Arguably, the proposed level would not
“provide an ample margin of safety” for Clean Air Act purposes
because it would produce a racially and socioeconomically
skewed pattern of health setbacks.
Even statutes that do not permit agencies to consider
distributive justice in shaping legal directives—that is, in
issuing legally binding rules or legally binding individualized
orders, such as permits to particular facilities or licenses for
particular products—may well allow agencies to inject
distributive considerations into other choices. Regulatory
priorities, or enforcement priorities, could be influenced by
racial or socioeconomic skews. OSHA’s rules governing toxic
workplace substances are supposed to ensure that no worker
suffers “material impairment of health or functional
This may leave no space for distributive
capacity.”383
considerations at the rule-issuance phase. But could OSHA, in
deciding which workplace toxins to regulate first, give priority
to those substances the toxic effects of which are borne
disproportionately by blacks?
Or could the agency, in
determining which firms to target for violations of existing
rules, give priority to those firms whose illegalities cause
disproportionate harm to low-income workers? Arguably so.
Finally, it should be noted that distributive considerations may
bear upon state risk regulation—both as a matter of state law,
and as a matter of federal law, in particular Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which precludes racial discrimination in
“any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”384 Title VI has been widely understood by federal
agencies to authorize regulations prohibiting recipients of
federal funds, including state actors, from activities that have a
disparate racial impact.385 The upshot is that state risk
regulators may run afoul of federal regulations enacted under
Title VI if their choices produce a racially skewed pattern of
death, illness, injury, toxic exposure, or other setbacks.386
383. See supra text accompanying note 272.
384. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
385. See id. § 2000d-1 (instructing federal agencies, in section 602 of Title
VI, to issue regulations to effectuate the statutory nondiscrimination norm);
John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implication for
Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2002) (describing
agency practice under section 602 and the relevant case law).
386. See Lazarus, supra note 377, at 834-39; Bradford C. Mank, The Draft
Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidances: Too Much Discretion
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A consensus methodology for implementing Executive
Order 12,898, and more generally for measuring the degree of
distributional skews with respect to health and safety, has yet
to emerge.387 It is frequently suggested, however, that the
racial or socioeconomic distribution of frequentist risk is an
important part of the environmental justice inquiry. For
example, Robert Kuehn, a leading scholarly proponent of
“environmental justice,” argues that agency risk assessments
should not simply aim to determine the average, median, or
maximal (frequentist) risk created by some health or safety
threat, but should determine (frequentist) risk for racial and
economic subgroups of the exposed population. “[T]he inclusion
of distributional information [should be] a matter of course in
all risk assessments. Risk assessors should be required to
include information on the exposures and risks experienced by
relevant subpopulations disaggregated by race, ethnicity,
John
income, age, and other important variables.”388
Graham—a very prominent scholar in the area of risk
assessment, who now chairs the regulatory review office in
OMB—agrees:
[W]hen the same hazard poses more danger to some citizens than
others, Congress should insist that agencies report that information
through distributional methods of variability analysis. For example,
some citizens are more sensitive to environmental agents than
others . . . . Some citizens are also exposed more to hazards than
others . . . . Agencies should present to decision makers a public
document with information about the number of citizens exposed to
various levels of risk. Since low-income and minority citizens often
incur a disproportionate share of public health and environmental
risks, agencies should make a special effort to investigate those
citizens’ degree of exposure and susceptibility to hazards.389

The approach sketched by Kuehn and Graham was endorsed in
1996 by the National Research Council,390 and in 1997 by a
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment

for EPA and a More Difficult Standard for Complainants?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.
11144, 11147-48 (2000).
387. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 310, § III.A.8
(“There are no generally accepted principles for determining when one
distribution of net benefits is more equitable than another.”).
388. Kuehn, Environmental Justice, supra note 377, at 151.
389. John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 183, supra note 31, at 190-91.
390. See COMM. ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 4041, 157 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996).
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and Risk Management.391 It has also been used in empirical
scholarship seeking to determine whether risk regulation and
risky activities indeed produce distributional skews along
racial or economic lines.392
More recently, a risk-based methodology for identifying
such skews was sanctioned by the EPA in its draft Title VI
guidelines.393 The guidelines provide that a Title VI challenge
to a state or local permitting decision should be evaluated by
determining whether there is some group that is adversely
affected by the decision and that has a higher proportion of
racial minorities and suffers a greater adverse impact from the
decision than an appropriate comparison group. In turn, the
risk imposed by the decision on the two groups is one legitimate
measure of the decision’s impact.
[The Title VI analysis] involves a disparity analysis that compares
the affected population to an appropriate comparison population to
determine whether [a] disparity exists that may violate EPA’s Title
VI regulations . . . .
A disparity may be assessed using comparisons both of the
different prevalence of race, color, or national origin of the two
populations, and of the level of risk of adverse impacts experienced by
each population.394

“Risk,” for purposes of this disparate impact analysis, clearly
means frequentist, not Bayesian risk.
[Disparate impact analysis under Title VI] involves prediction of
potentially significant exposures and risks resulting from stressors
created by the [challenged] activities or other sources. These
predictions may be based on ambient levels of stressors derived from
monitoring or modeling . . . . In estimating cancer risks, such unit risk
factors estimate the probability of contracting a cancer case for a unit
of exposure. For example, an area’s predicted cancer risk could be
based on the estimated ambient concentration times the unit risk

391. See 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESSMENT & RISK
MGMT., RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION
MAKING 72-77 (1997).
392. See JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS?: THE
SPATIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 157-88
(1999).
393. Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering
Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft
Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg.
39,650 (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter EPA Draft Title VI Guidance]; see Mank,
supra note 386 (providing detailed analysis of EPA Draft Title VI Guidance).
394. EPA Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 393, at 39,681 (emphasis
added).
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factor.395

To sum up, distributive justice is often a relevant
consideration for state and federal risk regulators, under
applicable statutes and executive orders, and frequentist risk is
widely proposed and used as a metric for distributive
injustice.396 But this approach is undermined by the Hybrid
(Bayesian) View of risk—specifically by the proposition,
defended above in Part III, that risk in the frequentist sense is
not a welfare setback Assume that E is an environmental
hazard that imposes a higher frequentist risk on a group of
persons G1 that live close to E, as compared to a group of
persons G2 that live farther from E, where G1 is
disproportionately nonwhite as compared to G2 or the total
population (G1 + G2). The Hybrid (Bayesian) View of risk
implies that the members of G1 are not worse off in welfare
terms than their counterparts in G2, qua the difference in
frequentist risk, nor are they worse off with respect to welfare
resources. Conceivably, the high level of frequentist risk
among G1 might constitute a violation of its members’ rights—a
violation not suffered by the members of G2—but distributive
justice is standardly seen to depend on the distribution of
welfare or welfare resources, not on the pattern of rights
violations. Further, a high level of frequentist risk could
constitute a rights violation only when conjoined with further
395. Id. at 39,679; see also id. at 39,680 (endorsing the use of risk levels to
determine whether a permitting decision has an adverse impact). Other
official EPA documents also endorse use of a risk-based methodology for
identifying distributive skews. See, e.g., 2 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 31-36
(1992); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA GUIDANCE FOR CONSIDERATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 309 REVIEWS 16 (1999).
396. At the risk of undue repetition, I should make clear that the kind of
“metric” I am interested in is a metric for the distributive injustice of
outcomes, which in turn will help determine what policies regulators ought to
choose in light of distributive justice. The legal proposals and academic
commentary just described, as I read them, do conceptualize frequentist risk
as a feature of outcomes, independent of premature death, that bears upon the
justice of the outcomes. This is different from saying that (1) in a given
outcome, it is the differential death rate between two groups that make the
outcome unequal, and (2) in evaluating choices, regulators should (ceteris
paribus) avoid a choice with a higher risk, in some sense, of producing an
outcome skewed with respect to its death rate. See supra text accompanying
notes 95-100 (distinguishing between ex post and ex ante views). Although
some advocates of incorporating risk in distributive justice analysis may
merely be proposing the use of risk in this sort of “bridging” or ex ante role,
the sources I have just cited seem to propose that it have a quite different role
in the analysis, a role in ranking outcomes.
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elements, such as a suitable lack of voluntariness and
responsibility on the part of the person suffering the risk. A
metric for distributive skews focused on rights violations would
need to be sensitive to these elements; but the risk-based
metrics now proposed and used are not (typically) thus
sensitive.
What would be an appropriate welfare-based metric for
determining whether the situation of G1 and G2 constitutes a
distributive injustice? Imagine that a substantially higher
proportion of G1 dies as a result of E than does G2. Since death
is a welfare setback, the difference in death rates between G1
and G2 could be seen as an unfair distribution of welfare or
welfare resources, and thus as an instance of distributive
injustice along racial lines. To be sure, differences in death
rates, as between population subgroups, will often track
differences in frequentist risks.
But the two kinds of
comparisons are analytically distinct. For example, if the
frequentist-risk comparison between G1 and G2 focuses on the
maximally exposed individual, then clearly the two groups
could have dramatically different levels of frequentist risk but
not dramatically different death rates. The same is true (a bit
less obviously) if the frequentist-risk comparison focuses on the
risk to the median members of G1 and G2.
To be sure, death is not the only dimension of welfare
relevant to “environmental justice.” A full distributive justice
analysis of regulatory outcomes would arguably consider illness
and injury; wealth and income; unemployment; loss of natural
resources; and many other welfare benefits or hindrances such
as “[n]oise, odors, blowing trash, aesthetic concerns, increased
traffic, termites, decreased property values and uses, fires,
accidents, [and] psychological harm.”397 The Hybrid (Bayesian)
View of risk implies that the distribution of Bayesian risk—by
contrast with the distribution of frequentist risk—is, or might
be, a relevant outcome-ranking factor for regulators authorized
to consider “distributive impacts” and promote “environmental
justice.” If a large percentage of nonwhites believe to a high
degree that they will die from environmental toxins, while a
smaller percentage of whites believe that, then a
disproportionate number of nonwhites suffer a kind of welfare
setback—on the view that Bayesian risks need not be
affectively charged to be harmful. At a minimum, probabilistic

397. Kuehn, Taxonomy, supra note 377, at 10,687.
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beliefs about premature death that are affectively charged are
harmful; and in practice, of course, such beliefs will be
affectively charged. In short, the skewed distribution of fear is
a kind of distributive injustice, one that (in principle) should be
a relevant consideration under Executive Orders 12,898 and
12,866 and similar regimes. As the philosopher Keith BurgessJackson has argued in a different context,
[W]hile fear, or a certain amount . . . of fear, may be useful in keeping
individuals safe from harm, it is, as a mental state, burdensome to
those who experience it. Fear of crime in particular is a socially
created burden . . . . [Further it is] women [who] bear a
disproportionate share of this burden . . . . Justice, I maintain,
requires that the state, employing institutions such as law and
education and using the power of the purse, both reduce the overall
level of fear in society and, more particularly, redistribute fear so that
women no longer bear the brunt of it.398

E. COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
“Risk assessment,” the influential methodology described
above, is widely used by agencies at the rule-making stage.
Paradigmatically, a risk assessment identifies the deaths and
frequentist risks that would result were a particular toxic
substance left unregulated, and that information is then used
to determine the advisability of a proposed rule.399 So-called
“comparative risk assessment” (CRA) is quite different.400 CRA
is a priority-setting tool. It informs threshold legislative,
presidential, or administrative choices about which hazardous
activities, substances, or conditions deserve governmental
attention. Threshold choices about the appropriate priority
that risk regulators ought to give to various hazards are made

398. Keith Burgess-Jackson, Justice and the Distribution of Fear, 32 S. J.
PHIL. 367, 368 (1994).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 308-17317.
400. The literature on CRA is large. Important contributions include:
BREYER, supra note 4; COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR
SETTING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996); WORST
THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PRIORITIES (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994); John S.
Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment
in Environmental Decision Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1656-67 (1995);
Finkel, supra note 344; Baruch Fischoff, Ranking Risks, 6 RISK 191 (1995);
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992); Symposium, Risk
Assessment, supra note 308; and Symposium, Risk in the Republic:
Comparative Risk Analysis and Public Policy, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1
(1997).
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by OMB and Congress in the budget-setting process and
elsewhere.401 As for priority setting at the administrative level,
that occurs, for example, when an agency decides which rule
making to initiate first, or where to target enforcement effort.
The EPA pioneered CRA in the late 1980s, when it studied
the relative importance of thirty-one different environmental
problems and published the results of the study in a nowfamous report, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment
of Environmental Problems.402 The problems were ranked with
respect to four different concerns: the occurrence of cancer and
cancer risks, the occurrence of non-cancer health setbacks and
risks, ecological effects, and “welfare effects” (meaning
quantifiable non-health harms such as property damage).403
The ranking of the thirty-one problems with respect to cancer,
as follows, illustrate the typical scope and conclusions of a
CRA.
Consensus Ranking of Environmental Problem Areas on
the Basis of Population Cancer Risk404
Rank (from most
Problem
to least important)
Worker Exposure to Chemicals
1 (tied)
Indoor Radon
1 (tied)
Pesticide Residues on Food
3
Indoor Air Pollutants other
4 (tied)
than Radon
Consumer Exposure to
4 (tied)
Chemicals
Hazardous Air Pollutants
6
Depletion of Stratospheric
7
Ozone
Hazardous Waste Sites—
8
Inactive
Drinking Water
9
Application of Pesticides
10
401. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1992 pt. 2 § IX.C, at 371-76 (proposing
use of risk assessment in determining agency budgets).
402. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter UNFINISHED
BUSINESS].
403. See id. at 5-16 (describing study methodology).
404. See id. at 28-34 (listing all thirty-one problems).
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Since Unfinished Business, CRA has become an important
feature of risk regulation. The EPA has continued to conduct
CRA studies and to rely upon these studies in its internal
priority setting.405 Other federal agencies, too, have engaged in
CRA, although not as visibly as the EPA.406 Executive Order
12,866 implicitly directs federal executive agencies to conduct
CRA, where permissible by statute, by mandating that, “[i]n
setting regulatory priorities, each agency shall consider, to the
extent reasonable, the degree and nature of the risks posed by
various substances or activities within its jurisdiction.”407 In
the early 1990s, then-Judge Stephen Breyer wrote a widely
cited book which argued that the existing regime of risk
regulation failed to direct governmental effort and social
resources to the most pressing problems, and advocated the
creation of an OMB-like oversight agency staffed by highquality civil servants to coordinate risk-regulatory efforts—in
particular, to perform CRA studies and to implement these
studies in setting intra- and interagency priorities.408 Prodded
by this book, and by general enthusiasm for CRA among
advocates of “regulatory reform,” various statutory proposals to
impose a broad CRA requirement on agencies have been
considered by Congress, although none has yet been enacted.409
CRA has also become popular at the state and local level.
California performed a major CRA study in 1994,410 and many

405. See Ken Sexton, Setting Environmental Priorities: Is Comparative
Risk Assessment the Answer?, in BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS:
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 195, 199
(Ken Sexton et al. eds., 1999) (describing use of CRA at the EPA). For an
important and often-cited follow-up study to Unfinished Business, see SCI.
ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
406. See, e.g., Thomas P. Grumbly, Comparative Risk Analysis in the
Department of Energy, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23 (1997); see also
CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., TECH. & GOV’T, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 75-82 (1993) (recommending that
all federal risk-regulatory agencies engage in CRA).
407. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
408. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 59-81.
409. See Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk
Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 89, 96-108 (2000) (describing recent regulatory reform proposals,
including proposed CRA provisions).
410. CAL. COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY:
PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA’S ENVIRONMENT (1994).
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other states and localities have also done so.411 Finally, CRA
has become a central focus of the academic literature on risk
regulation. The pros and cons of CRA and specific CRA
methodologies has emerged as a major topic of academic
debate.412
The Hybrid (Bayesian) View advanced in this Article has
important implications for CRA. No welfare-focused CRA
should rely upon frequentist risk as a kind of consequence
relevant to regulatory priorities. Frequentist risk is properly
irrelevant to the ranking of outcomes within the context of
CBA, RRA, the setting of health and safety thresholds, and
distributive justice analysis, or so I have argued.413 Similarly,
frequentist risk is irrelevant (at the outcome-ranking stage) for
purposes of CRA—more precisely, for purposes of welfarefocused CRA. In principle, CRA might evaluate hazardous
activities, substances, and conditions in light of their nonwelfare effects—for example, in order of the rights
infringements they involve. Since I am (for purposes of this
Article) agnostic on the question whether the imposition of a
high level of frequentist risk amounts to a harmless wrong, I
am agnostic on the proper inclusion of frequentist risk in
nonwelfarist CRA. But CRA is typically conceptualized in
welfarist terms: as a methodology for evaluating hazardous
activities, etc., with a view to their impact on human welfare.
Frequentist risk (whether risk to the average individual, risk to
the maximally exposed individual, or frequentist risk in some
other sense) should play no role in ranking outcomes within
CRA thus conceptualized.
What is the proper form of a welfare-focused CRA? A
generic answer is this: Hazards should be ranked with respect
to one or more aspects of human welfare. Most simply, hazards
could be ranked in light of the total number of deaths they
produce, under the regulatory status quo. Indeed, this was the
approach followed by the EPA in the seminal Unfinished
411. See David M. Konisky, Over a Decade of Comparative Risk Analysis: A
Review of the Human Health Rankings, 12 RISK 41, 42 (2001) (noting that
“over thirty states and municipalities have completed comparative risk
projects”); Sexton, supra note 405, at 199 (describing state CRA activity). CRA
has also become important internationally. See Richard D. Morgenstern et al.,
Comparative Risk Assessment: An International Comparison of Methodologies
and Results, 78 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 19, 24-34 (2000) (surveying the
international use of CRA).
412. See supra note 400.
413. See supra Part V.A-D.
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Business study.414 This simple approach to ranking hazards
ignores the costs of ameliorating the hazard, but developing
that information is itself costly (particularly since the cost will
depend on the particular regulatory approach used to
ameliorate the hazard). Once multiple dimensions of welfare
are included, a problem of commensuration arises.415 If the
analyst has available a dollar valuation of lifesaving that
approximately tracks its welfare effect (what I have called
Vdeath), then hazards might be ranked in terms of the predicted
net dollar benefits of ameliorating or eliminating them.
Alternatively, they might be ranked, without pricing life, in
terms of their marginal or average cost per life saved—the cost
per life saved of a small or large regulatory expenditure to
address the hazard.416
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss whether
welfarist CRA should be single- or multidimensional; which
particular dimension(s) of welfare should be included; and how
multiple dimensions should be commensurated. The Hybrid
(Bayesian) View does have direct implications, however,
concerning the permissible dimensions of welfarist CRA. Since
death but not frequentist risk is a welfare setback, the number
of deaths but not the level of frequentist risk is a permissible
dimension for welfarist CRA—a kind of consequence
permissibly given weight in welfarist priority setting.
It appears that most CRA studies, at least by United
States governmental entities, have emphasized the total deaths
resulting from various hazards and have given less weight to
the level of frequentist risk.417 On the other hand, the EPA’s
Guidebook to Comparing Risks and Setting Environmental
Priorities states that both “population risk” (the total number of
deaths) and average or maximal “individual risk” (what I term
414. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 402, at 26, 41.
415. On multidimensional CRA, see John Kadvany, From Comparative
Risk to Decision Analysis: Ranking Solutions to Multiple-Value Environmental
Problems, 6 RISK 333, 342-49 (1995).
416. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 24-27 (ranking regulations by “[c]ost per
premature death averted”); cf. LAVE, supra note 288, at 19-25 (describing both
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness techniques for regulatory analysis).
417. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A GUIDEBOOK TO COMPARING RISKS
AND SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 2.2-15 (1993) (“While many
regional and state comparative risk studies have estimated both individual
risks and population risks, most have relied primarily on the population risk
estimates in the final ranking of problem areas for cancer risks.”). I have not
surveyed the studies since 1993 to determine whether this statement still
holds true.
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frequentist risk) are equally valid criteria for comparing cancer
hazards.418 According to the Guidebook, “[t]he most useful
presentations of cancer risk estimates for comparative risk
studies are excess individual lifetime risks and the excess
numbers of annual cancer cases expected in the exposed
populations.”419 Adam Finkel, a prominent expert on CRA,
similarly claims that “population-based measures” and
“[i]ndividual-risk measures independent of the number of
persons at risk” are both appropriate dimensions for CRA.420
Estimating the magnitude of risk either by population-wide
consequence alone or by maximum (or average) individual risk alone
necessarily discriminates against people who live in either denselypopulated or sparsely-populated areas. The former type of measure
-6
regards a risk of 10 /person in a city of two million as more serious
-2
than one of 10 /person in a village of 100. . . . On the other hand, if
the individual-risk criterion were used exclusively, urbanites would
lose out . . . .421

If, however, neither the urbanites nor the villagers in this
hypothetical are aware of the hazards, and hazard-prevention
costs are the same, then the city hazard should take regulatory
priority over the village hazard, as a matter of overall welfare
or welfare resources—since the city hazard will lead to more
deaths than the village hazard.422 Notwithstanding claims to
the contrary by Finkel, the EPA Guidebook, and other CRA
analysts who have advanced similar suggestions, the level of
“individual risk” created by some hazard should not be used, for
purposes of regulatory priority setting, as a metric for the
importance of the hazard distinct from the aggregate number of
deaths it causes.
F. TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW
My focus in this Article has been risk regulation, but the
view developed here also bears upon tort law and criminal law,
418. Id. at 2.2-15 to 2.2-18.
419. Id. at 2.2-15.
420. Finkel, supra note 344, at 343.
421. Id.
422. More precisely, in the simple case where the regulator knows for
certain that one death will result in the village and two in the city, generating
-2
-6
a 10 frequentist risk for everyone in the village and 10 risk for everyone in
the city, the city hazard should take priority. If (more realistically) the
legislator uses his beliefs about the level of frequentist risk to generate a
probability distribution, of some kind, over the number of deaths, then
choosing which hazard to address raises issues of ex ante valuation—issues
beyond the scope of this Article. See supra Part I.C.
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specifically with respect to the status of risk imposition as a
crime or tort.
Consider first tort law.
In a provocative article,
Christopher Schroeder suggests that the actual occurrence of
death, bodily injury, or other tangible harm need not be a
standard prerequisite for a tort judgment.423 He delineates two
hypothetical cases.
The Toxic Dumper Case
Amalgamated Manufacturing is discovered to have been dumping
toxic chemicals into an underground aquifer. Company records reveal
fairly well the amounts that have been discharged. Studies suggest
that individuals who have consumed well water from the aquifer have
between a twenty and thirty-three percent chance of contracting
cancer within their lifetimes because of this consumption.
The Speeding Motorist Case
A motorist, in a hurry to get from her house to an important
engagement in the neighboring town, enters the connecting freeway
and speeds up to ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit. She
arrives at her destination safely, only a few minutes late.424

Schroeder argues that persons who impose risks of harms on
others should be subject to tort liability—not merely in the
special case of “toxic torts,” exemplified by Toxic Dumper, but
also in the garden-variety case of risk imposition, exemplified
by Speeding Motorist—if the administrative costs of doing so
are low.425 Schroeder’s claim has been seconded, both by
scholars (like him) who understand tort law as an institution
properly designed to serve corrective justice,426 and by law-andeconomics scholars who see economic efficiency, social welfare,
or similar welfarist goals as the purpose of that institution.427
The view that tangible harm is not a precondition for tort
liability is, to be sure, merely a proposal. Current doctrine
typically does require the occurrence of death, bodily injury,
property damage, or at least emotional harm, for a tort suit to
go forward.428 Risk imposition per se is, typically, not enough.
423. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990); see also Kenneth W. Simons,
Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 113 (1990) (responding to Schroeder).
424. Schroeder, supra note 423, at 439-40.
425. See id. at 460-77.
426. See David McCarthy, Liability and Risk, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 238
(1996).
427. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 263-69 (1987).
428. See Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV.
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But there are a few important doctrinal exceptions from this
demand for tangible harm. First, in so-called “loss-of-chance”
cases, some courts have imposed liability for the mere creation
of a risk.429 The standard “loss-of-chance” scenario involves a
person threatened by tangible harm and a defendant in a
special relationship with that person, such that the defendant
more likely than not was not in a position to avert the harm,
but acted or failed to act in a way that increased the risk (in
some sense) of the person suffering the harm. For example,
imagine that Pete now has advanced skin cancer, which doctor
Dan negligently failed to diagnose. Had Dan diagnosed and
properly treated the cancer, Pete’s risk (in some sense) of dying
from the cancer would have been sixty percent. Dan’s failure to
diagnose the disease increased Pete’s chance of dying to ninety
percent. Under current doctrine, in this hypothetical case,
some courts would award Pete damages for the thirty percent
“loss of chance” of avoiding death caused by Dan’s negligence.
Other courts would not, but would have Dan pay damages to
Pete’s survivors if he were to die—even though, on those facts,
Dan would not be the likely cause of Pete’s death.430
Second, even without the special relationship between the
defendant and the risked or injured party characteristic of
“loss-of-chance” cases, courts may impose risk liability on a
defendant whose action has both caused present injury to some
person and created a risk of future injury to that same person.
For example, in a case where the defendant negligently caused
head injury to the plaintiff, damages were increased to
compensate for the small risk of epilepsy that might result from
the head injury.431
Finally, in the toxic tort context illustrated by Schroeder’s
Toxic Dumper hypothetical, some courts do award damages to
plaintiffs who have been exposed to a toxic substance and

1505, 1505 (1998).
429. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 436-49 (2000); see also Joseph
H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and other Retrofitting of
the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 499-516 (1998)
[hereinafter, Reduction of Likelihood]. For an early article that spurred
development of this doctrine, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation,
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and
Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
430. See Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 429, at 502-11 (distinguishing
between past-harm and future-harm variants of the “loss-of-a-chance”
scenario).
431. Note, supra note 428, at 1510.
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whose risk of death or disease has been increased by that
exposure, but have not died and are currently asymptomatic for
the diseases possibly resulting from the exposure.432 This
occurs, typically, in class action suits, where the class is
structured to include some plaintiffs who have already been
injured by the exposure, and others merely at risk of injury.433
What kind of “risk” is involved in the “loss-of-chance”
cases, toxic torts cases, and others where liability has been
imposed or increased for risk imposition? The answer varies
and is not always clear. It appears that risk imposition
involves either (1) a frequentist risk of premature death,
relative to some kind of reference class; (2) a hypothetical
Bayesian risk, namely the probabilistic belief of some
hypothetical bystander or “reasonable person” that the
defendant’s action will cause premature death or other injury;
or (3) an actual Bayesian risk, specifically the actual
probabilistic belief of the actor himself that his action will
result in premature death or other injury. The frequentist
construal of risk imposition is certainly employed in the toxic
tort context.434 If, for example, a firm’s toxic release has
exposed 1000 persons to a carcinogenic substance, one of whom
has already died, and experts predict that eight more will too,
the court adjudicating a class action against the firm might
well determine that the firm has imposed a 9-in-1000 or 8-in999 risk of death on each class member. This is, of course, a
frequentist risk relative to the reference group of all exposed
persons (namely, the plaintiff class). On the other hand, the
increased risks that trigger liability in the “loss-of-chance
context” may (at least sometimes) be Bayesian, not
frequentist.435
What does my Article imply for the practice of imposing
tort liability for risk imposition: both the (fairly limited)

432. See id. at 1511; see also Tamsen Douglass Love, Deterring
Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic Substances: The Case for Legislative
Recognition of Increased Risk Causes of Action, 49 VAND. L. REV. 789, 809-10
(1996); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based
Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 216-24 (1996).
433. Note, supra note 428, at 1511.
434. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 432, at 235. See generally Schroeder, supra
note 423, at 477 (suggesting that risk imposition should be tortious only in
cases where the risks are “actuarial”).
435. Cf. Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 429, at 532-33 (arguing that
both “individualized” and “statistical” evidence should be used to establish
“loss of chance”).
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practice under current doctrine, and the much broader practice
advocated by Schroeder and other scholars? The Article
undercuts one important justification for that practice.436 One
way to defend the practice, of course, is to argue that the risk of
death, bodily injury, or other tangible harm is itself a harm to
the person upon whom the risk has been imposed. The Hybrid
(Bayesian) View of risk I have presented here vitiates that
defense—at least if risk is construed in one of the three senses I
have just described. Imagine that toxic dumper D1 imposes a
high frequentist risk of premature death on P1. Imagine, now,
that doctor D2 fails to diagnose P2’s disease, such that the
hypothetical observer’s probabilistic belief that P2 will die
prematurely has increased substantially. Imagine, finally, that
doctor D3 fails to diagnose P3’s disease, and the good doctor
herself possesses a probabilistic belief that this failure will
cause P3’s death. In none of these cases has the plaintiff yet
been harmed (at least consequentially) by the defendant’s
actions, absent some fear on the plaintiff’s part or some other
impact additional to the enhanced risk of death that he now
suffers. That conclusion follows directly from the Hybrid
(Bayesian) View of risk defended here. Note that P2’s risk of
death is what I earlier termed a “hypothetical” Bayesian risk,
and that P3’s risk is an actual, third-party Bayesian risk rather
than an actual, first-party Bayesian risk, since it is D3’s beliefs,
not P3’s, that constitute the “risk” here. Although my Hybrid
(Bayesian) View recognizes that actual, first-party beliefs may
be harmful, it denies that hypothetical or third-party beliefs
are.437
To be sure, risk imposition construed in a different way—in
actual, first-party terms—is harmful, at a minimum if the
actual beliefs on P’s part produced by defendant D’s action are
a component of fear, anxiety, or some other epistemic-affective
hybrid. “Emotional harm” is a genuine harm.438 What courts

436. Stephen Perry, in his rigorous and important work on the tortiousness
of risk imposition, concludes that risk imposition in the frequentist sense is
not harmful, at least where the harm-causing processes are deterministic.
Perry, supra note 25, at 336. As stated earlier I endorse Perry’s conclusion
and some (if not all) of his arguments. See supra text accompanying notes
160-65.
437. I do acknowledge that the beliefs or at least fears of a person’s friends
and family members may be harmful to her. See supra note 262 and
accompanying text.
438. See Perry, supra note 25, at 338-39 (distinguishing risk imposition
from the causation of psychological harm).
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in the toxic tort and “loss-of-chance” contexts have done,
however, is to recognize a tort cause of action for risk
imposition separate from any cause of action for emotional
distress.439 My Article suggests that this practice is justifiable,
if at all, only on a revisionary understanding of tort law: only if
tort liability is justifiably imposed without harm at all. Many
law and economists would accept that revisionary view of tort
law.440 So would some corrective justice theorists—for example,
theorists who think that an action which is wrongful but
harmless (say, an action that ought not have been performed in
light of its probable harms and benefits, but may not cause
those harms and in any event has not yet) may, consistent with
corrective justice, be adjudged tortious.441 On the other hand,
corrective justice theorists, and others, who believe that the
traditional doctrine that the tort plaintiff must show actual
harm reflects a deep and important feature of tort law, should
conclude that risk imposition ought not be tortious.442 Cases
like Toxic Dumper and Speeding Motorist cannot be
assimilated to the standard paradigm that identifies duty,
breach of duty, causation, and harm as the individually
necessary and jointly sufficient elements of a tort suit.
This last claim is a bit too strong. It might be argued that
“harm” for purposes of the standard tort paradigm is a welfare
setback
understood
in
deontological
rather
than
consequentialist terms. On the consequentialist construal, P is
harmed by D’s action (relative to an alternative choice) just in
case the outcome resulting from that action is worse for P’s
welfare than the outcome that would have resulted from the
alternative choice. If P can be harmed deontologically without
being harmed consequentially, and if deontological harming
suffices for tortious harming, then the arguments of this Article
439. See Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 429, at 504 (distinguishing
claim for lost chance from claim for mental distress); Love, supra note 432, at
809-10 (distinguishing claim for increased risk from claim for fear of future
disease).
440. But see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 103-10 (2001) (arguing against liability for risk imposition).
441. See Schroeder, supra note 423, at 460-77 (arguing that corrective
justice permits liability for expected harm). Indeed, Schroeder’s position
seems to be that corrective justice permits liability, in the amount of expected
harm, for actions that do not cause harm and are not wrongful in any sense
beyond their creating a risk of harm.
442. See Perry, supra note 25, at 338 (stating that he is “generally
prepared to accept [the] claim” that “tort liability should only be imposed in
order to compensate for damage caused”).
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would not preclude assimilating risk imposition to the standard
tort paradigm. Still, the proponent of that approach to
justifying tort liability for risk imposition has much
philosophical work to do—the philosophical work of showing
that the propositions contained in the two “if” clauses in the
previous sentence are indeed true.
This Article has implications for the criminal status of risk
imposition similar to those for tort law. Liability for risk
imposition is less exceptional as a matter of current criminal
law doctrine than it is as a matter of current tort doctrine. The
Model Penal Code includes reckless endangerment as a
criminal offense: “A person commits a misdemeanor if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”443
Many jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code on this score;444
many, too, criminalize types of risk imposition more specifically
Finally, inchoate
defined, for example drunk driving.445
crimes—attempts, conspiracies, and solicitations—might be
seen as actions that risk choate crimes.446 By attempting to
commit homicide, I have imposed a risk of death upon the
attempted victim. Liability for inchoate crimes is a centerpiece
of the Model Penal Code and of enacted criminal codes.447
John Stuart Mill famously advanced what might be termed
the “Harm Principle”: Only those actions which cause harm to
persons other than the actor ought to be criminally proscribed
and punished.448 Joel Feinberg, one of the preeminent criminal
law scholars of our time, and other contemporary theorists
have adopted Mill’s view or variants of this view.449 If the
443. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2, reprinted in 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW app. A (1986).
444. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW 312-13 (1986).
445. See Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive
Legislation, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 604-05 (1998) (conceptualizing
reckless driving as a “simple inchoate offense,” which targets a risk of harm
and is “simple” because it is not defined with reference to an object offense).
446. Cf. id. at 602-03.
447. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 444, at 1-179.
448. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN
STUART MILL: ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS 187, 197 (Marshall Cohen
ed., 1961) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.”); see also 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 10-16 (1984) (discussing Mill’s view).
449. See FEINBERG, supra note 369, at ix-xx. Feinberg does endorse an
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Harm Principle is true, and if the kind of harm required by the
principle is a welfare setback understood consequentially—that
the “harmed” person be worse off than he would have been
absent the harmful action—my Article has important
implications regarding the criminality of risk imposition.
Prohibitions on reckless endangerment, on drunk driving, on
inchoate crimes, and on all other actions of risk imposition are
inconsistent with the Harm Principle thus construed.450
Lawrence Crocker, attentive to the deep tension between
the Harm Principle and the criminality of risk imposition,451
has distinguished between “harmful” attempts, which involve
an “objective risk” of harm (on Crocker’s characterization, a
kind of frequentist risk452), and “harmless” attempts, which
involve no such risk.453 Crocker claims that the Harm Principle
permits the proscription of “harmful” attempts and other
actions which may not cause physical harm but impose a
frequentist risk of harm on some victims.454 My Article
undercuts Crocker’s claim. Whether risk is seen in frequentist
terms, or alternatively in Bayesian terms that do not refer to
the actual beliefs of the victim, suffering a risk is not (without
more) a welfare-reducing feature of someone’s life history.
Anyone who takes the Harm Principle seriously must
contemplate major changes in the structure of existing criminal
law.
To be sure, Mill might have been wrong. Law and
economics scholars deny that particular actions need be
harmful or otherwise blameworthy to trigger criminal
punishment. Desert theorists will insist on blameworthiness,
Offense Principle, but “[a]rguably . . . all the types of offensive conduct that
liberals would wish to criminalize also involve harm.” A.P. Simester & A. Von
Hirsch, Some Questions about the Offense Principle 1 (unpublished paper, on
file with author).
450. Making the causation of fear or other such emotional harm an element
of these prohibitions—as in one variant of the crime of assault—would
eliminate the inconsistency. See generally 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 444,
at 315-17 (discussing the crime of assault).
451. See Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing
Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1057-63 (1992). More precisely,
Crocker argues that an “imposition” principle limits the proper scope of the
criminal law: “[F]ree people should not become criminally liable unless they
trespass upon someone else’s moral space, that is, unless they impose in some
way.” Id. at 1060.
452. See id. at 1099-1102.
453. Id. at 1096-1109.
454. Id.
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but need not construe that to entail harm.455 Our old friend,
harmless wrongdoing, surfaces here. Some desert theorists will
argue that harmless wrongdoing is blameworthy and properly
punished, at least if the actor had a culpable mental state.456
Other desert theorists, for example Larry Alexander, argue
that culpability absent harm or wrongdoing is sufficient for
criminal liability.457
It would be foolhardy for me to enter these debates, here,
just as it would be overreaching to take a stand on the goals
and preconditions of tort liability. My Article does not resolve
the criminal or tort law status of risk imposition. Rather, it
makes an important contribution to the debate about that
status, by showing that one important argument in favor of
liability—the argument that risking is itself a kind of
consequential harming—must be abandoned.
CONCLUSION
This Article has rigorously analyzed the harmfulness—the
welfare impact—of death and the risk of death. The analysis
was lengthy and complex because welfare plausibly involves
various elements—what I termed Experience, Preference,
Value, and Integration—and because the nature of risk is also
quite contested. My conclusion was that death is harmful, that
Bayesian risk is harmful (at least the actual, first-person
variant of Bayesian risk, and at least where linked with
appropriate affective states), but that frequentist risk is not. In
the final part of the Article, I surveyed the large implications of
my analysis for risk regulation. How the CPSC, EPA, FDA,
NHTSA, OSHA, and other risk-regulatory agencies should
engage in cost-benefit analysis or risk-risk analysis, how they
should specify health and safety “thresholds,” how they should
take account of distributive considerations, and how these
agencies should set priorities all depend on whether death,
Bayesian risk, and frequentist risk are harmful. Tort and
criminal law doctrines, too, are implicated by the claims
advanced here.
455. See Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 157, 209 (1994).
456. Id. at 208-15.
457. See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 1-2 (1994) (stating that culpable action, not harm production, is
central to criminal law); id. at 21-22 (distinguishing between culpable action
and wrongdoing in Hurd’s sense).
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Much more remains to be said about regulatory
implications, to be sure. How, exactly, does one calculate the
appropriate monetary valuation of death, “Vdeath,” one that
follows from a welfarist rather than Kaldor-Hicks construal of
cost-benefit analysis and from the premise that frequentist risk
and hypothetical Bayesian risk are not welfare setbacks? How
should the predicted number of deaths be integrated with cost
considerations, if at all, in setting safety thresholds, or
performing comparative risk assessment? How does one
calculate a monetary value for fear states, for other epistemicaffective hybrids, and for naked belief states if beliefs alone can
be harmful? Nor have I discussed the status of risk and harm
with respect to moral considerations other than welfare. When
is the causation of death not just harmful but wrongful to the
victim? Can the imposition of a frequentist risk be a harmless
wrong, if not a harmful one? My Article has explored part of
the normative underpinnings of risk regulation—the welfarist
part—but I have nowhere claimed that risk regulation is
merely a matter of overall or well-distributed welfare. These
vital questions, both foundational and practical, must await
another day.
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